REFUGEE ACT REAUTHORIZATION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON
THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H.R. 5879

AN ACT TO AMEND CHAPTER 2 OF TITLE IV OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT TO EXTEND FOR 1 YEAR THE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATION FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

SEPTEMBER 13, 1982

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REFUGEE ACT REAUTHORIZATION

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1982

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:13 p.m., in room 2228, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Alan K. Simpson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Staff present: Richard W. Day, chief counsel; Donna Alvarado, counsel; Arnold Leibowitz, special counsel; and Valentine Jones, research assistant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ALAN K. SIMPSON, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Senator SIMPSON. I do very much apologize for being late. I was visiting with my colleague in the House, Ron Mazzoli, as he goes into his activity tomorrow with regard to the Immigration Reform and Control Act, and we were just doing some last minute plotting, frankly.

Anyway, it is good to see so many of you here who have assisted us so much in previous efforts. During today's hearing, we will discuss the U.S. domestic refugee resettlement program. The statute that authorizes that program is the Refugee Act of 1980, and specifically title IV of that act. The funding for title IV programs expires on September 30, 1982, and must be reauthorized by Congress in order for the domestic refugee assistance program to properly continue.

Of course, the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, chaired by my good friend, the very able Chairman Ron Mazzoli, held extensive hearings on the refugee assistance programs and an amended form of the administration's original reauthorization bill did pass the House on June 22, 1982. That bill, H.R. 5879, will soon be considered by this subcommittee.

[The text of H.R. 5879 follows:]

97TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R. 5879

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNE 24 (legislative day, JUNE 8), 1982

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

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AN ACT

To amend chapter 2 of title IV of the Immigration and Nationality Act to extend for one year the authorization of appropriations for refugee assistance, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

SHORT TITLE

SECTION 1. This Act may be cited as the "Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982".

EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS

SEC. 2. Subsection (a) of section 414 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1524) is amended to read as follows:

"(a)(1) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1983 such sums as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions (other than those described in paragraphs (2) and (3)) of this chapter.

"(2) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1983 $100,000,000 for the purpose of providing services with respect to refugees under section 412(c).

"(3) There are hereby authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 1983 $14,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out section 412(b)(5).".

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT RESPECTING REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

SEC. 3. (a) Section 412(a)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C 1522(a)(1)) is amended—

(1) by redesignating clauses (A) through (D) as clauses (i) through (iv), respectively,

(2) by inserting "(A)" after "(1)", and

(3) by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:

"(B) It is the intent of Congress that in providing refugee assistance under this section—

"(i) employable refugees should be placed on jobs as soon as possible after their arrival in the United States;

"(ii) social service funds should be focused on employment-related services, English-as-a-second-language training (in non-work hours where possible), and case-management services; and

"(iii) local voluntary agency activities should be conducted in close cooperation and advance consultation with State and local governments.".

(b) Section 413 of such Act (8 U.S.C. 1523) is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:

"(c)(1) The Director shall study the feasibility and advisability of providing—

"(A) for interim support (to refugees who are not employment-ready upon arrival in the United States) for a period determined on a case-by-case basis through a mechanism (other than public assistance) that recognizes the primary role of case management through voluntary agencies at the local level, and

"(B) a mechanism (other than one associated with the provision of cash assistance) through which refugees, requiring medical (but not cash) assistance, are provided medical assistance, and shall report to Congress on the study not later than January 1, 1983.

"(2) The Director shall study and report to the Congress, not later than September 30, 1983, on the feasibility and advisability of providing for the establishment of special refugee centers in various locations at which refugees would receive orientation, training, and education in English and in the legal governmental, monetary and economic systems, history, culture, and geography of the United States before resettlement in the United States.".

PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION

SEC. 4. (a) Paragraph (2) of section 412(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1522(a)) is amended—

(1) by inserting "(A)" after "(2)", and

(2) by adding at the end the following new subparagraphs:

"(B) The Director shall develop and implement, in consultation with representatives of voluntary agencies and State and local governments, policies and strategies for the placement and resettlement of refugees within the United States.

"(C) Such policies and strategies, to the extent practicable and except under such unusual circumstances as the Director may recognize, shall—

"(i) insure that a refugee is not initially placed or resettled in an area highly impacted (as determined under regulations prescribed by the Director after consultation with such agencies and governments) by the presence of refugees or comparable populations unless the refugee has a spouse, parent, sibling, son, or daughter residing in that area, and

"(ii) provide for a mechanism whereby representatives of local affiliates of voluntary agencies regularly (not less often than quarterly) meet with representatives of State and local governments to plan and coordinate in advance of their arrival the appropriate placement of refugees among the various States and localities.".

(b) Paragraph (3) of such section is amended by inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: "The Director shall compile and maintain data on secondary migration of refugees within the United States and, by State of residence and nationality, on the proportion of refugees receiving cash or medical assistance described in subsection (e).".

INITIAL RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

SEC. 5. Section 412(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1522(b)) is amended—

(1) by striking out the last sentence of paragraph (1)(A);

(2) by adding at the end of paragraph (1)(A) the following new sentences: "Funds provided to agencies under such grants and contracts may only be obligated or expended during the fiscal year in which they are provided (or the subsequent fiscal year or such subsequent fiscal period as the Federal contracting agency may approve) to carry out the purposes of this subsection. Such grants and contracts shall provide that the agency shall provide (directly or through its local affiliate) notice to the appropriate county or other local welfare office at the time that the agency becomes aware that a refugee is offered employment and provide notice to the refugee that such notice has been provided. Such grants and contracts shall also provide that the agency shall assure that refugees, known to the agency as having been identified pursuant to paragraph (4)(B) as having medical conditions affecting the public health and requiring treatment, report to the appropriate county or other health agency upon their resettlement in an area.";

(3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

"(5) The Director is authorized to make grants to, and enter into contracts with, State and local health agencies for payments to meet their costs of providing medical screening and initial medical treatment to refugees."; and

(4) by adding after such paragraph the following new paragraph:

"(6) The Comptroller General shall conduct an annual audit of funds expended under grants and contracts made under this subsection.".

CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE

SEC. 6. (a) Paragraph (1) of section 412(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1522(e)) is amended by striking out "up to" before "100 per centum".

(b) Paragraph (2) of such section is amended—

(1) by striking out the semicolon at the end of subparagraph (B) and all that follows through the end of such paragraph and inserting in lieu thereof a period;

(2) by striking out "and" at the end of subparagraph (A);

(3) by redesignating subparagraphs (A) and (B) as clauses (i) and (iii), respectively, by inserting "(A)" after "(2)", and by inserting after clause (i) (as so redesignated) the following new clause:

“(ii) on the refugee’s participation in any available and appropriate social service program (funded under subsection (c)) providing job or language training in the area in which the refugee resides; and”; and

(4) by adding at the end the following:

“Such cash assistance provided to such a refugee shall be terminated (after opportunity for an administrative hearing) with the month in which the refugee refuses such an appropriate offer of employment or refuses to participate in such an available and appropriate social service program.

“(B) Cash assistance shall not be made available to refugees who are full-time students in institutions of higher education (as defined by the Director after consultation with the Secretary of Education).”.

(c) Such section is further amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:

“(6) As a condition for receiving assistance, reimbursement, or a contract under this subsection and notwithstanding any other provision of law, a State or agency must provide assurances that whenever a refugee applies for cash or medical assistance for which assistance or reimbursement is provided under this subsection, the State or agency must notify promptly the agency (or local affiliate) which provided for the initial resettlement of the refugee under subsection (b) of the fact that the refugee has so applied.”.

STUDY OF NEED FOR REFUGEE IMPACT AID PROGRAM

SEC. 7. Section 413 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1522), as amended by section 3(b) of this Act, is further amended by adding after subsection (c) the following new subsection:

"(d) The Director shall study, and report to Congress not later than January 1, 1983, on the feasibility and advisability of establishing a program providing payments to States, counties, cities, and other units of local government to reflect a net increase in outlays on educational, health, criminal justice, and other governmental services resulting directly from the initial resettlement of refugees in, or secondary migration of refugees to, that State, county, city, or other unit. Such study shall include an examination of the extent to which the programs and assistance described in section 412 (particularly under subsection (c) thereof) provide for such payments to impacted areas and the extent to which increased outlays in these impacted areas are offset by the provision of additional Federal funds under other programs or authority or by increased taxes, revenues, or other economic activity resulting from refugee resettlement in, or migration, to these areas.".

EFFECTIVE DATE

SEC. 8. The amendments made by—

(1) sections 3(b), 4, 5(3), 5(4), 6(a), and 7 take effect on October 1, 1982, and

(2) sections 5(2), 6(b), and 6(c) apply to grants and contracts made, and assistance furnished, on or after October 1, 1982.

Passed the House of Representatives June 22, 1982.

Attest: EDMUND L. HENSHAW, JR.,
Clerk.

By THOMAS E. LADD,
Assistant to the Clerk.

Senator SIMPSON. Before the markup occurs, we wish to have an opportunity for expert testimony from Federal officials, and representatives of voluntary agencies, State and local governments and the private sector. We have asked these witnesses to assess and inform us as to how well the domestic refugee program is working in terms of the Refugee Act; that is, in assisting refugees to become economically and socially self-sufficient in as short a time period as is possible. That is the objective; that is at least the intention of Congress.

In making that assessment, we are going to ask all of the witnesses, in their areas of expertise, to address such issues as the trends in refugee dependency rates, placement policies, the sponsorship process, the accountability of the agencies receiving the Federal funds to resettle the refugees of the world, programs for refugee health and English language, cooperation among the various sectors involved with resettlement, and the adequacy of refugee social services.

So, that is an interesting afternoon's agenda. There is much here for our attention and I am looking forward to it.

So, in the first panel we have Ambassador Gene Douglas, U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs; Phil Hawkes, Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, Department of Health and Human Resources; Al Nelson, the Commissioner of the INS, Department of Justice; and Richard Vine, Director of the Bureau for Refugee Programs of the Department of State.

I believe you have been advised of the time limitations on opening statements, and if you will proceed in the order listed, beginning with Ambassador Douglas.

STATEMENT OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF: H. EUGENE DOUGLAS, U.S. COORDINATOR FOR REFUGEE AFFAIRS; PHILLIP N. HAWKES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES; ALAN C. NELSON, COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; AND RICHARD D. VINE, DIRECTOR FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

Ambassador DOUGLAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here to discuss the reauthorization of title IV of the Immigration and Naturalization Act and our Refugee Act of 1980. I have prepared a short statement which has been submitted to the committee, and would ask that it be included in the record and thereby permit me to make a few additional comments in the time that I have.

In the 6 short months since I officially came into the Office of the U.S. Coordinator, I have learned that the word "frustration" can be written with an even larger sized script than I had known before. It is not, however, a frustration that leads into a despondency. It is a frustration that the task that we have before us to provide for an open, humane, flexible national refugee policy that retains the basic American voluntary, private character can be responsive to the pressing, vast, new needs of the international refugee situation as we have come to know it in the last 5 years.

I think, in a way, much of the difficulty that we have, as I have said often in our conversations, stems from the protracted nature of the high levels of flows out of several regions of the world that are extending far longer than we had anticipated when, as a country, we embarked on the resettlement of Southeast Asians, boat people and Cambodians in 1979 and 1980.

I think that flow has persisted. It is one of the major elements that this administration has to look at, and one of the major concerns that the Congress has. Certainly, the State Department, under Ambassador Vine, is devoting considerable attention to this particular aspect.

Another point, I think, has been the far greater than anticipated dependency rate among the Southeast Asian refugees—far greater than we had expected when we passed the act—and has been one of the more intractable things that we are grappling with. Then you add to these considerations the heightened public perception of the domestic costs and societal effects of legal and illegal immigration that you and Chairman Mazzoli on the House side have so ably been addressing in your new legislation.

If I were to pick three or four subjects that frame the daily work routine in my office, I think I would frame them as a philosophical issue, an international issue and a domestic issue; philosophical, in that we have found, as we have tried to come to grips with persistent high flows and with the domestic cost, both societal and financial, that there is not a uniform view on what the American refugee program is supposed to do.

I think that the burden that the administration carries and that the Congress carries must be shared by the voluntary organizations and the American citizenry as a whole in the philosophical and ethical context that we are, in effect, administering a program of a certain kind of inequality; not purposeful inequality, but one that rests on the fact that we cannot assist all and we cannot resettle all who would wish to come to this country.

It is a difficult issue to decide who will come and who will not, and we are trying to make clear and to make plain what the philosophical and the ethical bases and the principal bases and the legal bases are upon which we are conducting our programs. And I think you will hear us speak more of this as we go through the year.

The international aspect is to reconfirm strongly to our friends, allies, countries of first asylum and the international organizations that this country's priorities are for assistance in place, for repatriation, and only as a last resort for resettlement. Somehow, resettlement had come, in the past 5 years, to play much too large a role as a solution for the often intractable and difficult problems of refugees around the world.

Domestic: Well, I said in the beginning that we are determined to make the essential voluntary character of the American refugee program work, to find a way to make it hold through the eighties, and that is the principle, I think, upon which I entered into this office, and that is to balance the international pressures and the international needs with the domestic capabilities and the resources that we have in any given period of time.

We want to reconfirm that we believe that refugees can be intergrated socially into the communities and rapidly integrated into the work force, and that is the biggest sticking point, I think, that we have to face in 1983.

My colleagues and I believe that 1983 is very much a turning point in the national refugee programs, perhaps as you believe that it is in the national immigration program; that either the administration, with its small staff here in Washington, together with the States and the voluntary organizations around the country, will be able to make clear that we know how to make this program work, or else the Congress will respond to public pressures and provide for tighter strictures on the levels of admissions.

There are these philosophical, international, and domestic points of view, I think, that have illuminated our daily work. One last point on the Congress and the relationship of my office to the States and to the Congress: As I said in the consultation hearing, I feel that the Coordinator was a very special creation of the Congress. And we have tried, in our 6 short months, to be more open, more frank and more available to the committees and to the staffs.

We feel that that has had a very good effect. We feel that, together, all of us have worked out a far more efficient and more trusting relationship in the ongoing consultation process. We believe that the consultation mechanism of the act works and is adequate to address the needs of the electorate, the concerns of the Congress, and the international pressures.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Ambassador. I appreciate that.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Douglas follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF H. EUGENE DOUGLAS

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the reauthorization of Title IV of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980 and to discuss other related issues.

First of all, let me explain the Administration's formal position on the reauthorization bill in its present draft.

We believe that the work done by your counterparts on the House side has been most valuable, but there are some modifications which we believe would improve the bill.

We would prefer to see a three year authorization period for the Refugee Act. We believe this provides the necessary stability needed to manage the program. Without it, we are hampered in making long range plans. Additionally, we are requesting that there be a specific authorization for Fiscal Year 1983 in the amount of $514,809,000.

And we believe that there should not be separate authorizations for social and medical services to refugees. We would also like to see Section 6 (a) (1) deleted since we believe it would excessively restrict necessary Administration flexibility in the management of the program.

Generally, however, we believe that the bill before you is sound, and with the changes we have outlined we would be pleased to support it.

I would like to turn briefly to some of the initiatives we are taking in managing the refugee program which I believe will help to alleviate some of the concerns I know are present in the Congress regarding this program.

I have said many times before this body and the House of Representatives, that the single most important aspect of my job is to ensure that domestic considerations are given equal weight to foreign policy when deciding refugee admissions to this country.

The United States has a tremendous humanitarian record over the past seven years in bringing almost three quarters of a million Indochinese refugees to resettlement in this country. And again, in 1980 we took another great influx of Cuban-Haitian entrants.

I think it is clear to all of us, however, that the United States is not capable of repeating refugee resettlement on that scale -- whether for Southeast Asians, or others -- in the near future.

We should, instead, turn the focus of our efforts from sheer numbers to improving the health and preparatory skills of those refugees we will continue to take, and improving the resettlement success of those here already.

We are already pursuing several initiatives to help us meet those goals.

I have recently returned from a trip to Japan, where in the area of health care, the Japanese government officials have given their pledge to donate greatly increased resources to a new program to improve health and vocational training programs for refugees in the processing center in the Philippines.

They have agreed to design, equip, and staff new clinical facilities in the Bataan Refugee Processing Center for general medical and dental care for refugees. These facilities will, in tandem with HHS' new effort to tighten up tuberculosis screening procedures in the camps, substantially improve the general physical health of refugees. They will also help repair some of the severe dental conditions found among refugees which is so much more costly to fix here in the United States.

In the area of vocational education, the Japanese have also agreed to provide equipment and personnel for a training program in the Refugee Processing Center in Bataan. We will work out the program requirements of this training with the states, so that we can better prepare refugees for work that is actually available in the areas they intend to resettle in.

In the area of language skills, which we think is the key to successful resettlement in the United States, we will be making a number of changes to improve and expand the program.

We will be concentrating more of our attention on English as a Second Language and Cultural Orientation (ESL/CO) programs given to refugees overseas.

We will expand the ESL/CO program in the camps from 14 to 24 weeks. We are developing a uniform curriculum for all the refugee processing centers in Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia. One of our major projects for 1983 will be to link up the English language and cultural orientation programs given in the camps with those in the states. We want Stateside instruction to pick up where the other left off, instead of some refugees having to start all over again once they arrive here or, more often, being placed in classes without regard to the work they have completed in Southeast Asia.

We will be developing a new program to emphasize vocational English as a second language. And for cultural orientation, we will try to give meaning and impact to this program by bringing back to the camps refugees already resettled in the States, so they can share their first hand experiences with refugees in the camps.

We are concentrating on these areas, because we believe that intensive pre-education in the camps is the most efficient, as well as the most cost effective way, to prepare refugees for resettlement.

My staff and I continue to think that consultation with states and local governments is one of the most important parts of our job. For this reason, as I have said before, we continue to visit all those areas of the country where refugees are most concentrated in order to hear the problems that local officials have. It is partially in response to their needs, that we have taken the initiatives I have just described.

In addition, Dr. Hawkes and some of my staff recently visited Canada to get a first hand description of their refugee program, and how they handle one of the largest concerns we have -- continued welfare dependency among refugees. One of the most striking things about the Canadian approach is the success they have had in presenting their cash and medical assistance program as a temporary one, and in making it very clear that early employment and self-support is the rule, not the exception. We do not believe that economic problems here at home are the chief cause of high welfare dependency rates among refugees in the United States, and hope that the Canadian experience can help us design better programs to improve our performance in this area.

In closing I would like to say something about the refugee consultation process itself as mandated under this Act. I believe the consultation process is working, and that it has become an increasingly effective vehicle for the Judiciary Committee to exercise meaningful oversight of the U.S. refugee program. In addition, the Executive use of the parole authority has been overtaken by the amendments to the immigration law contained in this Act. And the Congress has set forth comprehensive guidelines which have resulted in a much improved refugee admissions program. I know that there have been many problems in the past, and that there is some sentiment within the Congress to place further controls on refugee admissions through other mechanisms. I do not believe, in light of the above, that we need additional ways to control the refugee admissions numbers other than the mechanism of the continuing consultation process. The lessons we have learned from our collective experience with the program of the past two years, together with our joint commitment to bring refugee admissions into line with domestic resources, will ensure the success of the current process.

Let me add, that I feel an exceptionally close relationship with the Congress and the states, and I mean to make it a productive one through frequent and honest talk.

Mr. Chairman, in light of the forthcoming consultation meeting on refugee admissions and related issues, I will end my testimony with these brief remarks, and am happy to answer your questions.

Senator SIMPSON. Phil Hawkes, please.

STATEMENT OF PHILLIP N. HAWKES

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted a short testimony paper and I would like to just summarize a few of those points, if I may.

Senator SIMPSON. You may.

Mr. HAWKES. The 1980 Refugee Act was the first comprehensive Federal statute for refugee admissions and resettlement. It was preceded by the Cuban refugee program in 1961, the Indochinese refugee assistance program in 1975, and the matching grant program for Soviet Jews in 1979.

We believe that there may be some room for changing the Refugee Act of 1980, but that basically a lot of good has been accomplished under it, and that it should be reauthorized with only minimal change.

The Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) works closely with the Coordinator's Office, the Department of State, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and has consulted regularly with both Houses of Congress, in hearings and in meetings with staff and ongoing discussions.

Since 1980, we have resettled something in excess of 300,000 refugees. We have disbursed over $1.7 billion in areas of preventive health, social services such as English as a second language (ESL) and employment training, educational assistance to children, matching grants, a phase-down of the Cuban refugee program, and, of course, the cash and medical assistance program.

The character of the refugee program has changed somewhat since 1975, when large numbers of Indochinese began to come to the United States. The refugees who arrived in the United States from 1975 to 1978 were, by and large, educated and sophisticated with respect to technological life. The refugees who have arrived since 1979 have been, in some ways, different. They are more likely to have lower levels of education, and to be illiterate or even preliterate. This has posed a different set of problems in refugee resettlement, and it has taken some time to react to these.

There are currently a number of refugees residing in the United States who came in with little or no English or job skills. They arrived here before educational programs were developed by the Department of State in the refugee camps.

New refugees are arriving in the United States with ESL training, but we have a group already here—1979-80 and early 1981 arrivals—who had little or no in-camp training.

The Refugee Act of 1980, which stated that special refugee assistance would be available for 3 years at full Federal reimbursement, created, in the minds of many people, a welfare mentality. Refugees came to this country expecting 3 years of full support at Federal Government expense in order to learn English and to learn vocational skills before they had to go out and actually look for a job. I might add that that was a mentality not limited only to refugees. Many sponsors—U.S. citizens who sponsored refugees—also had that same belief; that they had 3 years to bring those refugees up to a position where they could compete for work on their own.

In addition, the years that many of these people spent in the camps before coming to the United States, when they were wholly dependent on somebody else for assistance, sapped some of their drive to be self-sufficient.

The distribution of refugees within the United States has been poor—some 10 States and 40 counties were heavily impacted by refugees so that available services were swamped and, even though jobs were available, there were many more refugees looking for work than there were available.

Finally, there was a 60-day waiver in the program that allowed a refugee not to look for work for at least 60 days after arriving in the United States. We are requesting that, in the reauthorization of the act, the 60-day waiver be removed.

During the last year, there have been several initiatives on the part of ORR, in concert with the Department of State and the Coordinator's Office, to deal with some of these problems.

We have implemented a placement policy that emphasizes placement of refugees in nonimpacted areas of the United States. We are searching for favorable sites—areas in the United States where a variety of jobs that refugees can hold is available and where there is sufficient housing—and we are working with local elected officials from Governor's to mayors and county commissioners to effect refugee resettlement in those areas.

We are doing a national ESL study, looking at some 200 different approaches to ESL currently being funded and trying to coordinate those programs with ESL currently being taught in the refugee camps. We are doing a study of self-sufficiency to find out what particular aspects of social services contribute most greatly to refugee self-sufficiency.

Finally, we have reduced the 36-month entitlement—for refugees who are not categorically eligible—for special refugee cash and medical assistance from 36 to 18 months. The Federal Government still pays costs for refugee assistance for the full 36 months, but, during the second 18 months of residence, refugees have to qualify for assistance on the same basis as citizens.

In the reauthorization of the act then, we would like the 60-day waiver of looking for employment to be repealed. We would like to change the procedure for notification of State health officials of refugee arrivals in the individual States. Currently, State health officials must be notified of the resettlement of all refugees. We would like to change that to notify all State health officials of refugees who have medical conditions of public health concern which require treatment, and we would continue notifying health officials of all Indochinese refugee arrivals.

We would like to repeal the annual report to the Congress from the Secretary of Health and Human Services. We believe the report duplicates the consultation document and also that, since we have such regular hearings, consultations, and conversations, the report is usually obsolete by the time it arrives here.

Finally, we would like to request a 3-year reauthorization of the act. We believe this reassures the States that this program is ongoing and that it will not be abandoned in midstream. We would also like to have reauthorized the reimbursement of States for up to 100 percent of cash and medical assistance costs believing as we do that it is not cash and medical assistance but rather social services and self-sufficiency programs which are most important. We also believe that the incentive of the up to reimbursement to control costs is an important part of the law. Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Hawkes.

[The prepared statement of Phillip N. Hawkes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PHILLIP N. HAWKES

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you to discuss the reauthorization of Title IV of the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended by the Refugee Act of 1980.

Although immigration has been a tradition in this country since its inception, Federal refugee programs are relatively new. It was not until the years immediately following World War II that the Federal government admitted thousands of refugees and displaced persons outside established immigration quotas. At the time, voluntary and Federal refugee programs were developed in response to particular political crises. In the mid-1950s, Hungarian Freedom Fighters were admitted to the U.S. under a special program. In 1961, the Cuban Refugee Program was established to assist Cubans fleeing the Castro regime. Under the Cuban Program, federally-funded public assistance, health care and training were provided for the first time for refugees. A similar federally-funded program, the Indochinese Refugee Assistance Program, was established in 1975 for refugees fleeing Southeast Asia. Finally, in the late 1970s, the Federal government established a special matching grant program primarily for Jewish refugees fleeing persecution in the Soviet Union. This program now covers other non-Indochinese refugee groups.

The Refugee Act of 1980 (Public Law 96-212) was the first comprehensive Federal statute for the admission and resettlement of refugees. Passage of this Act demonstrated the United States' ongoing commitment to refugee admissions and to resettlement in this country, by providing for both the regular and emergency admission of refugees and by providing a single authorization for Federal refugee resettlement assistance.

The Refugee Act created a unified and equitable program with a central mission and established the means to provide for its effective management. We believe the Act should be reauthorized without substantial change. Certain amendments are proposed, however, to improve administration and management of the program. I will discuss these in more detail later.

The Act promotes refugee resettlement in two ways. First, the Act sets as a goal the encouragement of self-sufficiency among refugees. To accomplish this goal, the Act provides for assistance to refugees during the critical early period of the resettlement process. Refugees arrive in the U.S. often after a traumatic break with their native country, with few resources, with continuing English language training needs and few relevant job skills. However, they also usually arrive with a great deal of enthusiasm and high motivation to succeed in this country. Historically, refugees have shown that they can and do become independent and productive members of our society. Thus the cash and medical assistance, social services, and other forms of assistance provided under the Refugee Act serve as transitional assistance to enable refugees to meet their immediate needs for food, clothing and shelter, and then to learn English, obtain jobs, and adjust to life in the U.S.

To minimize long-term dependence on public assistance, the Act establishes a time limit on special cash and medical assistance to refugees. Time limits on this type of assistance are important if refugees are to be encouraged to become self-sufficient. Such time limits also encourage States and resettlement agencies to provide services and training to enable refugees to become independent as quickly as possible.

Secondly, the Refugee Act promotes the effective management and coordination of both the international and domestic aspects of the national refugee assistance program. Several provisions of the Act manifest this intent. The Act established the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to take responsibility for the general interagency coordination of the policy and budgetary aspects of the Federal refugee program. We work closely with Ambassador Douglas and his staff on the domestic aspects of refugee resettlement.

The Act, in broad language, provides for the grants which voluntary agencies receive to assist refugees in their first days in this country. The Department of State administers this program, and we are currently working with them on such cross-cutting matters as case management and placement policy.

The Act also established the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), to administer domestic resettlement activities. Moreover, the Act provided ORR with the tools to administer effectively the domestic program, with emphasis on the State-administered programs, Refugee Coordinators appointed by the States, and State Plans.

Finally, the Act provides for close consultations between the Executive and Legislative branches of the government on the two most fundamental issues of the refugee program: the total number of refugees to be admitted to the U.S. each year and the allocation of these refugees by geographic region. Both the admissions level and allocation of refugees are determined by the President in consultation with the Congress. This statutory provision for consultations ensures that the Congress is actively involved in decisions regarding U.S. foreign policy concerns, refugee flows, and the impact of these on the domestic resettlement program.

We have now worked under the Refugee Act for more than two years and can feel proud of our accomplishments. Of utmost importance is the humane and just refugee program the U.S. has developed. We have admitted 330,000 refugees since March 1980 from Southeast Asia, the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, the Near East, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, about $1.7 billion has been authorized for HHS-funded refugee assistance activities from FY 1980 through FY 1982, primarily for the

State-administered programs of cash and medical assistance and social services, but also for preventive health care, education assistance to children, the phasedown of the Cuban refugee program, the voluntary agency matching grant program, and related Federal administration costs.

Moreover, during these last two years, we have seen some positive results of the refugee resettlement process as it pertains to the Southeast Asian refugees who arrived from 1975 to 1977. These refugees have succeeded in becoming self-sufficient on a timely basis and are contributing significantly to the U.S. economy.

More recent refugee arrivals have fewer skills in English and in employment relevant to the current U.S. market than did the earlier arrivals. However, they have demonstrated a high level of demand for English language training in recognition of their need to have these skills to successfully enter and remain in the U.S. job market. The Department of State maintains extensive overseas training programs to provide U.S.-bound refugees with English language, cultural orientation, and prevocational training. To meet this demand further after refugees' arrival in the U.S., States entered into over 500 contracts with service providers in FY 1981 for the provision of social services; eighty-eight percent of these funds were used for the highest priority services, English language training and employment services, and for services which support participation in training such as transportation and day care. Even though over 85% of the refugees arriving in the U.S. in FY 1982 will have received pre-entry English training, some refugees will continue to need assistance in language acquisition. There is both a backlog of refugees who entered the U.S. prior to FY 1982 who did not have an opportunity to participate in overseas English language training, as well as recent arrivals who need further language training.

We have made progress in implementing the management procedures and carrying out the goal of self-sufficiency established by the Act. Let me discuss our activities in these areas.

In developing and carrying out the management procedures set out in the Act, our accomplishments occur in four major areas. First, the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, the Bureau for Refugee Programs in the State Department, and HHS work in close cooperation on refugee matters and through that process have enhanced the linkage between overseas and domestic refugee issues. Second, ORR has established the requisite staff to maintain a capable headquarters office in Washington, D.C., as well as strong field offices in each of the ten Federal regions. The regional offices facilitate coordination with States and localities affected by refugee resettlement. ORR is organizationally within the Social Security Administration (SSA) in order to draw upon SSA's experience in programs which assist needy individuals. As Director of ORR, I report directly to the Commissioner of SSA and have access to the top officials of the Department.

A third set of management accomplishments has been the implementation of the State-administered portion of our program. At present, 49 States (all except Alaska), the District of Columbia, and Guam participate in the refugee cash and medical assistance and social services programs. Each of these entities has selected a State Refugee Coordinator and submitted an initial State Plan for the program. As a part of ORR's attempt to manage the refugee program more effectively, new program standards, goals, and priorities have been issued this year which address the States' management of the refugee program, particularly as it relates to linking social service expenditures directly with the efforts to increase refugee prospects for self-sufficiency. Considerable energy has been spent this past year to tighten the management of the program to insure the most cost-effective use of the domestic assistance funds available.

Lastly, we have participated in three formal consultations with the Congress on refugee admissions. We participated, as part of an Administration team led by the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, in consultations in April 1980 in setting admissions levels for the rest of FY 1980, in September 1980 in setting FY 1981 admissions levels, and in September 1981 in setting FY 1982 admissions levels. We have welcomed these opportunities to work with your committee and your counterparts in the House on the various issues surrounding the refugee program in a comprehensive way.

Perhaps the most important activities that we have undertaken in the last two years have been those intended to fulfill our responsibility to enable refugees to become self-sufficient as soon as possible. We consider this responsibility to be of prime importance and take our activities in this area very seriously.

First, as mandated by the Act, we implemented the 36-month limitation on refugee assistance on April 1, 1981. In effecting this change, we worked closely with the States and other affected parties to inform them and to help them prepare for the changes. In monitoring States' activities following these changes, we found that most States complied in a timely manner, and those that did not came into compliance soon after.

Second, we have been encouraging States to target their refugee social service monies towards English language and job development and placement programs. We believe that these social service programs are the key to refugee self-sufficiency. Several studies undertaken by this Department and other groups familiar with refugee resettlement have shown that employment services and English language instruction are the catalytic factors in helping refugees to become economically independent. ORR has identified exemplary employment training practices for refugees. We have shared these with States to further improve their delivery of social services and will offer technical assistance to States and service providers using this information. Similar exercises will cover other key social service activities undertaken under the refugee program.

A third effort in the area of self-sufficiency is our work on refugee placement policy. ORR worked closely with both the State Department and the voluntary resettlement agencies this year to generate new placement criteria for refugees. These criteria were developed after extensive discussions with State, local, public interest, refugee and other interested groups, and are contained in the refugee placement policy adopted by the Department of State in July. One of the fundamental principles of this policy is that the "distribution and placement of refugees shall be done in a manner which will reduce further impact on certain communities and avoid creating new areas of high impact in the future." The policy is also aimed at strengthening the initial placements of refugees so that secondary migration is curtailed. This policy and the policy that the voluntary resettlement agencies themselves adopted late last year have altered the patterns of initial refugee resettlement. For example, California received 24% of newly arriving refugees in the first 8 months of FY 1982, as compared with 31% in FY 1981. Moreover, resettlement agencies which refuse to abide by the placement policy will be allocated fewer refugees to resettle. The Department of State intends to ensure that this policy continues to modify the initial resettlement patterns of refugees in this country.

One aspect of the placement policy calls upon ORR, in consultation with the voluntary agencies, the Department of State, and State and local officials, to identify alternative sites for refugee resettlement which are consistent with certain agreed-upon standards of acceptable conditions for resettlement, such as availability of jobs appropriate to the refugees' skills, and housing. These sites will be developed through a process involving close collaboration among the resettlement agencies and State and local public and private agencies involved in the resettlement process. The number and location of sites will be based upon the need for additional sites. Preliminary work has already be undertaken in two sites.

A fourth effort with respect to self-sufficiency was the adoption and implementation of new cash and medical assistance regulations in April 1982. As you know, these regulations shortened the period of eligibility for special refugee benefits to encourage refugees to become self-sufficient more quickly. We believe that an "entitlement mentality" developed among some refugees after passage of the Refugee Act, so that a number of newly arriving refugees did not expect to work during their first 36 months here. Our new policy affects only those needy refugees who are not eligible for Aid to Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, or Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and provides them with 18 months of special refugee cash and/or medical assistance and then reimburses States for providing refugees with State or local general assistance where available during their second 18 months in the country.

Implementation of this policy change has taken time. Twenty-two States and the District of Columbia did not implement the new regulations on April 1, 1982. Reasons for not implementing these regulations included court-ordered delays, lengthy State statutory notification requirements, and extensive administrative procedures to effect the policy change. All but three States had implemented the regulations by July 1. The Urgent Supplemental Appropriations bill, signed into law by the President in July, contained an amendment which provides an additional $20 million for refugee and entrant assistance to reimburse States which could not implement the new regulation for the above-cited reasons.

Finally, ORR has several evaluation studies underway to provide further information on self-sufficiency. One study will determine the degree to which refugees have become self-supporting and will assess the service strategies which affect self-sufficiency. A second study will ascertain the most effective approaches to English language training. A third effort is an on-going survey of refugee progress in resettlement in order to plan program activities. The information provided by these studies will be important for further program planning and policy development, and we will provide you with the findings of these studies as soon as possible.

We have requested reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980 for an additional three fiscal years. As I have indicated, we have implemented the provisions of the existing Act, and we are proud of the strides that we have made. We believe that the Refugee Act as it stands is a strong, humane, and important piece of legislation and should be maintained. We have proposed to you some amendments to the Act.

First, one amendment proposes to make applicable immediately the requirement that a refugee receiving cash assistance register for employment services. The 60-day delay provided under present law is not consistent with the requirement to accept employment immediately, nor does it comport with the broader purpose of the program to assist refugees to achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible.

Secondly, we propose that current law be amended to eliminate the requirement to notify State health officials routinely of the arrival of refugees. As amended, notice would only be given regarding those individuals who have medical conditions of public health concern requiring treatment. Notification of the arrival of all Indochinese refugees will continue.

Finally, our proposal would repeal the statutory requirement that the Secretary of Health and Human Services report annually to the House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary concerning the refugee program. Much of this data is duplicative of the annual report of the U.S.

Coordinator, to the Congress, "Proposed Refugee Admissions and Allocations." Elimination of this requirement would in no way preclude the Secretary from presenting information to the Congress upon its request and would reduce the associated paperwork burden imposed by the routine preparation of this report. In lieu of this annual report, we anticipate providing the Committee, upon their request, with detailed information on a regular basis.

These amendments reflect the few substantive and administrative improvements that we believe are needed at this time. We hope that you will favorably consider these amendments and the time extension that we have proposed for the Refugee Act.

The Administration would support H.R. 5879, the Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, passed by the House on June 22, 1982, if amended in the following way:

First, we propose that there be a three-year reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980 rather than the one year in H.R. 5879. A three-year reauthorization would provide greater assurance to States and localities of Federal intent to continue to provide Federal funding to offset the financial burdens on States and localities following initial placement of refugees. Such indication of a longer Federal commitment would help to assure the continued willingness of States and localities to accept refugees and participate in efforts to achieve their successful resettlement. Furthermore, a longer period of reauthorization would not interfere with the interest of the Congress in examining and acting on other aspects of the Refugee Act during fiscal year 1983.

Our second proposed amendment is that the amount to be authorized for FY 1983 correspond to the President's budget request of $514,809,000 for ORR, and the amounts for the following two years be "such sums as may be necessary." This change, which is consistent with Administration policy for all legislative proposals, will assure necessary budget control during the coming year and provide full flexibility thereafter. In the event that a supplemental appropriation is required, an amendment to the statute could be proposed. In addition, we do not believe that explicit authorizations are needed for either social services or medical screening, as contained in H.R. 5879, because funds for these activities are already included in the proposed $514 million authorization for FY 1983.

Finally, we propose deletion of the amendment to H.R. 5879 which authorizes the Secretary of HHS to reimburse States for 100 percent of their cash and medical assistance costs rather than the current "up to 100 percent" provision. We believe that States should be reimbursed to the extent of available appropriations. If the "up to" language were deleted, HHS could be in the position of having to reimburse either 100 percent of State costs or providing no reimbursement at all. Furthermore, deletion of the "up to" language would make cash and medical assistance the first priority in the use of refugee funds, while in fact, other programs, such as employment and English-language training, also contribute to the goal of reducing refugee dependence. By making cash and medical assistance the first priority, the amendment may limit HHS's capacity to provide these and other services or to respond to emergency situations. Finally, if the Federal government is required to reimburse States 100 percent of all costs for cash and medical assistance, then HHS would have no ability to respond to State decisions to fund refugee support at levels that HHS feels are out of line with funds available or benefits available in other States.

As a nation, we made a tremendous moral and humanitarian commitment in adopting the Refugee Act of 1980. In these past two years, we have made impressive progress in meeting that commitment. In the next few years, we must continue to build on our accomplishments and further strengthen the refugee program. This legislation represents a great tradition upon which this Nation is based — the tradition that persecuted peoples can find refuge here and start their lives anew.

Thank you for the opportunity to speak this afternoon. I am prepared to respond to your questions at this time.

Senator SIMPSON. Commissioner Nelson, I understand that you do not have a formal statement, but I do very much appreciate your being here. Your willingness to be accessible and available is, I think, one of the keystones of your effort in your new role of Commissioner. It is not so new anymore. It seems old, does it not?

Mr. NELSON. Yes, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. Anyway, thank you very much for being available to answer questions that might arise. I very much appreciate your taking that time to do that.

Mr. NELSON. I am pleased to be here, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. And now Director Vine, please.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. VINE

Mr. VINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You have prepared remarks which I have submitted for the record, and I beg your leave, please, to revise, summarize and extend those remarks briefly for you.

There have been a significant number of changes in both the numbers of refugees and, so to speak, the quality of refugees who are being inserted into the resettlement process in the United States over the past year.

First, with respect to numbers, there are substantially fewer. In this fiscal year, we shall bring in between 98,000 and 99,000 refugees, as against 158,000 last year—a substantial reduction. One reason for this is our emphasis on the point that Ambassador Douglas has already called to your attention; namely, that resettlement is increasingly becoming the exception rather than the rule. To the extent that we can cope with problems of persons who need assistance abroad in place or resettle them in the area if repatriation is not possible, we are trying to do that. And I think we have, by and large, the agreement of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to proceed on those lines.

Second, when refugees arrive in this country, they are coming in at a more measured pace now. We have tried to institute procedures that will allow refugees to be examined, to be processed, and to move into this country at a regular pace, to the extent this is possible in terms of meeting all of our other requirements. This last year, we have been relatively successful in doing that.

The upshot is that the arrivals in this country are much more easily accommodated by the voluntary agencies. You do not have the peaks and the valleys that you used to have, and because there is a degree of predictability, it makes it a lot easier to work out prior arrangements with HHS and with the State and local governments as to the areas in which these refugees will be ultimately resettled.

Third, we are not, by and large, any longer considering persons from Southeast Asia for refugee status who do not have demonstrable close ties to the United States. The upshot is that refugees, by and large, who are coming in henceforth from Southeast Asia will tend to be, in one way or another, cases of family reunification. That means that they will have some kind of anchor in this country. We will insist upon strong sponsorship arrangements and make certain that the sponsors themselves are not on welfare or not in dependency status. But it is our judgment in terms of what has happened in the past that this will tend to strengthen and solidify the process of resettlement in this country.

Fourth, refugees that are coming now are better prepared to cope with the realities in the United States. This year, some 88 percent of the refugees who arrive will have completed English as a second language and a cultural orientation program, as against a fraction of that figure last year. The upshot is that most refugees then will be in a position to have at least elementary command of the English language and will have some familiarity with life and social customs in this country.

Finally, we will have health standards that are somewhat tighter than they have been in the past. While there is authority to waive certain health conditions for entry and to permit those things to be treated in this country, to a far greater extent we are going to try to treat those conditions abroad, rather than have them be imposed upon local health services.

As a consequence of these changes in the quality and the quantity of the refugees who are coming into the United States, there are certain changes which have developed in our programs and with domestic services.

First, we have established a very much closer collaboration with Dr. Hawkes and Health and Human Services. This has worked out in a variety of ways. You can see from Dr. Hawkes' remarks that this has spilled over, certainly, in the very close meshing of the English as a second language program abroad and here in this country.

We have worked with Dr. Hawkes on placement policy. This has been a matter in which we have very closely collaborated. We have worked with the voluntary agencies to make certain that the policy that was put into effect is being carried out as effectively as possible.

We have begun a program of monitoring that started just about a year ago with our commissioning of a private report to judge the efficacy of our efforts in reception and placement. We have begun, since, a detailed program of monitoring on the spot to see precisely how the services that we have been obtaining from voluntary agencies on the reception and placement grants have been carried out and the extent to which they mesh in with the later processes which are carried out by Dr. Hawkes and HHS.

Finally, we have been tightening standards with respect to the application of our reception and placement grants, and this has been done through a variety of ways: through consultation with the individual agencies, through improving language in the contracts that we write for this purpose, and to a certain extent through what I might term sanctions.

The result of all of this, I think, is fewer refugees to cope with than we have had in the past, but refugees that are better prepared to cope with the contingencies that they are going to run into in this country, and better prepared to become self-sufficient sooner.

On that note, sir, I would like to bring the support of the Department of State for the reauthorization of title IV of the Refugee Act of 1980, and hopefully for 3 years. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Director Vine; we appreciate that.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Vine and responses to written questions from Senator Simpson follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RICHARD D. VINE

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the Department of State's refugee programs pursuant to the Refugee Act of 1980. We believe the Act has well served its purpose of rationalizing the U.S. Government's refugee programs, overseas and domestically.

Today's hearing focusses on domestic resettlement aspects of the Act, which have an expiration date of September 30. Testimony by Phillip Hawkes, Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) in HHS, discusses the domestic refugee assistance programs managed or funded by his Department. Allow me, therefore, to concentrate on the programs supervised by the Department of State: the overseas processing and initial reception and placement of refugees coming to the United States.

It should be emphasized that our refugee admissions programs, though substantial, by no means encompass the full extent of the Department of State's assistance to refugees. Only a minimal percentage of refugees being assisted by the United States are brought to this country; almost all who benefit from our programs receive assistance in countries of temporary or permanent asylum in areas near the refugees' original homelands. As the number of refugees admitted to the U.S. continues to decline, an increasing portion of our refugee resources will go to support refugees in their places of asylum overseas. Only in cases of special concern for foreign policy or humanitarian reasons do we resort to resettlement of refugees in the U.S.

Such a policy is in accordance with the position of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who gives priority to maintaining the option of voluntary repatriation and to providing care and maintenance to refugees in countries of asylum in their regions. Only where there is no acceptable alternative does the High Commissioner advocate resettlement in distant third countries. In such cases we rely on the High Commissioner to take the lead in searching for a broad range of resettlement opportunities, rather than relying exclusively on the U.S. and other traditional resettlement nations. A substantial majority of refugees resettled in recent years have been placed in countries other than the U.S., including close to half of those resettled from Indochina.

Resettlement for refugees coming to the U.S. is an integrated process, beginning in often far distant camps or other places of temporary asylum, where Department of State officers work with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and private voluntary agencies to interview and select those to be admitted to the U.S. We rely on medical experts from the Center for Disease Control (CDC) for guidance on medical screening of refugees, and on the Intergovernmental Committee of Migration (ICM) and the resettlement staff of the UNHCR to assist with documentation and transportation.

Field processing and selection operate within the ceilings established in consultations with the U.S. Congress, and are governed by the criteria specified in the Refugee Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act, and by selection priorities established for each refugee program. These ceilings, criteria, and priorities define the scope of our program and provide the means by which it is determined which refugees, out the many potential candidates, will be approved for admission. The final approval is given by officers of the INS and represents the first step towards the integration of refugees into the U.S. as self-sufficient members of our communities.

Nearly all refugees from Southeast Asia who are approved for admission go first to Refugee Processing Centers (RPC's) for intensive programs of English as-a-second-Language and Cultural Orientation (ESL/CO). It is here that the actual resettlement process begins. The RPC'ss provide a safe, stable environment for refugees who know they will be coming to the U.S. and, therefore, can concentrate on preparing themselves for that move. We are in the process of extending the time and expanding the resources devoted to basic and vocational English training, with the objective of ensuring that the greatest possible number of refugees of working age achieve a basic competency in English before they arrive. Under our current program, 88% of refugees of working age receive such intensive training, with longer duration courses provided for those starting from the lowest levels of language competency.

We are receiving positive reports from many communities in the U.S. on the utility of the enhanced language training programs for newly-arriving refugees, and have set in motion a more formal study to evaluate the progress made by refugees who receive such training. We are confident that the funds devoted to ESL/CO programs overseas are highly cost-effective, in comparison to the costs of providing language training in the U.S.

Although the major part of our ESL programs have been concentrated on Indochinese refugees in Southeast Asia, we are offering such training to some refugees coming to the U.S. from Africa, and expect soon to begin similar programs in other parts of the world. Teaching materials developed for our overseas programs are now being made available to domestic ESL programs in the U.S.

With HHS, we have also taken steps to tighten the medical screening of refugees overseas and to provide needed medical care before refugees arrive in the U.S. As with language training, the costs of providing such treatment overseas is substantially lower than comparable services provided to refugees after arrival in the U.S. We are working with other governments and with private organizations to enlist their assistance to reduce the direct governmental costs of such medical programs for refugees overseas.

I might note that these programs carried out in the RPC's respond to the needs and energies of the refugees themselves. Once refugees are approved for admission to the U.S., they customarily have a strong motivation to learn English and to prepare themselves for life in the U.S. Refugees tend to be ambitious and goal-oriented, so that the programs offered find willing refugee clients. In every aspect of these programs it is made clear to the refugees that they are preparing for a new life as self-sufficient, self-reliant residents of our country. Their understanding of this objective is spelled out in a written form, prepared by the voluntary agencies and required to be signed by all refugees before they are moved to the U.S.

During the time that refugees are in the RPC's, the process of arranging for them to be resettled in the U.S. goes forward, under the direction of the Bureau for Refugee Programs. Biographic data on each refugee family is transmitted to the Allocations Committee of the Refugee and Migration Committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies in Foreign Service. The aim of the allocations process is to establish the place of resettlement that is right for each refugee, consistent with the policy of broadening the distribution of refugees in the U.S. and reducing refugee concentrations in areas high impact.

The Department of State has played a significant role in the development and implementation of placement policy for refugees. The Department participated actively in the formation of the current policy developed under HHS/ORR leadership, and transmitted it to the voluntary agencies in July 1982. At the same time HHS/ORR transmitted it to state and local leaders, refugee coordinators and other concerned elements.

Recognizing that placement policy is an important step in the resettlement process, we have canvassed our overseas posts in Southeast Asia to determine how many and what kind of refugee cases will be available for "free" resettlement, that is, resettlement not tied to family reunification. This process will integrate with the planned placement programs being established in areas of low refugee impact and should result in further reductions of concentration in high impact areas. The voluntary agencies had earlier reached agreement on a placement policy also directed to reducing refugee movements to high impact areas. The Department of State monitors the placement process by participating in the Allocations Committee meetings and by periodic reviews of placement data to ensure that refugees are being resettled in accordance with the policy.

Once a case is assigned to a voluntary agency and a decision is reached on placement, the refugee can be moved to the U.S. The agencies receiving the refugees include many of the same organizations that assist in refugee processing overseas. The agencies as a whole form the backbone of refugee resettlement activities in the U.S. The reception and placement program is a unique blend of private and public cooperation, the terms of which are spelled out in cooperative agreements between the voluntary agencies (Volags) and the Department of State. The agreements set forth a range of services to be provided for refugees during the period of their initial resettlement. These are functions that in other resettlement countries tend to be handled by governments, often the central government, without tapping the voluntary and donated aid that is available through our private agencies.

The agencies have long experience in refugee resettlement, in many cases going back to World War II and before. Many of them were helping refugees before the U.S. Government provided financial support for such programs through the reception and placement grants. In a basic sense the government grants continue to serve as augmentation of the agencies' private resources and volunteer structures.

While appreciating the contribution of the voluntary agencies to our refugee programs, the Department of State also recognizes the need of oversight and monitoring of the cooperative agreements, both to assure that services reach refugees requiring them in a way that meets the objective of promoting refugee self-sufficency, and to verify that U.S.-provided funds are properly expended. The Committee may be interested in steps we have taken to improve and tighten our oversight of this program.

The Bureau for Refugee Programs has established an office specifically devoted to linking the domestic and foreign aspects of our programs, providing a point of contact for the domestic refugee community, and monitoring voluntary agencies performance under the cooperative agreements.

We plan a regular schedule of on-site monitoring of reception and placement activities, supplementing the Department of State's long-standing program of trouble-shooting and review of specific problems area. An initial monitoring visit took place recently in Arlington, Virginia, and established a pattern that we expect to follow in subsequent field visits at regular intervals. The monitoring focusses particularly on voluntary agency performance under the terms of the cooperative agreement -- orientation, sponsorship, provision of food, clothing and shelter, job counseling, and the availability of donated goods and services -- and includes extensive discussions with voluntary agency staff, sponsors, the refugees themselves, and local and county officials, . The visits examine service performance as well as financial management issues. The monitoring program will enhance the Department of State's ability to coordinate our programs with those supported by HHS/ORR to provide longer term assistance where needed for refugees. We are working with HHS to develop improved systems of case management to provide a self-sufficiency plan for each refugee.

The Bureau for Refugee Programs is preparing changes in the cooperative agreements to further highlight the goal of refugee self-sufficiency. Revised provisions are also being proposed to ensure the Department's review of all sub-contracting and on limiting the accumulation of funds under the reception and placement grants. The voluntary agencies previously agreed not to permit refugees on welfare to serve as sponsors. They recently completed state plans describing each agency's programs in each state in which it places refugees, which have been sent to all state coordinators and HHS/ORR regional offices. The Department of State and HHS will use these plans as a basis for expanded consultations with concerned state, local, and county officials.

In summary, we are making the continued improvements in our activities which contribute to the domestic domestic resettlement of refugees. We project further changes and look forward to working with our partners - from government and the private sector - to fashioning an even better program.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED TO RICHARD D. VINE BY SENATOR SIMPSON

REDUCED REFUGEE FLOW

Question 1. You have stated that the incentive of prospective resettlement in third countries for Vietnamese with less than compelling reasons was decreased? What statistics do you have to support this and how was this reduction engendered?

Answer. The United States announced, in late April 1982, via Voice of America broadcasts and other channels, that Indochinese refugees arriving in first asylum after April 30, 1982, who have no ties to the United States would not be considered for resettlement in the United States. In numerous private and public meetings with Vietnamese groups across the country, and in press interviews; we have emphasized the Government intentions not to accept priority five individuals. We believe that this message gets back rather quickly to friends and relatives inside Vietnam.

Some of these refugees, who fall in our processing priority six, continue to arrive in first asylum countries. They continue to flee Indochina because of those countries repressive practices, even though many have heard of the U.S. announcement. Many refugees also report being aware of Thai "humane deterrence" policies and the new Hong Kong "closed camp" policy.

SOVIET JEWISH EMIGRATION

Question 2. How many Soviet Jews do you anticipate we will admit in 1983? What percentage would that represent of the total Soviet emigres resettled next year?

Answer. Unless the Soviet Union relaxes its restrictions on prospective emigrants, we anticipate that only some 3,000 to 4,000 people will be allowed to leave that country in fiscal year 1983. That would be up only slightly from this fiscal year. The United States as well as all democratic countries should seek to convince Moscow to permit increased emigration and we must be prepared to receive more, should the U.S.S.R. relax its strict emigration controls. A higher admissions number (6,000) than the currently anticipated emigration will signal to the Soviet Union our willingness to accept a larger number of Soviets if they are permitted to emigrate.

We anticipate that most of those people allowed to leave the U.S.S.R. would be Soviet Jews. Of those, about 20 percent, would go to Israel, 5 to 10 percent to other Western countries, and the rest between 70 to 75 percent, would come to the United States. We also anticipate some 300 Armenians being allowed to leave the Soviet Union, with nearly all coming to the United States.

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES

Question 3. How many actual admissions would you project for Indochina?

Answer. Our projected admissions ceiling for East Asia in fiscal year 1983 is 68,000. As in previous years, actual admissions may be somewhat lower.

Question 4. We have heard that the United States may be promulgating policies which actually stimulate or at least maintain a refugee crisis by feeding the Khmer who are located on the border, when many of these persons are farmers who come from productive areas of Kampuchea and simply come after crops are harvested to collect free food. Would you please comment.

Answer. U.S. policy is not encouraging a movement of Khmer to the border to collect free food.

The United States contributes to the United Nations relief operation which cares for approximately 230,000 displaced Khmer on the Thai-Kampuchean border. We do not run our own relief program. The U.N. program distributes only emergency food and medical assistance to the Khmer. Conditions at the border remain harsh and dangerous. There is no evidence to suggest that the border program serves as a magnet for Khmer from the interior in the sense of offering an easier life. Some people do go to the border to escape Vietnamese domination, however, and the feeding program enables them to live, but not to live well.

Most Khmer on the border have been there for several years; they originally fled Kampuchea to avoid armed conflict, food shortages and the Vietnamese occupation. Although many border Khmer are from rice-producing provinces in western Kampuchea, few are able to move back and forth to their homes because of the dangers involved and the increasing harassment by Vietnamese/Heng Samrin troops. Population figures kept since 1980 reveal no consistent pattern of population surges after harvests in the interior.

AFRICA—BUDGET INCREASE FOR U.S. REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Question. 5. I notice that the budget for U.S. refugee assistance to Africa has risen from $49 million in 1982 to $61 million in 1983. Why is $12 million more requested for next year?

Answer. In attempting to project the UNHCR/Africa program requirements for 1983, the Department of State used the following assumptions:

The total number of African refugees will remain at least constant from 1982 to 1983 and, if past experience is any guide, could increase.

The cost of doing business for the international and private voluntary organizations will increase by at least 15 to 20 percent (World Bank estimates annual average inflation rate in Africa of 20 percent).

African refugees can be provided care and maintenance in their asylum countries or they can be assisted to resettle permanently. Since the prospects for voluntary repatriation appear bleak for significant numbers of African refugees who have been in asylum countries for anywhere from 5 to 15 years, it is imperative that they be assisted to settle permanently in place. Although the final result of such local resettlement is refugee self-reliance and reduced requirements from the international community, the initial costs of local resettlement are higher than simple care and maintenance. For example, in 1980, which was a year of emergency crisis intervention on behalf of African refugees (Chadians, Ugandans and Ethiopians).—UNHCR expended 50 percent of its budget on relief assistance and 50 percent on durable solutions (local resettlement, third country resettlement and voluntary repatriation). The Department of State anticipates that the percent of the 1983 UNHCR/Africa budget devoted to durable solutions, as opposed to relief assistance, will increase significantly; therefore, program budget will be correspondingly higher.

Question 6. Please explain why we fund refugee resettlement in Israel at $12.5 million a year when the United States is resettling 70 percent of the Soviet Jews? What are these funds used for? How many persons does the program assist?

Answer. Since 1973, the United States has contributed funds to the United Israel Appeal (UIA) for the resettlement in Israel of persons from Communist countries in Eastern Europe. The 1982/83 State Department Authorization Act, however, contains language which broadens the use of these funds to provide assistance for the resettlement in Israel of refugees from the U.S.S.R., from Communist countries in Eastern Europe, and from other countries.

For many years, this appropriation was a congressional initiative. The funds were specifically for the purpose of aiding Israel's overburdened economy bear the cost of absorbing and resettling thousands of refugees. In 1983, we have requested an appropriation of $12.5 million for this purpose. As in the past, these funds will be granted to the UIA which transfers the money to the Jewish Agency for Israel (JAI). It is the JAI which actually administers the absorption and resettlement program in Israel.

This U.S. contribution to the UIA represents only a small portion of a much larger UIA contribution to the JAI program. The tasks of the JAI fall into two categories: one, its historic role in immigration and absorption of people from "lands of distress"; and two, helping close the social gap—in housing, education, and in improving the quality of life—for these people in Israel. The Agency does not undertake or support any activities which fall within the statutory responsibility of the Israeli Government. In 1980-81, the Jewish Agency program was Jews in Israel.

Among other things, U.S. funds provided for this program are to finance the care and maintenance of refugees following their arrival in Vienna, Austria; their transportation from Vienna to Israel; and, initial housing, language training, income support for the aged and handicapped refugees, and scholarships for students. While this program originally sought to deal with the needs of refugees immediately following their arrival in Israel, it has evolved into one which provides general housing and social service assistance for the refugees—which often is provided for many years. This is especially true for aged refugees who did not contribute to the Israel Social Security system. For these individuals, a significant portion of their on-going income is obtained through this program.

Below is a break out of the utilization of fiscal year 1982 U.S. funds by the UIA:

	Amount
En route maintenance	$75,000
Maintenance at absorption centers, hostels, and Ulpanim	7,175,000
Maintenance at Youth Aliyah institutions	1,250,000
Financial assistance to needy or handicapped refugees	600,000
Scholarships	400,000

	Amount
Financial assistance to the elderly	3,000,000
Total	12,500,000

Question 7. You have indicated that the largest refugee problems—those of Afghans and Africans do not seem to have a long-term solution. Is the UNHCR prepared to cope with long-term refugee maintenance programs?

Answer. Where a given refugee situation in Africa is not susceptible to a long-term solution, UNHCR will have no choice, if it is to be faithful to its mandate, but to provide long-term care and maintenance.

Some African nations are, however, becoming increasingly aware of the need to provide local resettlement to refugees for whom the prospects of voluntary repatriation are very bleak. Sudan, Zaire, Tanzania, Zambia, and Botswana are all examples of countries which have concluded that the refugees who have been in their midst for long periods of time require integration into the economic life of their asylum countries. Tanzania and Botswana, for example, have even gone so far as to extend citizenship.

Unlike most African countries with a major refugee problem, resettlement in place of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is not a possible solution since this is unacceptable to both the refugees themselves and to Pakistan. At the same time no political solution appears to be in sight which would permit the Afghans to return home in the foreseeable future.

Efforts are underway by the World Bank and the UNHCR in conjunction with the Government of Pakistan to begin programs which will help the Afghan refugees begin to be able to provide for a portion of their own needs. These programs would complement the ongoing relief efforts.

The proposals recommended by the World Bank would provide both Afghan and Pakistani employment for irrigation, reforestation, range improvement, and road construction or improvement projects. These types of activities also fall within the priorities of Pakistan development efforts.

AFRICAN ADMISSIONS

Question 8. Since you have stated that most of the African refugees admitted to the U.S. are professionals, skilled workers and students, how do you respond to the assertion that our African refugee policy contributes to the "Brain Drain?"

Answer. Although almost all African refugees can be successfully resettled in Africa or remain safely for indefinite periods in countries of asylum within Africa, there are cases which require resettlement outside of Africa. These include refugees who do not easily merge with the local populations in first asylum countries. They tend to be urban professionals, skilled workers and students. These refugees are often unsuitable for the rural resettlemant that is so successful in Africa and are equally unable to compete successfully for the scarce employment available. As developing countries, these African nations have a limited number of professional jobs available and normally give preference to their own citizens.

EAST ASIA—SLOW DECLINE IN REFUGEE POPULATION

Question 9. You have indicated the Thai Government's alarm at the slow rate of decline in the refugee population in Thailand. What are the factors creating this situation and how can it best be addressed?

Answer. The refugee population in Thailand is continuing to decline because resettlement in third countries is taking place more rapidly than new refugees are arriving.

However, the Thai Government does not want a permanently settled refugee population within its borders, and is concerned that Thailand may become the only place refugees rejected by resettlement countries may live.

Hence the Thai Government is concerned about US admissions ceilings, INS rates of processing refugees and the percentage of refugees which are not accepted for resettlement in the United States. The Thai tend to view the U.S. response to the refugee question as the bellweather for the rest of the world community.

Question 10. What initiatives has the State Department undertaken to resettle Indochinese in Latin America?

Answer. Some Indochinese have been resettled by Brazil and Argentina, as part of the international response to the mid-1979 crisis period. Paraguay also accepted a few refugees. The United States has periodically urged Latin American countries to initiate or enlarge their resettlement programs either bilaterally or in conjunction with the UNHCR. Overall, the response was been limited and disappointing. The typical response was that their economies did not permit them to take more then token numbers of Asians and that they preferred refugees from their own region or from Europe.

At our urging and with our funds, the UNHCR made preliminary studies aimed at resettlement of Indochinese in Suriname. Recent changes in the government there and other events have made it unlikely that the resettlement project will proceed. Explorations with Guayana also came to naught becuse of both domestic and neighboring countries objections. The coordinator's view is that funding study projects should become the responsibility of other UNHCR donor countries who presently carry less of the overall financial and resettlement burden than the United States.

POLISH REFUGEES

Question 11. How many Poles are anticipated for admission? Is there a fairly free movement of Poles in and out of the country at this time?

Answer. In fiscal year 1982 we will admit approximately 6,700 Poles. Our proposed admissions ceiling for Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in fiscal year 1983 is 17,000, including some 11,000 Eastern Europeans and about 6,000 Soviets, mostly Jews and Armenians. Included in the Eastern European portion of the ceiling, it seems likely that up to 8,000 will be Poles.

Movement of Poles out of Poland is sharply restricted at present. The present military regime, however, has indicated willingness to permit the departure of some members of the Solidarity movement, particularly those who have been interned.

We would hope to continue our recent new program to provide resettlement in the United States for eligible political prisoners who have been interned in Poland because of their political activities with the Solidarity movement.

NONIMMIGRANT VISAS FOR IRANIANS

Question 12. Does the Department still have in effect a "liberal nonimmigrant visa policy" with regard to Poles and Iranians? Do many of these people take this as a back-door route to then claim asylum once they are in the United States?

Answer. The Department of State's consular officers have been taking a "long-term view" of ties to the homeland with regard to nonimmigrant visas for Iranians, but with the institution of a new refugee program for Iranians, this policy will be terminated.

Because we have a refugee program whereby Polish refugees may enter the United States, a similar nonimmigrant visa policy is not in effect for Poles.

The "long-term view" is not envisaged as a back-door for immigration. It is intended for those who eventually will return to their homelands, but who cannot immediately do so because of political, religious, or other differences with the current regimes. Whether they be Iranians, Poles, or nationals of other countries, if they avowedly seek permanent resettlement in the United States, they are not eligible for nonimmigrant visas.

Question 13. You have indicated that large numbers are not required for Latin America because of that regions history of generous first asylum. What is Mexico's policy toward granting asylum to such groups as Cubans, Nicaraguans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans?

Answer. Mexico's past record in granting asylum to political prisoners from the region has been a good one. In recent years, Mexico has not, to our knowledge, been asked to grant asylum to any significant number of Cubans or Nicaraguans. There are about 3,500 Salvadorans who have been granted political asylum and who now receive refugees benefits from the Mexican Commission for Refugees. There are an estimated 18,000 Guatemalans who receive refugee relief from the Commission although they are technically temporary visitors. The Guatemalans are the typical Latin American refugees. They are from rural areas, they continue to live near the border, and they plan to return to their own villages once the area is secure.

In the past several years, Mexico has strengthened its cooperation with the UNHCR. We are optimistic that Mexico will play a major and constructive role in Latin American refugee affairs in the future.

Question 14. You have stated that all but 20,000 of the Nicaraguan exiles returned to their homeland. Now many of these are in the United States?

Answer. Of the 200,000 Nicaraguan who fled during the 1979 civil war all but 20,000 returned to their homeland after the war. Of this number we estimated that 6,000 to 8,000 remained in surrounding countries (i.e., Costa Rica and Honduras) and 12,000 to 14,000 in the United States.

Since that time an additional 20,000 to 30,000 Nicaraguans, including supporters of former President Somoza, anti-Somoza members of the middle class who grew dissatisfied with Sandinista policies, and Miskito Indians, have left the country. It is difficult to arrive at specific numbers since many left through traditional, legal or illegal means of migration and few have sought refugee status.

Question 15. How much have we provided for Lebanon relief? Is more needed?

Answer. We expect to commit almost $40 million in emergency relief assistance through international and private voluntary agencies for Palestinian refugees and Lebanese displaced persons. The U.S. has already committed $11 million. A proposal to reprogram another $14.5 million to UNRWA for relief and preparation of tent sites is before the Congress now. We also plan to use for urgent relief needs approximately $14 million of the $50 million specified for Lebanon assistance in the Congressional Supplemental Appropriations Bill, H.R. 6863. Additional funds will be sought in fiscal year 1983 if required.

In addition, some $66 million has been earmarked for longer range rehabilitation and reconstruction needs in Lebanon. Of the $50 million Lebanon supplemental appropriation, $36 million is earmarked for these purposes and another $30 million will be provided from AID's Housing Guarantee Program.

We believe that Lebanon emergency relief needs will probably be met from the monies already committed or planned for that purpose. More funds, however, will likely be required for rehabilitation and reconstruction.

EAST ASIA—ADMISSIONS ASSURANCES TO THAI GOVERNMENT

Question 16. Specifically, what assurances were given to the Thai Government with regard to U.S. admissions levels?

Answer. We have never provided the Thai government with specific assurances with regard to U.S. admissions levels.

However, we have repeatedly said that the refugee problem is an international one which requires a concerted, international response.

For example, at his meeting with ASEAN Foreign Ministers in Singapore on June 18, Deputy Secretary of State Stoessel said:

The United States will share the refugee burden by continuing its resettlement program and, with the UNHCR, by urging other resettlement countries to do their fair share.

EAST ASIA—INDOCHINESE ADMISSION LEVEL

Question 17. Specifically, what admission level for Indochinese would satisfy our foreign policy concerns with Thailand and still be realistic in terms of domestic resettlement?

Answer. We believe an admissions figure of 68,000 for Indochinese refugees will accommodate U.S. foreign policy concerns with Thailand, as well as the domestic realities of resettlement in the United States.

Senator SIMPSON. Now, to some questions, and since we have four members here to address answers to the questions, if you could try to be as brief as possible in the response, and yet we certainly want to have a record here that is significant, as the House did in their activities on this.

I have a couple of questions here of Ambassador Douglas. You indicate the importance of increasing the responsibility of the mutual assistance associations, the MAA's, and the refugee self-help groups in the resettlement process. What is your reaction to a recommendation which will be made and is in the testimony of the MAA groups today that the Refugee Act be amended to codify the role of the MAA's as one of the sectors in refugee resettlement, which would be formally included along with the voluntary agencies and the State and local governments in planning and implementing the program? What is your thought on that?

Ambassador DOUGLAS. I have been strongly supportive from the very beginning to the role of the MAA's partially because I believe that many of the Southeast Asians coming over, being competent, intelligent, active adults, should be treated in that fashion.

Certainly, as the communities continue to grow up both in size and in their familiarity with this country, they ought to assume more and more control of socializing, integrating and extending services and assistance to those who come behind, and even beyond those who are yet to arrive, those who are here and have a continuing need for service.

I am reserved in my judgment, Mr. Chairman, about codifying the role of the MAA's within the act. I am not quite sure what they imply by codification. I think the MAA's have a long way to go and to grow, and to do that, they need formalized recognition; they need more assistance, more outreach, more help from us. And we have some ideas that we are discussing between State, HHS and my office on how to do that.

Recognize them in the act, yes; amend the act to place them with the tested, institutionalized members—that might be, as yet, just a little early unless we had a far clearer idea than we have now of what role they could play, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you. You know, I am interested too, in the MAA proposal to move gradually from the emphasis on cash assistance in the refugee program to an emphasis on economic development of refugee communities in the United States. I would be interested if you have any thoughts on that—any brief thoughts.

Ambassador DOUGLAS. Well, again, we have been supportive for this past year in encouraging these nascent groups—some of them have been around 4 and 5 years—to think in productive work rather than in cash and medical assistance, but I think we have got to be very cautious—I certainly am in my own thinking—about promoting the idea that the Government is going to evolve, develop and fund a kind of small business administration for refugees. That is not where we are going.

We certainly want them to look for seed money, both privately and perhaps a little bit, you know, from the Government. Perhaps the vol ags (voluntary agencies), as time goes on, can help in setting up businesses. But we are not interested in the administration in developing large-scale small business development funding into refugee organizations. We do not want to equip ourselves in a bureaucracy to deal with that kind of thing.

Senator SIMPSON. You have stressed, too, that social services, such as the English language classes and the employment training, are critical to the development of refugee self-sufficiency. Yet, I find, and I am sure you do, too, that in terms of budget policy, which I know is also one of your responsibilities, the social service programs always seem to get the short shrift because they have been cut back from previous years and always are the first programs to be cut when any shortfall occurs in the cash assistance account.

In view of those realities, could you describe briefly how the administration plans to emphasize social services as a priority in the coming fiscal year?

Ambassador DOUGLAS. Well, I will take a crack at that, and maybe Dr. Hawkes wants to come in because it is something that he has an operational familiarity with more than I.

Point one, Mr. Chairman: The term "social services," to me, is far less descriptive of what this administration is aiming at than support services. Yes, the social services and support services are far more of a controllable line item in a budget as you through the year than are the mandated reimbursements to the States of cash and medical assistance.

Yes, the observation is a correct one that we have had far less available to us in the support services area than we had hoped for because the dependency rates during our tenure have been higher than we wanted.

But you are balancing several things at once here. One is the overall budget and the need not to expand certain kinds of services through certain delivery means. We believe that next year, these MAA's that we have been speaking of are far more likely to be reasonable, cost-effective, self-monitoring and socially effective delivery vehicles for some of these social services than are the State bureaucracies or in some cases, perhaps, even the vol ags or the communities.

We are looking, still, to this day at ways to effect savings and readjust some of the spending to have more funds available for support services in the coming year. It is a tough nut. It is not one that we have a facile policy to lay before you.

Senator SIMPSON. A final question: The administration has advocated restoring the language of "up to 100 percent of full Federal reimbursement to States for refugee expenses." The House deleted that because they believe that the refugee program is indeed a Federal responsibility.

Would you advise why the administration recommends simply reimbursing to the extent of the available appropriations rather than authorizing a supplemental appropriation if the original budget were to prove inadequate to meet that commitment?

I think that you will find that the congressional intent states that this program is a Federal fiscal responsibility for the first 3 years, especially since the Congress authorized the phrase "such sums as are necessary" rather than any specific amount to carry out that program.

If you could just briefly respond to that, the problem that the chairman in the House and I both confront is figures to fit. If we are having a consultation process, then let us have figures that fit it and a budget figure that fits it, and not go through that kind of anguish in the future. But I would appreciate your thoughts there.

Ambassador DOUGLAS. In trying to live on a daily basis with the minutiae and the operation of the act, we have become, I think, cautious and conservative about an implication of further entitlements or greater flexibility.

We feel that up to permits the administration to reimburse to the tune that the Congress has authorized and made available to us.

Second, I think although the States may not be comfortable with the suggestion, while the admission of refugees is most certainly a Federal responsibility, there is a useful tension to be derived from a leverage that the States have a stake in making sure that their expenditures are somehow or other constantly kept in check. And the thought that some of the States would be more comfortable with a stronger congressional legislative wording, fully 100-percent reimbursable, I think leaves us a little cold.

Senator SIMPSON. All right, thank you.

I have some questions of Dr. Hawkes in this area of refugee dependency rates. What are the present refugee welfare dependency rates, as calculated, as you know them at this time?

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. Chairman, we have just completed a nine-State survey of dependency rates and have derived a figure of about 52 percent, down from 67 percent a year ago. We are also looking at the dependency rate by State by State, and it is a little different picture because California, which has around 35 or 40 percent of the refugee population, has a dependency rate which approaches 80 percent. In fact, if California's own figures are to be believed, then their dependency rate approaches 99 percent, and that tends to skew our figure toward the high end.

There are other States with dependency rates of 9, 13, and 15 percent, but, because of their smaller refugee populations, they do not carry the same weight. I think there has been considerable improvement in refugee dependency rates this year, with exceptions in a couple of States.

Senator SIMPSON. I think the word "skew" would be an understatement there, would it not? Ninety-nine percent, if you took certain statistical material?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes, sir, considering what our estimates are of California's population that is eligible for refugee assistance and the amount of money that California is claiming, that would put close to 99 percent of their refugees on assistance.

Senator SIMPSON. I am sure there is an obvious reason for that, and I think of several, but I would like your thoughts of why that would be. Secondary migration?

Mr. HAWKES. Yes, sir, it is, in part, secondary migration. We believe that there are large numbers of refugees moving to California, although refugee resettlements in California this year are just slightly over half of what they were a year ago; that is, original, initial resettlements.

Senator SIMPSON. Do you think that those dependency rates represent an accurate gage in measuring the effectiveness of refugee programs?

Mr. HAWKES. No, I do not, sir, particularly because the California dependency rates are not really representative of what is going on in the rest of the country. The average of 52 percent represents a more realistic dependency rate and, if you take California out of the picture or adjust its rate downward, then the average rate would be even lower.

Senator SIMPSON. Is ORR going to adopt any changes in the method of calculating these rates, by taking into account any other statistical variations or comparing experiences of refugees with comparable background of those that have been here for some time? What is your thought there?

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. Chairman, it is an ongoing process. We are noting, for instance, that the difference in educational levels of the more recently arrived refugees makes it more likely that they will depend, for at least some time, on welfare.

On the other hand, the programs that the State Department has put in place in the camps are preparing refugees better to go to work. We are targeting money specifically in those areas of English training and job placement that we think will do the most good. And, of course, we are looking at the way in which the programs are being administered on a State-by-State basis.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me ask you, as you do your budget work, what is the rationale for only including in the budget projections for social services and English and job training, the newly arrived refugees, when those dependency rates are still extraordinarily high among those who are already here?

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. Chairman, that is an issue that Health and Human Services has been looking at a great deal recently, up to and including the Secretary. We are reevaluating the amount of training and service needed by the refugee population—those who arrived a year or two ago without language training and those more recent arrivals who came from preliterate background.

We are looking at the adequacy of our social services funding and our impact aid, and we are also, in line with our placement policy, developing a service strategy which will deal with areas in the country on a city-by-city rather than a national basis, so that we can meet with members of a community who have front-line responsibility for dependency—welfare directors, local voluntary agencies, State refugee coordinators—and, within the limits of our social service and impact aid funding, develop a local response to that dependency rate.

We have discussed this program with some State coordinators and expect to initiate it this fall. It seems to be the kind of program that can deal with the dependency rate on the local level.

Ambassador DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, if I may, I think it is germane to observe that if we were able to clear up the backlog—100,000, 200,000, or however many people it is we are talking about who came in, in earlier programs and who are, in varying degrees, stuck in the system without adequate training and still waiting in line to get what training they need—I think that the administration's thinking is not that that is going to be best addressed principally by a federally directed effort.

The vol ags have a role to play here; many of them are coming forward to do that. The MAA's have an immense role that we feel they could play in cleaning up this backlog. So, while it is true that it has been an inconsistency and, at times, a little hard to understand from the States and the Congress point of view, I do not think we want to leave the impression that although we view that backlog as a major task for this fiscal year, we do not believe that it is something that is going to be principally responsive either to a federally directed effort or necessarily to a 100-percent federally funded effort.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes, I understand that, and yet I think that the Congress is always somewhat startled at the dependency rates, and that is the phrase we use with regard to refugees. If we are now reaching a more reasonable rate of 52 percent dependency, I think that still is unreasonable in the eyes of Congress. I guess I throw that out to you as a reality of life in this place.

When we want to meet the compassionate role of taking in the refugees of the world who truly meet the definition of "refugee" under the U.N. protocol and the U.S. definition, and that is the kind of people we do want to meet the needs of, then why is it that we find them in a dependency status for so long a period of time?

Those are some of the things we will probe here today, but I think the Congress would never accept that simply because we have come from 67 percent dependency to 52 percent, we are now right in where we should be. I do not think you will find that, and I do not think that is a statement where I speak for my brothers and sisters in this place, but I think that that is very real.

Ambassador DOUGLAS. You know our view on dependency rates; 52 percent is as unacceptable to us as it is to you.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes, I now have that on the record. Thank you.

Ambassador DOUGLAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]

Senator SIMPSON. Your rebuttal will come, Gene; I will give you your chance. You are always ready and able to do that.

I have another question of Dr. Hawkes. On the issue of the regulation changes which resulted in a benefit cut off for some refugees. What has been the result of the 18-month cutoff in eligibility for services for certain refugees in terms of what is actually happening to those people without access to the Federal program? How much will the Federal Government be reimbursing States for their costs in providing services to that population?

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. Chairman, first of all, it did not change refugees eligibility for English and jobs-related services; they are still eligible for those services. What it did was to force refugees to qualify for welfare and medical assistance on the same basis as citizens. And, as you might expect, the results have been extremely mixed nationally.

There were, certainly, people who lost their refugee cash assistance special eligibility and, in some States that had no general assistance program, those people were left without any Federal or State welfare program. However, there were a number of responses. Some people talked about moving to States that had better benefits and, in fact, even some State governments suggested, in letters to them, that their refugees might want to move to other States with better benefits.

Some refugees themselves talked about such moves. Other refugees responded that they would move to States that had better job opportunities. And, in fact, a couple of our States with very low dependency rates and fairly decent job opportunities have experienced secondary migration.

In some States, there was just a wholesale transfer of refugees from refugees cash assistance to general assistance or State-funded AFDC programs, in which case the Federal Government goes on making 100 percent reimbursement, and those people suffered only from whatever income level differences that occurred in the grant level among the programs.

Senator SIMPSON. Just one final question. What has been the response of the voluntary agencies to your agency on the proposed placement policies which have been advanced? I would be interested in that.

Mr. HAWKES. I think generally favorable. There have been some questions and, of course, this is a proposal to do things a little differently than voluntary agencies have done in the past and there is, perhaps, some reluctance. But I think the overwhelming weight of the dependency rate and the hardship on refugees in areas where they have little or no prospect of becoming self-sufficient as opposed to what may be available to them in other parts of the country is an overwhelming factor.

Senator SIMPSON. Are we going to get into the same box we did last year with regard to budgetary calculations in which we find a shortfall of funds in reimbursement to States for refugee cash and medical assistance? Do you see that shortfall coming? If not, is there a reprograming in accounts, and so on?

Mr. HAWKES. Mr. Chairman, the Secretary of Health and Human Services remains committed to 100-percent reimbursement for all legitimate costs of the refugee program to the various States. We have met all of those costs, with one exception, and we are currently working with that State to continue to refine our estimates of their costs and their claims to costs. When it is resolved, we will adjust their award in accordance.

Senator SIMPSON. And do you have the funds to do that?

Mr. HAWKES. That would depend a lot on the outcome, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, you know, we are trying to get to the realities of this situation so that we do not have the same problem as we did before. Either administer the refugee program or do not do it, and fund it if you do do it.

One final question: Senator Hawkins, who was most helpful in the debate on the other legislation, is interested in an amendment, which I know you have reviewed, to provide full Federal fiscal responsibility in the event of a mass immigration or refugee crisis, or combination thereof.

What are the Department's and the administration's views of the feasibility of adoption of such an amendment?

Mr. HAWKES. Well, Mr. Chairman, first of all, the Refugee Act deals specifically with providing special benefits and costs to States for people with real need that are allowed into this country for humanitarian purposes.

The amendment, as offered, would create an open-ended entitlement for special services; that is, services provided to any illegal immigrant who was in the United States by a State government. The State could perform anything within reason for that person or persons and expect full reimbursement by the Federal Government. We think it would be an open-ended entitlement program that would have no real incentive on the part of a State to limit or curtail.

We do not back away from the Federal commitment for refugees, but do not believe that such entitlements, and especially open-ended, should be made available to any alien who manages to make his way into the country.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you.

Now, Ambassador Vine, just a few questions. What positive steps are being taken to improve State Department monitoring and accountability of the voluntary agencies?

Mr. VINE. Mr. Chairman, just about a year ago at this time, we commissioned a study by a private contractor—the so-called kaleidoscope report, which was designed to give us a first crack at how the services for which we contracted were being carried out in the field. I think that has to be considered our very first step toward monitoring. It quite clearly identified areas that we had to take up with the voluntary agencies, and which we did, in fact, begin to take up on a systematic basis with the voluntary agencies to get improvements and to eliminate some of the problems that had been signaled.

Since then, we have begun a system of monitoring. We had a pilot monitoring trial in Arlington recently from which we have learned a great deal and from which we have already identified problems. We have taken up some with the voluntary agencies and are systematically working on others.

We expect from here on out to be able to go at monitoring in the field of actual reception and placement situations about every 6 weeks in various key areas in the country. And every time we do that, we come back and we consult with our colleagues in HHS and we consult with the voluntary agencies. We basically work with the specific agencies on the spot to correct the problems that we have run across, and we have been very effective in doing that.

We have had cases, for example, where we have seen shortcomings where we have recommended to the voluntary agencies that the problems be corrected, and where they have made good-faith efforts to do so. In one case, where an agency was not able to adequately take care of a problem, on the other hand, we have simply, as a draconian final action, taken the cases away from them and turned them over to other agencies that were better positioned to carry out the core services for which we contract. This has all worked very well so far.

Senator SIMPSON. But is there an increase in monitoring the results as you contract and pay these voluntary agencies? Are you watching that more closely?

Mr. VINE. We certainly are. In fact, we are in the process right now of adjusting some of the language in the contracts. That will be, of course, a mutual discussion between us and the voluntary agency.

Senator SIMPSON. I would be very interested if you could furnish for the record the contract form that you use for the voluntary agencies and the suggestions that you are making on changes in drafting of the language in the contract relating to sponsorship, anchor relatives, release into the community, followup, and those things. It would be very interesting to me.

Mr. VINE. We would be glad to.

[The requested material follows:]

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 13, 1982

Mr. Wells Klein
Executive Director
American Council for
  Nationalities Service
20 West 40th Street
New York, New York 10018

Dear Wells:

This letter outlines the major items which I believe need to be addressed in the cooperative agreement to become effective on October 1, 1982. With the beginning of the new fiscal year rapidly approaching, we obviously must act as quickly as possible. All of the Executive Directors of the organizations represented in the ACVA Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs will receive similar letters. The States of Iowa and Idaho, although not formal members of ACVA, will also receive similar letters.

I ask that you consider the proposed modifications at your next committee meeting and provide me with your reactions. Enclosed for your use is a cooperative agreement with the changes highlighted in capital letters. While I wish to address each of the areas which follow, I am certainly open to suggestions on the particulars of the language.

We propose that three new paragraphs be added to ARTICLE I, PURPOSE as follows:

1. Self-Sufficiency - Emphasis needs to be placed on the goals of self-sufficiency and early employment. Although these are the ultimate aims of the agreement, they have not been stated explicitly. Given the high welfare dependency rate and the visibility of this problem, it is important that we be as up front as possible in our commitments. Proposed Paragraph:

    > In arranging for the provision of Core Services, the ______________ recognizes that the ultimate aim of assistance is to move the refugee towards self-sufficiency and early employment. Specifically, sponsorship choice, orientation of both sponsor and refugee, and employment counseling should be carried out in such a way as to emphasize these areas.

2. Local Presence - Language that more clearly defines what is expected of a "local presence", including its oversight responsibility, and describing at least a simple form of case management is needed. Proposed Paragraph:

    > The ______________shall ensure that the refugee is carefully monitored by its local affiliate for each of the core services for the first 90 days of placement (if the

> refugee remains in the same general geographic area where initially placed) and that the _______________'s local affiliate can readily provide assistance if problems arise relating to the refugee's needs under the core services. Where the ____________'s local affiliate relied on another individual or organization for delivery of a core service, the affiliate should determine if the service was satisfactorily delivered.

3. Monitoring - A provision that addresses the national agency's responsibility for monitoring the activities of its affiliates is included. Proposed Paragraph:

> The ______________ shall establish a monitoring system at the national level to periodically review on site (no less frequently than once a year) the activities of its local affiliates and shall provide information on the system to the Bureau's program liaison within 30 days after the effective date of this agreement.

We propose to add a reference to sponsorship in ARTICLE III, RESPONSIBILITIES. Under sub-paragraph 1.a. of the Core Services, a sentence has been inserted following the Pre-Arrival service for sponsorship and travel arrangements that precludes individuals on welfare from refugee sponsorship.

Proposed Sentence:

> Individuals who are participating in welfare assistance programs may not be accepted as sponsors.

In ARTICLE IV, ADMINISTRATION, we propose to add a paragraph requiring the submission of all sub-contracts or other arrangements prior to execution. Proposed language:

> Provide to the Bureau a copy of any proposed sub-contract or other arrangement with entities not a part of the_________'s structure, for the purpose of delivering program services under this agreement. Such copies must be submitted to the Bureau prior to finalizing the arrangement.

In ARTICLE V, FUNDING, we propose to include a provision to specify the time period during which the funds can be used. Proposed language:

> Funds awarded under this agreement: (1) shall be expended only for services specified here as core or optional; and (2) may be expended no later than twelve (12) months following the end of the fiscal year from which funded, unless revised in writing by the Department. Unexpended funds remaining at the end of the above specified period shall be returned to the Department of State for deposit in the Treasury.

Because the Bureau will be considering a number of changes in the program in the near future, in part based on the outcome of our monitoring, our FY-1983 cooperative agreement will be executed initially for only a six month period. Well before the end of the new agreement's expiration date, we will discuss our ideas and observations with you. For this reason, our current proposal changes have been kept to a minimum.

There are other policies in effect, which have been transmitted to you by letter and are not incorporated into the agreement. For example, our placement policy which has been previously specified in detail continues to require your adherence.

As a closing note, I must acknowledge the challenges I believe we jointly face in the refugee program. Each year seems to bring its own unique demands upon us and I sense this year the private organizations will be called upon to clearly demonstrate their special contributions to this program. As a step to assist in this effort, we wanted to strengthen the document which serves as the basis for your domestic refugee activities.

Sincerely,

Richard D. Vine
Director
Bureau for Refugee Programs

Agreement No. 1037-

PROPOSED

COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
AND

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT, made and entered into by and between the Government of the United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the "Government"), acting through the Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs (hereinafter referred to as the "Bureau")

WHEREAS, the Bureau is conducting a reception and placement program for refugees as authorized under the applicable provisions of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, and

WHEREAS, the Bureau deems it appropriate to seek the assistance in furtherance of the purposes of this program, and

WHEREAS, the is qualified and has indicated its willingness to provide required assistance in a manner acceptable to the Bureau,

NOW THEREFORE, THIS COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT WITNESSETH:

ARTICLE I

PURPOSE

In general and subject to the more detailed enumerations below in Article III, the is expected to use its best efforts to insure that, for each refugee it will perform core services relating to pre-arrival, reception, and initial resettlement activities of the Bureau's refugee program. Generally, the enumerated core services will be performed within a 90 day period after the refugee's arrival.

The Bureau recognizes that the is for the most part engaged in all phases of refugee resettlement, and it does not in any way intend to limit the performance of such other refugee assistance activities as the may wish to undertake during or after the 90 day period.

The purpose of this agreement, however, is to insure that an appropriate and adequate sponsorship for each refugee will be provided by the and that it will perform or arrange for the performance of required core services defined in Article III in approximately the first 90 days after arrival. The Bureau agrees that the may also perform other refugee resettlement services such as those defined in Article III, Section B, and stipulates that nothing in this agreement shall be construed as a prohibition against performance of such other activities.

IN ARRANGING FOR THE PROVISION OF CORE SERVICES, THE RECOGNIZES THAT THE ULTIMATE AIM OF ASSISTANCE IS TO MOVE THE REFUGEE TOWARDS SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND EARLY EMPLOYMENT. SPECIFICALLY, SPONSORSHIP CHOICE, ORIENTATION OF BOTH SPONSOR AND REFUGEE, AND EMPLOYMENT COUNSELING SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO EMPHASIZE THESE AREAS.

The , its local representative or designee, shall use its best efforts to make available to the refugee other resources which flow from the community to the to assist in refugee resettlement, including volunteer assistance and donations.

THE SHALL INSURE THAT THE REFUGEE IS CAREFULLY MONITORED BY ITS LOCAL AFFILIATE FOR EACH OF THE CORE SERVICES FOR THE FIRST 90 DAYS OF PLACEMENT (IF THE REFUGEE REMAINS IN THE SAME GENERAL GEOGRAPHIC AREA WHERE INITIALLY PLACED) AND THAT THE 'S LOCAL AFFILIATE CAN READILY PROVIDE ASSISTANCE IF PROBLEMS ARISE RELATING TO THE REFUGEE'S NEEDS UNDER THE CORE SERVICES. WHERE THE 'S LOCAL AFFILIATE RELIED ON ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION FOR DELIVERY OF A CORE SERVICE, THE AFFILIATE SHOULD DETERMINE IF THE SERVICE WAS SATISFACTORILY DELIVERED.

THE SHALL ESTABLISH A MONITORING SYSTEM AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL TO PERIODICALLY REVIEW ON SITE (NO LESS FREQUENTLY THAN ONCE A YEAR) THE ACTIVITIES OF ITS LOCAL AFFILIATES AND SHALL PROVIDE INFORMATION ON THE SYSTEM TO THE BUREAU'S PROGRAM LIAISON WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THIS AGREEMENT.

ARTICLE II

VALIDITY PERIOD

The period for performance of the required Core Services described herein is October 1, 1982, through March 31, 1982.

ARTICLE III

RESPONSIBILITIES

A. Required Core Services

The undertakes to insure, either from the per capita grant or from other sources, the availability of the following assistance up to ninety (90) days to each refugee who arrives in the United States during the period October 1, 1982 through December 31, 1982:

1. Pre-Arrival

   a. Provide appropriate sponsorship and facilitate arrangements for the refugee's travel to his or her final destination. INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE PARTICIPATING IN WELFARE ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS MAY NOT BE ACCEPTED AS SPONSORS.

   b. Provide needed information to local sponsor or resettlement office

   c. Make available orientation materials to appropriate, interested local agencies and individuals

   d. Conduct resettlement preplanning, including, as appropriate, recruitment and training of persons adequate to render services enumerated below.

2. Reception

   a. Arrange for the refugee to be met at the airport nearest to the refugee's final destination and transported to final or transient quarters

   b. Provide temporary accommodations, as necessary, and assist in obtaining initial housing and essential furnishings, which may include one month's rent, a security deposit or other essential fees

   c. Assure that food or a food allowance is provided and that the other basic needs of the refugee are met for up to one month after arrival or until other resources are available, whichever comes first

   d. Provide minimum clothing for refugees upon arrival if necessary

   e. Assist refugees in applying for a social security card and in registering children for school

3. Counseling and Referral (performed in coordination with other locally available information and referral services)

   a Orientation

   Oral orientation to refugees and sponsors supplemented by:

   (1) General and local multilingual or bilingual orientation materials developed by the Committee, local coordinating councils, and/or others as available

(2) Materials for sponsors, including an explanation of the resettlement process and the sponsor's role

b. Health

(1) Encourage and assist the refugee as soon as possible after arrival to seek public or private health services available locally and assist refugees with known health problems to secure follow-up treatment as necessary

(2) Coordinate with the local health authorities on programs that assist in health care and provide orientation and education about the health care system

c. Employment

(1) Provide job counseling and assistance in placing employable refugees in jobs on arrival and/or thereafter as necessary and appropriate

(2) Advise the refugees on the availability, advisability and procedure for applying for various training programs as necessary and appropriate

4. Consultation with Public Agencies

a. Inform interested local government authorities about the 's resettlement program

b. Provide advice when requested by local welfare or employment services about a refugee's employability

c. Work with representatives of federal, state and local government agencies directly concerned with or affected by the resettlement process or which have existing services that may be available to the resettled refugees

5. Unaccompanied Minors

The foregoing notwithstanding, the primary undertaking of the with respect to unaccompanied minors shall be to place them within an extended family setting, or the existing child welfare system, to ensure they will have the benefit of the same services and protections available in general to minors in that community. To the extent necessary, the will cooperate with public welfare authorities to assure that the placements of such minors are legally sufficient and appropriate.

B. Optional Services

After the provision of Core Services required during the initial 90 day period by refugees assigned under this agreement, the may provide from unexpended per capita grant funds optional services to these or other refugees who may have arrived prior to or who may arrive subsequent to the period of this agreement. These services are intended to continue or expand assistance to the refugees in accordance with the policy of the in performing its role in the reception, placement and resettlement of refugees in the United States. These optional services may include, but are not limited to, the following:

1. Pre-Arrival and Facilitation
    a. Coordinating program administration and policy at the national level
    b. Informing and educating the public
    c. Coordinating travel and local reception among ICEM, national agency and sponsor

2. Port of Entry
    a. Arranging for onward bookings, confirmation and securement
    b. Providing care through onward movement to final destination

3. Reception and Placement
    a. Providing ongoing community orientation
    b. Providing ongoing assistance with basic physical needs--health, housing, employment and transportation
    c. Arranging extensive orientation of individual families on basis of self-sufficiency potential and means:
        1. Employment assessment, career planning, counseling placement and follow-up
        2. Information and referral to public services as needed, including MEDICAID and Social Security Programs
        3. Assessment of language and skills training requirements
        4. Provision of or referral to training programs
        5. Utilization of and access to community resources to enhance resettlement process
    d. Furnishing emergency financial assistance and crisis intervention
    e. Continuing to monitor the reception and placement process

4. Ongoing Resettlement
    a. Providing family counseling particularly with regard to educational, medical and employment problems
    b. Providing continued orientation and assistance with adjustment problems--social, legal and financial
    c. Arranging immigration counseling and assistance--adjustment of status and naturalization counseling
    d. Assisting with job upgrading and introducing additional family members into the labor market
    e. Working with refugee communities on self-help activities and assistance to new arrivals

f. Arranging for day care services and providing family planning information and counseling

g. Providing ESL instruction, tutoring and curriculum development

h. Establishing revolving loan funding

i. Locating relatives in the United States and abroad

j. Arranging grants or loans for emergency needs, including down payments for housing, especially for large families

k. Providing information services, including development of materials, interpreter/translation services

l. Assisting with relocation within the United States where warranted

m. Arranging ongoing community orientation for target groups such as the elderly

n. Assisting refugees with preservation of cultural heritage and maintenance of cultural contact

o. Establishing and providing mental health programs

p. Emergency health care and maintenance for conditions developed during training, care and maintenance

q. Training and retraining artisans, academic graduates, professionals and technicians

r. Providing or arranging for services such as examinations and payment of tuition which materially contribute to employment and income objectives

s. Ongoing monitoring of resettlement programs

5. Activities Facilitating Effective Management and Delivery of Programs

a. Coordination with Federal, State and local government and other service providers

b. Arranging staff development and training, including training Indochinese paraprofessionals and community volunteers

c. Meetings and communications--national, regional and local networks

d. Servicing management needs and education

ARTICLE IV

ADMINISTRATION

In addition to the program responsibilities described in Article III, the   shall:

A. Adhere to the applicable provisions of the "Guidelines for the Administration of Agreements awarded by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs."

B. State in any annual reports or financial statements that these activities are assisted financially by the Department of State under the authority of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended.

C. Adhere to the provisions of OMB Circular A-110, except for the requirements set forth by the following Attachments thereto: Attachment B - Bonding and Insurance; Attachment D - Program Income; Attachment E - Cost Sharing and Matching; Attachment G - Financial Reporting Requirements, Paragraphs 2.a., b., d., e., that portion of f. which does not relate to cash disbursements, 3.a. and b., and 4.a. and b.; Attachment J - Revision of Financial Plans; and Attachment M - Standard Form for Applying for Federal Assistance; and Attachment N - Property Management Standards.

D. Utilize its best efforts to collect amounts due from refugees for transportation loans, establishing a proper collection process and adequately accounting for amounts due from the refugees, amounts received from the refugees, and amounts remitted to ICM.

E. PROVIDE TO THE BUREAU A COPY OF ANY PROPOSED SUB-CONTRACT OR OTHER ARRANGEMENT WITH ENTITIES NOT A PART OF THE 'S STRUCTURE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF DELIVERING PROGRAM SERVICES UNDER THIS AGREEMENT. SUCH COPIES MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU PRIOR TO FINALIZING THE ARRANGEMENT.

ARTICLE V

FUNDING

A. Payment

1. Payment of a fixed per capita grant of $525 for non-European refugees and $365 for European refugees is hereby authorized to cover the reception and placement services, previously described, for a total of refugees as indicated below who are expected to arrive in the United Stated during the period October 1, 1982 through December 31, 1982:

	Refugees	Number	Amount
a.	African		$
b.	European.		
c.	Indochinese		
d.	Latin American.		
e.	Near Eastern		

Payment of the above fixed per capita grant will be limited to the number of authorized refugees who actually arrive in the United States during the period October 1, 1982, through December 31, 1982, but in no case shall the total payment under this agreement, unless amended, exceed $ during this period.

2. Funds shall be paid to the in accordance with the "Letter of Credit" procedure set forth by the Bureau in the "Guidelines for the Administration of Agreements Awarded by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs."

B. Use Of Funds

It is understood and agreed that while the funds awarded under this agreement are authorized primarily to enable the Committee to provide or arrange for the provision of the "Core Services" described in Section A of ARTICLE III, any unexpended funds available to the after providing the "Core Services" required by assigned refugees during the first ninety (90) days may be used to continue the "Core Services" or to provide the "Optional Services" described in Section B of ARTICLE III. Such services may be made available to refugees assigned under this agreement or to refugees arriving prior to or subsequent to the period of this agreement.

These funds are limited to refugee assistance activities of the and are not to be used to cover expenses of other unrelated activities.

C. This agreement may be amended prior to December 31, 1982, to reflect the actual number of refugee arrivals in each category and to adjust the amount of funds accordingly.

D. With the written approval of the Bureau, the may enter into sub-agreements with other participating voluntary organizations to award or accept funds that will insure that each organization is properly reimbursed for the appropriate number of refugees to whom it has provided services during the period of this agreement.

E. FUNDS AWARDED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT: (1) SHALL BE EXPENDED ONLY FOR SERVICES SPECIFIED HERE AS CORE OR OPTIONAL: AND (2) MAY BE EXPENDED NO LATER THAN TWELVE (12) MONTHS FOLLOWING THE END OF THE FISCAL YEAR FROM WHICH FUNDED, UNLESS REVISED IN WRITING BY THE DEPARTMENT. UNEXPENDED FUNDS REMAINING AT THE END OF THE ABOVE SPECIFIED PERIOD SHALL BE RETURNED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE FOR DEPOSIT IN THE TREASURY.

ARTICLE VI

REPORTS

A. Financial

The shall submit a monthly financial report in accordance with the format described in Section 4.a. of the "Guidelines for the Administration of Agreements Awarded by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs." In addition, the shall submit one copy of its annual financial report as prepared and certified by its independent auditors, within 30 days of issuance.

B. Program

The shall submit a program report in accordance with the format described in Section 4.b. of the "Guidelines for the Administration of Agreements Awarded by the Department of State's Bureau for Refugee Programs."

ARTICLE VII

LIAISON

All liaison shall be with the designated elements of the Bureau relative to the following responsibilities incurred by the under this agreement:

A. Program - Office of Reception and Placement

B. Financial - Office of Financial Operations

STANDARD PROVISIONS

The attached Standard Provisions are made a part of this agreement and the compliance with the conditions therein is mandatory.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Cooperative Agreement as of the dates indicated below.

FOR THE		FOR THE BUREAU FOR REFUGEE PROGRAMS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
______________	Signature	______________
______________	Typed Name	Norman W. Runkles
______________	Title	Comptroller Bureau for Refugee Programs
______________	Date	______________

Senator SIMPSON. Which voluntary agencies are relying on subcontractors to resettle refugees, and is that a routine practice? Whether it is or is not, what are the results of that, generally?

Mr. VINE. First of all, subcontracting, is a definitional problem. By some broad definitions, one can argue that affiliates of even the larger voluntary agencies do, in effect, subcontract. That is not the principal point, however.

By and large, it is the smaller voluntary agencies that have carried out what is commonly known as subcontracting. The larger agencies, for the most part, do not.

Usually, when we talk about subcontracting, we are talking about the sharing or pass through of responsibilities, with or without funds, that we did not generally contemplate when we signed the reception and placement agreement with the agencies involved. Some of them have worked out very well; some of them have worked out very poorly.

To the extent that they have worked out poorly, we have taken, very quickly, cognizance of that, consulted with the voluntary agencies about it, and generally we have gotten some improved results.

As a result, however, there has been a very, very sharp decrease in the use of this forum or this device in the past year. And while we are considering striking it out as a device, I think in view of the mixed reaction, we have not yet been able to figure out a formula that will enable us to strike out the poor performance aspects and retain the good ones. However, performance now on that kind of basis is much better than it was a year ago.

Senator SIMPSON. Does that decrease in use of subcontracting have anything to do with the smaller consultation figures that are presented?

Mr. VINE. There is no question that contracting or subcontracting was more prevalent when there were larger numbers of refugees coming in. With smaller numbers, it makes it a lot easier for organizations to deal with cases with their existing and remaining permanent staffs. There is no question about that.

Senator SIMPSON. Would you say that the smaller the figures, the more conscientious the delivery of the services?

Mr. VINE. I would hope, sir, that services were conscientiously delivered no matter what the figures.

Senator SIMPSON. I would hope that, too. I wonder if they are.

Mr. VINE. I wonder, too. I cannot answer your question otherwise.

Senator SIMPSON. Good question.

One other question: GAO has indicated that about 67 percent of the refugees in their sample had relatives in the United States. However, only about one-half of those were defined as close relatives. Furthermore, placement policies resulted in 70 percent of all Indochinese refugees being placed in 10 States.

How will the new placement policies alleviate that problem?

Mr. VINE. I am not quite certain that I understood the first part of your question, Senator, in terms of 67 percent.

Senator SIMPSON. I am referring to the sample in the GAO study; and GAO will be testifying in the next panel.

Mr. VINE. Did I understand you to say that half of those, in fact, did not have the relatives they claimed to have?

Senator SIMPSON. Sixty-seven percent in the sample had relatives in the United States. However, only about half of those were defined as "close relatives."

Mr. VINE. I see. The distinction is between close relatives and more extended relationships.

Senator SIMPSON. Right.

Mr. VINE. You will perhaps have noticed that we, this year, have eliminated from Southeast Asia presenting to INS for consideration persons who do not have any relationship with the United States at all.

We have two categories of relationship, however, that still remain: Very close relatives and those which are more distant. These are spelled out in very distinct priorities. The close relatives, by and large, tend to be what you would expect—parents, children, spouses. The relationship here is much more controllable.

When they get to be more distant, we tend, indeed, to be more prudent ourselves. Nevertheless, we find that with the extended family system in Southeast Asia, whether they are close or less close relatives, if there is some anchor anywhere in the United States, we would consider that some form of family reunification tends to produce better results and better resettlement opportunities.

Yet we must be sensitive to impacted areas. We consider that persons with the more extended family relationship must be reviewed carefully, in the sense that they would be placed wherever it was determined, under a placement policy, that this would be most desirable. If it turned out that the close relationships were in an impacted area, however, I think by and large that is where they would tend to go.

Senator SIMPSON. Just one more question. The decision was made—and if you could just explain why that decision was made—to give responsibility for the placement policy to ORR, while your office retains the administrative and fiscal responsibility for the voluntary agencies' reception and placement activities.

How effectively, then, can ORR administer a placement policy without control of the voluntary agencies funding and contracts?

Mr. VINE. There are several aspects to this, Mr. Chairman. First of all, both ORR and the Department of State have in the broadest sense, resettlement services. We tend to make a distinction between initial reception and placement services which extend for the first 90 days and other reception and placement services which are carried out by Phil Hawkes and HHS. We try, wherever possible, to keep the tightest possible coordination, and we improved that coordination in the last year.

One of the many reasons that we work directly with the voluntary agencies in this country is because we also work overseas with these agencies—especially in Southeast Asia—where the sponsorship relationships first surface and start the chain which is completed when refugees arrive here.

It is this chain relationship, the overseas processing, the sponsorship assessment and the feedback from this that makes our involvement in placement and reception useful from our point of view. We quite recognize that one could look at this issue either as an extension of the overseas processing chain or the beginning of the domestic processing chain. I am just not sure where the break point is. However, by the cooperative efforts we have with HHS, in placement and policy and by coordinating reception and placement I believe we best deal with the issue.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you.

Al, I would not want you to leave completely empty handed there. You would not want that, would you?

Mr. NELSON. I would not mind at all, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Since you are here, in that GAO report there was a finding that refugees' medical conditions were not always, it was felt, fully considered by INS officers overseas in deciding whether refugees should be admitted to the United States, and thus persons with excludable diseases were admitted.

If that has occurred in the past—and the House spent particularly a great deal of time on that in their hearings—what is the current policy for INS officers overseas in that regard?

STATEMENT OF ALAN C. NELSON

Mr. NELSON. Mr. Chairman, certainly the current policy of INS—and as far as I know, it has always been the policy—is that we would not grant any kind of blanket exemption. Second, we, of course, are not in the health business, nor qualified ourselves. We do rely on the Public Health Service and other health-related organizations for the appropriate screening.

I am generally aware of the GAO report, and I believe there are probably people from the Public Health Service that might better comment on it than I could. But, certainly, there is no policy, plan, nor do we think actuality, where there has been any allowing of people with communicable diseases or others to get through.

Senator SIMPSON. Since we have discussed voluntary agencies—and we will certainly do more of that in the course of the day, as we go now almost immediately into the next panel—you have recently begun to implement the policy of paroling the detained Haitians into the community, pending their asylum or their exclusion hearings.

Could you just swiftly give us an update on that? Particularly, have the voluntary agencies met their commitment to provide sponsorship properly for those parolees? How many have been paroled, and are those persons appearing for their hearings? I would appreciate a quick update.

Mr. NELSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to do that. I think, to answer in broad terms, that the Haitian parole program under Judge Spellman's order, as well as the parole program that has been undertaken by the Justice Department and INS for humanitarian reasons, are both going very well.

I think there has been a good relationship between the Government and the voluntary agencies. We have had some differences in the initial development of the program, the funding and the responsibility, as Mr. Hawkes knows very well, having joined with me in meeting with the voluntary agencies, some of the issues.

But I think it was a good, honest discussion. We worked out the relationships, very well. There might have been a few rough edges, but I think we feel generally satisfied and we hope the voluntary agencies do, too.

I think the results have been very positive. Again, in the heat of a court, often, there will be charges and countercharges, but I think the statistics and the overall effort have been good.

For example, there were approximately 1,800—I am rounding these figures off—Haitians in detention several months ago at the time of Judge Spellman's order. About 1,100 of those have now been processed out under Judge Spellman's order. In addition, during the same period, another 200 have been paroled out for humanitarian reasons, aside from Judge Spellman's order. And even going back beyond that—I am digressing on that—there were, I believe, 800 to 900, or more, people paroled out by the Justice Department and INS on our own criteria prior to any court order.

So, of the roughly 1,800, 1,100 or so have gone out under the Spellman order, plus another couple hundred as humanitarian paroles. A total of 1,313 out of the total of 1,781 have been paroled since the order. Another 468 remain in custody. All of these have been pre-processed by the INS and by the agencies. The only thing remaining for these cases is the sponsorships. So, these are pending and as soon as sponsorships are developed, and that is being worked on, they can be paroled.

We think that the program—considering the short time involved, the administrative difficulties, and the many other aspects—has gone very well.

Now, on the showing up for hearings, it is still a little early to have definitive figures. In addition, Judge Spellman, as you know, required a weekly reporting. There was some delay in that reporting taking hold. There were some 49 that failed to report, but with about half of those, contact has been reestablished. There are about 16 that are pending further investigation and about 8 that we know of so far that we have really lost contact with.

The real proof of the pudding, we think, is going to be coming in the weeks and months ahead as the hearings start moving along in a more orderly and rapid fashion, because that, of course, is the key, that the people report to their hearings. We will be watching that very closely.

Senator SIMPSON. We will be helping you watch it.

Mr. NELSON. Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Ambassador, Dr. Hawkes, Commissioner Nelson, and Mr. Vine. Thank you so much for your assistance; it is very helpful to the subcommittee.

The next panel, please: Robert Peterson, Senior Associate Director of the Human Resources Division of the General Accounting Office; Susan Forbes, senior associate, Refugee Policy Group, Washington, D.C.; Le Xuan Khoa, cofounder of the Council of Southeast Asian Refugees; and David North.

We will proceed now with the second panel in the order of the agenda. Mr. Peterson, please; we appreciate having your testimony.

STATEMENT OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF ROBERT A. PETERSON, SENIOR ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, HUMAN RESOURCES DIVISION, U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE; SUSAN FORBES, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, REFUGEE POLICY GROUP, WASHINGTON, D.C.; LE XUAN KHOA, COFOUNDER, COUNCIL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES, WASHINGTON, D.C.; AND DAVID S. NORTH, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR LABOR AND MIGRATION STUDIES, NEW TRANSCENTURY FOUNDATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. PETERSON. Mr. Chairman, we have submitted a rather lengthy prepared statement for the record. I will summarize it within the 5-minute deadline.

We are pleased to appear today to discuss the work we have recently completed concerning problems with resettlement of Indochinese refugees. Overall, we have concerns about the continuing placement of most refugees in a few areas in the United States; the lack of employment assistance given refugees, coupled with the large number of them receiving public assistance; the fragmented Federal management of the resettlement program; and the inadequate medical examinations performed overseas.

Placement decisions involving Indochinese refugees have depended heavily on the location of family members and friends already living in the United States. Seventy percent of all Indochinese refugees have been placed in 10 States, and refugees have been assigned to areas of the country even when key resettlement services were not effectively provided by local voluntary agency affiliates and other service providers.

Since the early years of Indochinese refugee movements to the United States, voluntary agencies have maintained that cash assistance should be used as a last resort. Despite that general philosophy, cash assistance use by newly arrived refugees has been quite high and occurs almost immediately upon arrival. Seventy-one percent of the total employable age refugees in our sample were found to have registered for and received cash assistance.

Our review showed that neither early employment nor concurrent employment and training have been emphasized for recent refugee arrivals. Despite the State Department requirement that voluntary agencies provide refugees with job counseling and job placement assistance, little of this assistance was provided to the refugees in our sample. In fact, voluntary agencies and their affiliates performed only limited monitoring of the refugees' progress toward self-sufficiency.

In 30 percent of the cases, no contact had existed between the agencies and their case members beyond 30 days. By 90 days, there was no contact with 50 percent of the refugees. If refugees are to become self-sufficient as soon as possible, monitoring progress toward this goal is important to assure that needed services are received.

The complex process of resettling refugees and helping them to become self-sufficient as quickly as possible is more cumbersome at the Federal level than it needs to be. Three key offices with responsibilities for domestic refugee resettlement include the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs, and the HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement.

The roles of the three offices are tangled without anyone having overall authority over domestic resettlement management and policy functions. In our opinion, a realinement of domestic refugee responsibilities among the key Federal offices is needed.

Permit me to summarize our recent report on overseas medical examinations of refugees. Indochinese refugees have a far greater incidence of several serious and contagious diseases than the overall U.S. population. Among these are tuberculosis, serious parasites, hepatitis B, malaria and leprosy. State and local health departments in California, Maryland, Texas, Virginia, and Washington were concerned that the high rate of diseases in refugees may pose a public health problem.

The United States relaxed its usual medical admission requirements on the belief that refugees with serious diseases identified overseas would report for treatment in the United States. Follow-on care by State and local health departments is the cornerstone in providing medical care to Indochinese refugees after their arrival. However, several barriers hinder health departments' efforts to provide such care. To preclude many of the problems confronting U.S. health departments in providing medical care, steps need to be taken to improve the cursory medical examinations in Southeast Asia. Our report contains recommendations to this end.

If I might interject as an ad lib, we disagree with Director Hawkes when he recommends that the notification to local health departments be limited only to refugees diagnosed with diseases overseas. I would be happy to go into that more later if you would care to.

The House Committee on the Judiciary, in its report on H.R. 5879, instructed HHS, State, and Justice to improve the overseas medical processing of refugees. The bill also authorized additional funds in fiscal year 1983 to defray the costs to health departments for medical screening and treatment. This dual approach of increasing medical care to refugees both overseas and in the United States should help improve the health of refugees and protect the American public.

H.R. 5879 includes a provision requiring the Comptroller General to conduct an annual audit of funds expended under section 412(b). We are concerned with the likelibood of reduced accountability of the executive branch if this provision is enacted.

The State Department, which currently administers the funding for monitoring of refugees, has been criticized for not monitoring or auditing the program. The proposed amendment places GAO in the position of executing a basic function that should be performed by the executive branch agency as a normal part of its management function. Without that responsibility, program accountability on the part of the executive branch could be further diminished. Accordingly, we recommend that that requirement not be enacted.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy to respond to any questions you might have.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Peterson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. PETERSON

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, we are pleased to appear today to discuss the work we have recently completed concerning problems with both the resettlement of Indochinese refugees in the United States and in the overseas medical examinations given refugees.

Overall, we have concerns about

--the continuing placement of most refugees in a few areas in the United States;

--the lack of employment assistance given to refugees soon after their arrival coupled with the large number of them receiving public assistance;

--the limited monitoring by voluntary agencies to assure that refugees receive services needed to help them become self-sufficient;

--the fragmented Federal management of the resettlement program;

--the high incidence of serious contagious diseases among refugees admitted to this country and the expense and difficulties in providing treatment; and

--the inadequate medical examinations performed overseas.

Each of these concerns is individually significant. Collectively, they lead us to conclude that much remains to be done both to deal effectively with the social and medical problems of the Indochinese refugees who have already arrived in this country and to improve the medical examination and treatment of those expected to arrive in the coming years.

PLACEMENT DECISIONS ARE HEAVILY INFLUENCED BY REUNIFICATION EMPHASIS

Placement decisions involving Indochinese refugees have depended heavily on the location of family members and friends already living in the United States. The emphasis on reunification is a key contributor to the fact that 70 percent of all Indochinese refugees have been placed in 10 States. Perhaps the best way to describe the family reunification emphasis is to give you an overview of the refugee allocation process. The process itself suggests that there are options for reducing the impact on some States.

The process begins overseas in refugee camps, where biographical data sheets are completed by voluntary agency representatives for all refugees who have been ruled admissible by the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The bio-data includes demographic information on the refugees, names and addresses of family members and friends in the United States, and resettlement preference, if any.

The bio-data sheets are sent to the American Council of Voluntary Agencies (ACVA) in New York, the umbrella organization for voluntary agencies. Under a funding agreement with the Department of State, the Council serves as a clearinghouse to assign Indochinese refugees to voluntary agencies for placement in U.S. communities. Reunification, which involves resettling refugees with close and distant relatives and friends, is given priority in determining where new refugees will be settled. The Council searches its files to identify and locate (1) relatives and/or friends listed on the bio-data sheet and (2) relatives previously resettled or friends and relatives who may have expressed an interest in having the refugee join them, independent of any such listings on the bio-data sheets.

The matching process generates four classes of resettlement cases which are distributed once or twice weekly to the voluntary agencies during allocation meetings.

> "Family Reunification" cases where only one voluntary agency was involved in resettling earlier arriving friends or relatives. - These cases are generally assigned to the agency that handled the family member or friend.
>
> "Family Reunification" cases involving more than one voluntary agency. - These cases are discussed among the interested agencies to decide which one will take the case.
>
> "Geographic" cases - where the refugee designates a relative or friend in a particular location on the bio-data sheet but the Council has no record of the relative/friend or the sponsoring voluntary agency. These cases are distributed to voluntary agencies with support services in the designated areas.
>
> "Free Cases" - where the refugee has indicated no relatives, friends, or geographic preference on the bio-data sheet and none are found by the Council's file search. These cases are divided among the voluntary agencies.

The allocation process, with its heavy emphasis on reunification, has resulted in cases being assigned to areas of the country even when key resettlement services were not effectively provided by local voluntary agency affiliates and other service providers.

We examined a sample 1/ of refugee cases for fiscal year 1981 to determine the extent to which arriving refugees had relatives already in this country. About 67 percent had relatives here; however, only about half of those were close relatives including parents, children, siblings, grandparents, or spouses. Many of these relatives resided in areas already impacted by high concentrations of refugees.

The Refugee Act of 1980 directed both the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs and the Director, Office of Refugee Resettlement, (ORR) to consult with State and local governments and voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship process and placement of refugees. ORR and the U.S. Coordinator's Office have held meetings with representatives of these groups around the country during the past two years in an effort to obtain State and local views on the refugee program. However, representatives of State and local governments have often not viewed these meetings as giving them significant or meaningful input into the sponsorship and placement process. They have been concerned about the strain on local resources such as employment, housing, and community support services associated with continued placements of large numbers of refugees in the same areas.

Some voluntary agency affiliates have made attempts on their own to lessen the impact on local resources such as accepting only close family reunification cases for resettlement or placing refugees in clusters in peripheral areas away from impacted areas. In November 1981, ACVA, in response to concerns over the impact on local resources expressed by communities which were continuing to absorb large numbers of Indochinese refugees, formally designated a number of areas as impacted by refugees where member agencies would temporarily limit or refrain from placing "free" cases. Since then, two additional areas have been added to the list of areas to refrain from placing "free" cases.

1/ The sample was designed to be projectable to the total number of cases for FY 1981 at the 95-percent confidence level with a maximum sampling error of 6.5 percent.

In the past, refugee placement decisions were left up to the voluntary agencies with ad hoc policy guidance from the State Department and the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. In October 1981, the Administration gave responsibility for developing a refugee placement policy to ORR. However, the State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs retained administrative and fiscal responsibility for voluntary agencies' initial reception and placement activities.

The placement policy issued in July 1982, provides a framework for containing the impact on areas with high concentrations of refugees. We agree that efforts to more closely scrutinize reunification in resettling cases involving distant relatives and friends when they would otherwise go to areas of high refugee concentration are needed, particularly where employment conditions and other factors are not conducive to quick self-sufficiency. We also agree that more attention needs to be given to identifying, in cooperation with state and local officials, new resettlement areas conducive to refugees achieving self-sufficiency quickly.

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES

Our basic approach to examining resettlement activities was to look at a statistically valid sample of refugees initially placed in five counties during April and June 1981. Those cases represented the placement of 1,011 individual refugees, of which 594 were of employment age. 1/ Our review was designed to provide information covering a short period of time; that is, a snapshot of what services are being provided to refugees during their first months in the United States and what emphasis, if any, is given to quick self-sufficiency.

We chose the two months indicated to assure that the refugees had been in this country generally between 4 and 6 months--long enough to have potentially benefited from available services but not so long as to preclude our obtaining information because of

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1/ See attachments 1 and 2 for a further breakout of counties, voluntary agencies, and other general information regarding our sample.

inadequate records. Still, because of the limited records available, we often had to rely on interviews and voluntary agency case workers' recollections for information. We focused on obtaining information from providers rather than interviewing refugees. Let me elaborate on what we found.

Cash Assistance Dependency

The Refugee Act of 1980 provides Federal funding for cash and medical assistance, as well as social services, such as language instruction, training, and other services to foster self-sufficiency. Although the act emphasizes quick refugee self-sufficiency as a major objective, there is much room for interpretation as to what that term means. Absent definitive guidance, quick self-sufficiency has often been interpreted to mean self-sufficiency within the period of available Federal funding for cash assistance. As you know, until April 1982, that period was 36 months for all refugees, and now it is half that for refugees not meeting regular Aid to Families with Dependent Children eligibility requirements or residing in States or counties not having general assistance programs.

Since the early years of Indochinese refugee movements to the United States, many voluntary agencies have maintained that cash assistance should be used as a last resort when refugees' needs exceeded available sponsorship resources and sponsors were unable to help refugees become employed and self-sufficient. State Department funding of the voluntary agencies was intended to supplement the agencies' own resources, including additional local community resources, to help with resettlement needs.

Despite that general philosophy, cash assistance use by newly arrived refugees has been quite high and occurs almost immediately upon arrival. In fact 71 percent 1/ of the total employable age members in our sample were found to have registered for and received cash assistance. Of those registering, 88 percent did so within 30

1/ If the universe from which this percentage was calculated were adjusted to eliminate persons who migrated elsewhere before signing up for cash assistance or those for whom we could not determine whether they had been on cash assistance due to similarity of names, the registration rate would increase several percentage points.

days of arrival and most did so within 2 weeks. The percentages of employable-age refugees having received cash assistance ranged among counties from about 52 percent in Harris County, Texas, to 87 percent in San Francisco, California.

Available data on how long refugees stay on or actually require cash assistance is limited. Based on a survey of selected States, as of June 1, 1981, HHS projected a nationwide dependency rate of 67 percent for refugees here less than 3 years. Sixty-five percent of the refugees in our sample were still receiving public assistance as of October 31, 1981, 4 to 6 months after arriving in the United States. While the percentage of refugees on cash assistance in our sample dropped an average of 6 percentage points, the largest reduction, 11 percent, occured in Harris County, Texas, where benefit levels are lowest among the counties examined.

Using former refugees as sponsors has become an accepted practice of all voluntary agencies we reviewed. It is increasingly replacing what voluntary agencies described as their more traditional practice of resettling refugees in communities, assisted by paid caseworkers or volunteer help of Americans, individually and in groups. Relying on former refugees has resulted not only from a preference by some voluntary agencies/affiliates for former refugees to sponsor new arrivals, but also from the voluntary agencies' increased difficulty in finding traditional sponsors.

Former refugees sponsored 58 percent of the refugees in our sample. Voluntary agencies often used other refugees in the sponsorship process with limited assessment of whether or not they were self-sufficient. Although some voluntary agencies considered themselves to be the real sponsor, the agencies often relied on former refugees to provide services for which the agencies were responsible for providing or assuring they were provided.

Recognizing that former refugees on welfare will inevitably have a major influence on the resettlement of their relatives, the State Department, in September 1981 reiterated in writing its policy that voluntary agencies not use welfare recipients as sponsors. The letter stated that in cases where an incoming refugee joins a family on welfare, the agency should ensure some other means of providing resettlement services. Shortly following this State Department correspondence, we did some limited checking of agencies' reactions to the directive. Some agencies which had previously used former refugees as local sponsors and had maintained records designating them as sponsors simply stopped recording those persons as sponsors, yet continued to use them to provide resettlement services. Others were continuing to use former refugees as sponsors to further family reunification irrespective of the former refugees' self-sufficiency.

Next I want to focus on employment related services to refugees.

Quick Employment Has Little Emphasis

The Refugee Act emphasizes the goal of refugees achieving economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. Some limited guidance on how soon self-sufficiency should begin to occur is embodied in the act, HHS program instructions, and terms of the State Department funding agreements for voluntary agencies.

The act exempts refugees from work registration requirements during their first 60 days in the United States. HHS program instructions state that refugees' inability to communicate in English does not make them unemployable. At the same time, however, these instructions authorize delayed work registration requirements for refugees in approved training programs. The State Department requires that voluntary agencies provide job counseling and job placement assistance to refugees on their arrival or thereafter as necessary and appropriate.

Our review showed that neither early employment nor concurrent employment and training have been emphasized for recent refugee arrivals. Despite the State Department requirement that voluntary agencies provide refugees with job counseling and job placement assistance, little of this assistance was provided to the refugees in our sample. Voluntary agency staffs said they had provided job counseling to less than half the employable age refugees and job placement assistance to 10 percent. Although infrequently documented, voluntary agencies sometimes told us they referred refugees elsewhere for employment services, mostly to HHS-funded providers.

We contacted the HHS-funded social service providers who provided employment-related services in the five counties. Some of those providers were also State Department funded voluntary agencies. Only 29 percent of the employable age refugees received job counseling from these providers and 12 percent received job placement assistance.

Indications are that refugees are often not considered to be job ready without English speaking ability. Only 22 percent of the employable age refugees in our sample were described by voluntary agencies as having fair to good English speaking ability. The most predominant reasons given to us by voluntary agencies for refugees not being employed were that they needed more English instruction or they were taking English. Other reasons included refugees' (1) receiving no offers of employment, (2) not aggressively seeking employment, (3) needing additional training, and (4) caring for dependents at home.

Some States and counties are giving added emphasis to employment services in fiscal year 1982. However, when the refugees in our sample arrived in fiscal year 1981, HHS-funded service providers often placed more emphasis on social services, such as orientation and English language training, which they considered employment services, than on more directly related employment services, such as job development and placement. Often, refugees taking English language training attended such training less than full time without working either full or part time.

Providers that focused on job development and placement were able to place refugees--even those with poor language skills--in unskilled, entry-level jobs. In fact, the voluntary agencies described 40 percent of the refugees who they knew were employed as having little or no conversational English when they got jobs.

Of the 594 employable age refugees in our sample, only 83 (or 14 percent) were known by voluntary agencies to have been employed any time since their arrival in the United States. Over half of the 83 refugees had obtained jobs within 60 days of arrival.

Obtaining employment for unskilled non-English-speaking refugees often requires the assistance of interpreters or persons who can intercede between refugees and potential employers. State employment offices, where many refugees register for work, often did not have the resources to do this.

Voluntary agencies and other service providers told us that many refugees preferred training over immediate employment. There were some reported instances of refugees being reluctant to go on job interviews; however, the extent of this is not clear. We found few instances of refugees actually turning down specific job offers.

Some recent steps have been taken toward providing more emphasis on employment. H.R. 5879, the Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, passed by the House repeals the 60-day work registration exemption for refugees. We believe the 60-day exemption could inhibit those refugees who are capable of working from seeking employment. Also, based on our sample, we know that some refugees are capable of finding work shortly after arrival in this country. HHS/ORR, issued revised program guidelines which became effective August 1 1982 which tighten employment requirements for cash assistance recipients by not (1) recognizing attendance in a college program (for a person age 18 or over) as a reason for delaying work registration and (2) exempting persons attending part-time training from accepting employment.

We view these as positive steps toward emphasizing early employment.

Little Monitoring Of Refugees' Progress

If refugees are to become self-sufficient as soon as possible, monitoring progress toward this goal is important to assure needed services are received to facilitate that progress. The results of our case samples indicated only limited monitoring was taking place.

Voluntary agencies, under funding agreements with the State Department, are required to assure that refugees receive, as needed, such services as reception, provision of temporary care, job counseling and job placement. Some services, such as assistance with housing and food, are required only during the refugee's first month here. Other services, such as job counseling and job placement assistance, are to be made available longer. In fiscal year 1981, that period was 1 year; in fiscal year 1982, it was reduced to 90 days.

For refugee cases we sampled, voluntary agencies and their affiliates performed only limited monitoring of the refugees progress toward self-sufficiency. In 30 percent of the cases, no contact existed between the agencies and their case members beyond 30 days. By 90 days there was no contact with 50 percent of the refugees.

Extended contact between refugees and voluntary agencies did not necessarily mean the agency staff knew whether the refugees were receiving social services important to achieving self-sufficiency. As noted, voluntary agencies' staffs told us of having referred refugees to HHS-funded service providers, particularly for employment-related services. Contacts with these providers, however, turned up no record of registration for many of the refugees.

Although voluntary agencies and their affiliates frequently relied on local sponsors, such as former refugees, to provide services or help the refugees obtain them, the agencies and their affiliates did little to assure such aid was provided. Some voluntary agencies had formal followup systems to check on refugees' status. These called for oral or written communication with either the refugee or the local sponsor intermittently up to several months after the refugees' arrival. However, those reports were often not done for refugees in our sample until we inquired about them.

Welfare offices can also refer public assistance applicants to appropriate service providers; however, many times this was not done. Welfare offices frequently were required to send refugees to register with State employment offices in conjunction with their application for cash assistance. Despite recognizing that State employment offices in the five counties were providing little assistance to refugees, the welfare offices frequently did not refer refugees to other service providers for cases in our sample.

In an attempt to alleviate some of these problems with refugee referrals, four of the five counties took some action. Cook County, Illinois instituted a system in July 1981 requiring refugees to register with one of the HHS funded service providers offering employment services before registering for cash assistance. Ramsey County, Minnesota, also in July 1981, ceased requiring refugees to register with the State employment office in order to receive cash assistance and established a work and training unit within the welfare office to facilitate refugees receiving needed services. In the Fall of 1981, two counties, Arlington, Virginia, and San Francisco, began operating central intake and referral systems to better assist new arrivals. Arlington began requiring refugees to register with a service provider before registering for cash assistance. The San Francisco system, part of a state-wide effort to integrate and coordinate service delivery, provided central screening and development of a refugee service plan.

The newness of these changes did not permit us to evaluate them. However, we see them as much needed improvements directed toward assuring refugees receive needed services.

ORR issued a program instruction, effective August 1, 1982, requiring State welfare agencies to contact refugee sponsors or resettlement agencies as part of determining (or redetermining) refugees' eligibility for cash and medical assistance, to determine whether the refugees have refused employment offers or voluntarily quit a job without good cause. We believe these program changes can only be effective to the extent that voluntary agencies remain in contact with refugees and that voluntary agencies and other service providers are actively engaged in offering job development and placement assistance to refugees.

FRAGMENTED FEDERAL MANAGEMENT

The complex process of resettling refugees and helping them to become self-sufficient as quickly as possible is more cumbersome at the Federal level than it needs to be. Although three

Federal offices have key roles in domestic refugee resettlement, none has clear responsibilty and authority for the program. We believe these roles should be addressed in the reauthorization of the Refugee Act.

The three key offices with responsibilities for domestic refugee resettlement include the Office of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs; the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs; and the HHS Office of Refugee Resettlement. The mandate of the Refugee Coordinator's office is wide ranging and overlaps the work of the other two agencies.

The Coordinator's functions include policy development, coordination and consultation concerning refugee admissions and placements. The Coordinator is also charged with representing and negotiating on behalf of the United States with foreign governments and international organizations concerning refugee matters. The State Department Refugee Bureau administers the Government's international refugee programs and the initial domestic resettlement program carried out by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies and its affiliates. HHS' Office of Refugee Resettlement is responsible for administering programs of cash and medical assistance, and social services to refugees settled in the United States.

The roles of the three offices are tangled without any one having overall authority over domestic resettlement management and policy functions. For example, both the U.S. Coordinator and the Office of Refugee Resettlement are charged by law with consulting with State and local governments and voluntary agencies concerning the sponsorship process and placement of refugees. Yet, it is the Refugee Bureau that administers voluntary agencies' funding for initial reception and placement activities.

As mentioned, the administration recently assigned placement policy responsibilities to HHS, while leaving administration of voluntary agency funding for initial placement services with the State Department. We are concerned about how effectively HHS can administer placement policy without control of voluntary agencies' funding and the agreements under which they operate.

In our opinion, a realignment of domestic refugee responsibilities among the key Federal offices is needed.

In addition to eliminating fragmented management, specific improvements are needed in the monitoring of domestic resettlement activities at the Federal and State level. The State Department has not performed adequate program or financial monitoring of voluntary agencies. Beginning in fiscal year 1981, the State Department, for the first time, required a combination semi-annual program and financial report; however, inadequate instructions and unclear reporting criteria make these reports of little use. A State Department official acknowledged in April 1982 congressional hearings that it had never audited the voluntary agencies' use of Federal funds. Currently, the Refugee Bureau is developing procedures for monitoring service delivery of voluntary agencies under their funding agreements. The effectiveness of any future evaluations and the ability to establish measures of accountability will in large part be impacted by the extent to which the funding agreements with the voluntary agencies clarify agencies' responsibilities.

Monitoring by ORR, its regional offices and State Coordinator offices has also been limited though not to the extent we found concerning the State Department funded activities.

Officials at both ORR regional offices and State Coordinator's offices we reviewed told us that monitoring of ORR funded social service providers was difficult since no standards had been developed against which to measure program progress.

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As the Subcommittee addresses reauthorization of the Refugee Act, we believe a number of changes should be considered:

--Amending section 412(a) of the Refugee Act to require that (1) priority attention be given to quick employment and economic self-sufficiency, and (2) this priority be adhered to notwithstanding provisions for attendance at language and other employment training.

--Repealing that portion of section 412(e)(2) of the Refugee Act exempting refugees from employment registration and acceptance of job offer requirements during the first 60 days after entry.

--amending Section 412(b) of the Refugee Act to give total responsibility for the program of initial resettlement of refugees to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.

Essentially, this last change would place all domestic resettlement activities under one department and should better concentrate efforts on helping refugees seek self-sufficiency as quickly as possible. We believe that a single agency focal point for domestic refugee resettlement is needed to deal with the problems identified.

With this change in mind, we also recommend that the Subcommittee consider whether there is a need to have a separate U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. If the responsibilities for domestic resettlement activities are placed in the Department of Health and Human Services, and the State Department Refugee Bureau maintains responsibility for the international aspects, the duties of the Coordinator could be split as appropriate between the two departments. This, coupled with a strong provision that the departments coordinate their activities, would lead to a more streamlined system for dealing with this complex area.

H.R. 5879 includes a provision requiring the Comptroller General to conduct an annual audit of funds expended under Section 412(b). Regarding Indochinese refugees, this covers the activities of twelve nonprofit voluntary and two State agencies which are funded to provide reception and placement services. Each of the voluntary agencies has numerous regional and local affiliates to which Federal monies are channeled in carrying out the program. The cost for these audits could be quite high, and place a heavy burden on our resources.

We are equally concerned with the likelihood of reduced accountability of the Executive Branch if this provision is enacted. The State Department which currently administers the funding for agencies resettling refugees has been criticized for not monitoring or auditing the program. The proposed amendment places GAO in the position of executing a basic function that should be performed by the Executive Branch agency as a normal part of its management function. Without that responsibility, program accountability on the part of the Executive Branch could be further diminished.

As you know, committees and subcommittees having jurisdiction may request our office to perform desired reviews and, under section 204 of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, as amended, we will perform such requested reviews. We believe such an arrangement, in lieu of a specific legislative requirement, would be mutually advantageous because it would permit us, through discussions with the committee, to reach agreement regarding the scope of reviews to be conducted and thus concentrate on the matters of greatest concern to the subcommittee. GAO would prefer to retain its traditional role of performing periodic audits to assess agencies' performance and encouraging more effective, ongoing oversight by Executive Branch agencies. Accordingly, we recommend that the requirement for General Accounting Office audits as contained in Section 412(b) of H.R. 5879 not be enacted.

Now permit me to summarize our recent report, "Improved Overseas Medical Examinations and Treatment Can Reduce Serious Diseases in Indochinese Refugees Entering the United States" (GAO/HRD-82-65, August 5, 1982).

REFUGEES ENTERING THE UNITED STATES HAVE HIGH INCIDENCE OF DISEASES

Indochinese refugees have a far greater incidence of several serious and contagious diseases than the overall U.S. population. Among these diseases are tuberculosis, serious parasites, hepatitis B, malaria, and leprosy. State and local health departments in California, Maryland, Texas, Virginia, and Washington were concerned that the high rate of diseases in refugees may pose a public health problem.

Tuberculosis, for example, which was the second leading cause of death in the United States around the turn of the century, had declined to a rate of 12 cases per 100,000 population by 1980. In contrast, the Centers for Disease Control found that refugees who entered the United States in 1980 with no evidence of disease when examined overseas had a rate of 407 cases per 100,000 population, about 34 times greater than the overall U.S. rate. Overall, CDC found that Indochinese refugees had a reported rate of 1,138 cases of active tuberculosis per 100,000 population. Local health authorities have found the overall rate of tuberculosis in refugees, including those diagnosed overseas and those diagnosed after arrival in the United States to be as high as 2,300 cases per 100,000 population--about 192 times greater than the U.S. rate.

Other examples are the parasitic diseases amebiasis and giardiasis, which spread much illness, such as dysentery, in locations where hygiene and sanitary conditions are poor. They can be transmitted by direct contact with others or by indirect contact through food handling--an area in which many refugees are employed. CDC has found that 48 percent of all Indochinese refugees had at least one parasite and that amebiasis and giardiasis could cause a public health problem in the United States. Our work showed that the incidence of parasites in refugees exceeded 70 percent in some locations. Refugees also have a high incidence of hepatitis B, malaria, and leprosy.

The United States relaxed its usual medical admission requirements specified in the Immigration and Nationality Act to expedite Indochinese refugee admissions. This decision was based on the belief that refugees with serious diseases identified overseas would report for treatment in the United States. Follow-on care by State and local health departments is the cornerstone in providing medical care to Indochinese refugees after their arrival. However, several barriers hinder health departments' efforts to provide such care. These include

--variances in health departments' programs to locate and examine refugees,

--refugees moving from their place of resettlement without notifying health authorities,

--failure of refugees to take prescribed treatment, and

--problems of incomplete or missing medical records.

Although the Refugee Act of 1980 authorized the Federal Government to reimburse States and localities for up to 100 percent of the costs incurred in providing medical services to refugees, this does not always occur. HHS' Medicaid criteria were used as the basis for reimbursement and Medicaid has certain gaps in services that are reimbursable. As a result, some health departments have had to absorb substantial costs in providing services to refugees. For example, from August 1979 to April 1981, Fairfax County, Virginia spent about $270,000 in providing medical care to refugees, of which only about $61,000 was reimbursed by Medicaid. Prince Georges County, Maryland, estimated that in 1980 it cost $238 to screen and treat each refugee for communicable disease, but the county received no reimbursement for these services. Health departments in California, Hawaii, Virginia, and the District of Columbia stated that they have experienced similar problems.

According to a 1981 HHS study, communities are now faced with the dilemma of shrinking resources but having to find additional resources for the increasing number of refugees. Our work showed that refugees accounted for a large part of some health departments' workloads, which caused some departments to curtail or limit service to their general population.

OVERSEAS MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF REFUGEES SHOULD BE IMPROVED

To preclude many of the problems confronting U.S. health departments in providing medical care to refugees, steps need to be taken to improve the medical examinations in Southeast Asia. The overseas medical examinations of Indochinese refugees were cursory and the medical procedures used were not in accordance with U.S. standards. The medical examinations were inadequate to detect certain excludable diseases which frequently occur in refugees, such as tuberculosis and leprosy, and were not designed to detect other diseases, such as the parasitic conditions amebiasis and giardiasis, hepatitis B, and malaria, which, although not defined as excludable, are serious, contagious, and common in Southeast Asia.

In addition, refugees' medical conditions were not considered by the Immigration and Naturalization Service in deciding whether refugees should be admitted to the United States, and overseas examining physicians did not have access to medical records accumulated while refugees were in refugee camps under the care of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

The improved medical examinations should include

--a medical history;

--an examination for tuberculosis, leprosy, parasites, hepatitis B, and malaria using appropriate U.S. medical procedures; and

--an examination for mental health problems and other problems that could affect the refugees' earning ability.

We also believe that refugees with active tuberculosis, malaria, amebiasis, or giardiasis should be treated before they enter this country. Leprosy patients should receive treatment sufficient to render them noninfectious.

The House Committee on the Judiciary, in its report on (H.R. 5879), instructed HHS, State, and Justice to improve the overseas medical processing of refugees. The bill also authorizes $14 million in fiscal year 1983 to defray costs to health departments for medical screening and treatment of refugees. This dual approach of increasing medical care to refugees both overseas and in the United States should help improve the health of refugees and protect the American public.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes our statement. We shall be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the Subcommittee might have.

ATTACHMENT 1

INDOCHINESE REFUGEES INCLUDED IN GAO REVIEW BY COUNTY REVIEWED

County/State a/	Number of Refugee Cases b/	Total Refugees	Number of Case Members of Employable Age c/
Arlington County, Virgina	34	119	70
Cook County, Illioncis	64	207	131
Harris County, Texas	87	276	157
Ramsey County, Minnesota	32	92	56
San Francisco County, California	89	317	180
	306	1,011	594

a/States were selected in response to the Subcommittee's request that we examine areas greatly impacted by refugees. Additionally, we wanted our sample to be geographically balanced within the 10 States that have received about 70 percent of Indochinese refugee placements. We also wanted to include States with high and low cash assistance payments. Counties were selected from those which State Refugee Coordinators considered to be most impacted by Indochinese refugee.

b/The cases represent a statistically valid stratified random sample of total refugee cases initially placed by voluntary agencies in the five counties during April and June, 1981.

c/Age 16-64

ATTACHMENT 2

INDOCHINESE REFUGEE CASES INCLUDED IN GAO REVIEW BY VOLUNTARY AGENCY AND COUNTY

	Number of Cases Reviewed In					
Agency	Arlington	Cook	Harris	Ramsey	San Francisco	Total
U.S. Catholic Conference	20	10	25	12	15	82
American Council for Nationalities Service	0	20	0	13	12	45
International Rescue Committee	3	0	20	0	15	38
Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society	0	13	7	0	8	28
Young Men's Christian Association	6	0	20	0	0	26
Church World Service	2	4	[illegible]	2	5	23
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service	0	10	4	2	6	22
World Relief Refugee Services	3	5	1	3	8	20
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees	0	2	0	0	15	17
Tolstoy Foundation	0	0	0	0	5	5
Total	34	64	87	32	89	306

Notes: (1) GAO's sample of cases was selected from monthly arrival reports of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies.

(2) The sample of cases selected for review was stratified so as to be representative of cases resettled by voluntary agencies in the five counties during the 2 months sampled, April and June 1981. Consequently, the sample includes cases from all voluntary agencies then resettleing Indochinese refugees, except for one small agency, the Buddhist Council, which resettled few cases in the areas we reviewed during fiscal year 1981.

Senator SIMPSON. And now Dr. Forbes, please.

STATEMENT OF SUSAN FORBES

Ms. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate this opportunity to testify before the subcommittee. I am a senior associate with the Refugee Policy Group, a nonprofit organization founded in November 1981 to improve the quality of information and analysis used in addressing refugee issues, formulating policies, and developing programs.

The Refugee Policy Group's activities include policy and organizational analysis, research and data, and resource development. I am testifying today as the director of an RPG project that is focused on the meaning of refugee welfare dependency rates.

We looked at this issue because the statistics are frequently used, as they have been this afternoon, as indicators of the effectiveness of the U.S. refugee program in bringing refugees to self-sufficiency.

Increases in refugee welfare dependency rates from 37 percent in 1979 to 49 percent in 1980 to 67 percent in 1981 have been cited as evidence of a decline in the U.S. refugee program's capacity to resettle refugees. Parenthetically, it is to be assumed that the decrease now to 52 percent, as reported before, is likely to be used as an indication of an improvement in program effectiveness.

A close look at the statistics, though, reveals that the changes in welfare dependency rates are more apparent than real. They are much more determined by statistical and methodological effects than they are actual program development.

Since the issue of welfare dependency rates emerges each time there is a discussion of the refugee program, RPG's hope has been that the paper that we have produced will improve understanding of this key indicator.

My testimony which I would like to enter into the record, includes a much more detailed discussion of what these methodological effects are, but I would like to briefly summarize them.

Welfare dependency rates are the percentage of welfare eligible refugees—those eligible for the federally reimbursed cash assistance program—who are on cash assistance at the time that a survey is conducted to determine these rates.

Changes in the distribution of welfare eligible refugees by their length of residence in the United States therefore affects what these dependency rates will be. This occurs because the longer a refugee lives here, the less likely that refugee is to be dependent on welfare.

Two things have happened that have caused fluctuations over the last few years. First of all, there has been tremendous fluctuation in the pattern of refugee arrivals. Very briefly, you can see on this chart table I—and I apologize for using the chart, but for as simple a concept as this is, it is very difficult to present it unless there are some type of visual materials to show it.

TABLE I

REFUGEE ARRIVALS: 1975-1981



You can see that in 1975, there are large numbers of arrivals; very few through 1978. It picks up again in 1979, peaks in 1980, begins to lower again in 1981, and then this is the estimated number for 1982—75,000. So, it has gone down again.

What happens is that in 1979, when the dependency rate of 37 percent was calculated, the majority of those included in that calculation came in 1975, fully 4 years before the dependency rate was calculated. They had been in the country for quite a period of time.

By 1980, the proportion of new arrivals had increased and their effects on dependency rates began to be felt, as they continued to be felt in 1981. What also happened is that the effects of the 1975 arrivals—who tended to come in here with more education and better skills—began to diminish as the number of new arrivals took over in terms of the proportion of population.

That can be seen in this chart table II, in which, in 1981, the percentage of welfare eligible refugees who were 3 years or less in the country is 100 percent; this is as a result of the Refugee Act's 3-year cutoff of welfare eligibility. And the number of 1975 arrivals in that calculation is down to zero. As a result, the rates begin to increase tremendously in 1981.

TABLE II

REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES FOR
SPECIFIED PERIODS OF TIME



_______ % of Welfare Eligible Refugees Who Arrived in the United States in 1975

- - - - - % of Welfare Eligible Refugees in United States for Three Years or Less

With the decrease in arrivals in 1982, the pattern begins to shift again, and now it is those who are in the country for 2 and 3 years who are dominating the statistics rather than, as last year, those who are in the country for 1 or 2 years.

I did a quick calculation in preparing this testimony without having heard the ORR figures to see if the exact same pattern of welfare use existed this year as did last year and what the dependency rate would be. And depending on how many would be in general assistance, I came out to about 52 percent—somewhere between 48 and 54, depending on assumptions about general assistance usage. So, you can see that the numbers are very, very much determined by what the patterns of arrivals are.

It is because of this fact about welfare dependency rates that one can say that they are not a very good measure of program effectiveness, particularly if you consider just the aggregate rate. It would make much more sense to either disaggregate them in order to be able to look at how specific groups of refugees are doing at specific points during their resettlement, or to adjust them, as the Bureau of Labor Statistics adjusts the unemployment rate, to take into account some of these variations.

Better still would be to adopt other measures of self-sufficiency, looking more closely at labor force participation rates and unemployment rates—a more positive measure of whether refugees are, in fact, achieving self-sufficiency.

Whatever measure is chosen, though, the conclusion that can be drawn from this exercise of looking at the statistics is that we must be very, very cognizant of the differences among different refugee groups, the need for the flexibility in the refugee program to address those particular needs, and the need for us to take the time and to do the type of analysis that will permit us to really understand what is going on and not make changes that are premature or based on facts other than the data.

I thank you again and I would be happy to answer any questions.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you for your very precise testimony; that is helpful.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Forbes follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF SUSAN FORBES

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is Susan Forbes. I am a Senior Associate with the Refugee Policy Group, a non-profit organization founded in November, 1981, to improve the quality of information and analysis used in addressing refugee issues, formulating policies and developing programs.
The Refugee Policy Group's activities include policy and organizational analysis, research, and data and resource development.

I am testifying today as the director of an RPG project that has focused on the meaning of refugee welfare dependency rates. The Refugee Policy Group looked at this issue because these statistics are frequently used as indicators of the effectiveness of the U.S. refugee resettlement program in bringing refugees to self-sufficiency. Increases in welfare dependency rates--from 37% in 1979 to 49% in 1980 to 67% in 1981--have been cited as evidence of a decline in the U.S. refugee program's capacity to resettle refugees. A close look at the statistics, however, reveals that this increase in welfare dependency rates is more apparent than real, particularly when these rates are used to assess program performance rather than for the budgeting purposes for which they were originally calculated.

Since the issue of welfare dependency re-emerges each time there is discussion of the refugee program, the hope is that the paper will improve understanding of this key indicator.

The aim of the paper is not to judge current rates or to suggest that they are better or worse than they should be; nor is the purpose to suggest that no changes are needed to improve the quality of the refugee program. Rather, its aim is to provide better understanding of the factors that have caused fluctuations in the refugee welfare dependency rate in order to provide a context for making more informed program judgements--a context in which decisions can be made on the basis of accurate data and informed analysis.

Our findings are as follows:

- The most recent increases in welfare dependency rates can be attributed fully to methodological and statistical variation rather than actual change in patterns of welfare use.

  The seeming increase in welfare dependence from 1979 to 1981 was caused by two inter-related factors, both of which reflect the distribution of refugees by their length of residence in the U.S. These factors are important because of the relationship between welfare use and duration of stay in the United States: the longer a refugee lives in this country, the less likely he or she is to collect welfare benefits.

  - Changes in the distribution of the refugee population from greater proportions of older arrivals to greater proportions of new arrivals has contributed significantly to dependency rate increases. The pattern of refugee arrivals changed over time, with large numbers coming in 1975, fewer in 1976 to 1978, and higher numbers again in 1979 to 1981. When the welfare dependency rate was calculated in 1979, the experiences of the 1975 arrivals, then here for four years, figured prominently since they accounted for almost 60 percent of the eligible refugee population. In 1980, this group, now in the U.S. for five years, accounted for only 33 percent of the eligibles. At the other end of the spectrum, in 1979 "recent arrivals" -- those in the country less than 1 year -- accounted for 27% of the eligible population. In 1980 they accounted for 40%. In 1981, for reasons discussed below, no 1975 arrivals were counted in the eligible population; fully 100 percent had come within the previous three years, with 90 percent of these having arrived within the previous one to two years.

  - The Refugee Act of 1980 restricted eligibility for refugee program welfare benefits to not more than 36 months, resulting in a change in the timeframes used to calculate the welfare dependency rate.* Prior to this time all Indochinese refugees in the U.S. since 1975 were included in the calculation. Beginning in 1981 only refugees in the country less than 3 years were included and the older arrivals were dropped. This change accounts for a significant proportion of the increase in dependency rates between 1980 and 1981.

- The seeming increase in welfare dependency rates was compounded by other changes in calculation methods that caused an overestimate in the 1981 rate.

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* This change took effect on April 1, 1981.

Until 1981, the welfare dependency rate was calculated from data collected from all states participating in the refugee program. In 1981, however, the statistic was based on a survey of nine states. To determine the national rate from the nine-state dependency rate, ORR assumed that these states accounted for about the same proportion of the refugee welfare caseload in 1981 as they did in 1980. Since these states actually accounted for a larger share of eligible refugees in 1981 than they did in previous years, it is likely that there were fewer refugee welfare recipients nationwide than was assumed. **

Further, included in the welfare recipient population in the 1981 survey were non-Indochinese and non-Cuban refugees, but these other groups were not included in the number of eligible refugees. Had the non-Indochinese refugees been removed from the recipient category or added to the eligible category, the welfare dependency rate would have been lower.

- The welfare dependency rate of refugees who arrived in 1975 was lower during their first 36 months in the U.S. than that of refugees who have arrived within the last three years.

However, it is important to understand that the majority of 1975 arrivals were educated at the secondary or university level while the majority of post-1979 arrivals have had little or no education. The overall welfare dependency rate for each group has reflected the experiences of the dominant class within that group.

By controlling for education level in calculating welfare dependency rates, much of the variation between pre and post 1979 arrivals would be eliminated.

- The 1982 welfare dependency rate is likely to be lower than that of 1981. Statistical factors and policy changes affecting the period of refugee eligibility for refugee welfare benefits will again exert an influence on this rate:

--The definition of a welfare-eligible refugee is likely to remain one who has been in the U.S. for 36 months or less, but some of these refugees will in fact lose their eligibility after 18 months. Refugee program-reimbursable welfare use for this group will be zero. In effect, it will lower aggregate numbers.

--Also, in 1982, a larger proportion of the eligible population will have been in the U.S. for two to three years, rather than the one to two years found in 1981. The distribution of refugees by their length of residence should further reduce dependency rates.

In determining the effect of program improvements on decreases in dependency rates, these statistical variations will have to be taken into account.

** In reviewing this paper, an ORR representative notes that an adjustment factor was used, but that it underestimated the change in population size.

Because of the susceptibility of these aggregate welfare dependency ratesto variations caused by statistical factors, they are not the best statistics by which to measure the effectiveness of the refugee program. It is likely, though, that welfare utilization patterns will continue to influence perceptions about refugee resettlement. Certain changes in methods of calculation should therefore be considered.

More precision could be obtained if the measure were adjusted to take into account statistical variations or disaggregated to permit examination of the experiences of refugees with comparable backgrounds who have been in the country for similar periods of time. The use of such measures has programmatic implications: patterns of adjustment followed by specific groups of refugees could be identified and appropriate expectations regarding the use of welfare at specific points during resettlement could be developed. Then, the welfare dependency rates of refugees sharing the same characteristics could be examined to determine if their progress measures against reasonable expectations. With such information, better judgements could be made about the effectiveness of the resettlement program in meeting the needs of specific groups of refugees.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify today. I will be pleased to answer questions.

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Khoa, it is nice to see you again, sir.

STATEMENT OF LE XUAN KHOA

Mr. KHOA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify again before the subcommittee, this time to present the refugee viewpoint on the reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980—a legislative action that can greatly influence the effectiveness of refugee resettlement in the United States.

I am here today to represent not only the Indochina Refugee Action Center, but also, and mainly, the Council of Southeast Asian Refugees, a national organization formed in response to the needs of refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam.

Symbolizing our responsibility for the resettlement of our compatriots, I am accompanied today by Mr. Ou Thuok from the Cambodian community, Mr. Cheu Thao from the Hmong community, Mr. Voradeth Ditthavong from the Lao community, and Mr. Nguyen Van Hien from the Vietnamese community.

As part of our testimony before you today, we would like to go on record expressing our deep gratitude to the people and Government of this country for the critical humanitarian role the United States has played in accepting more than 600,000 refugees from the three countries of Indochina.

We are very much encouraged by the intensified congressional efforts to restructure the current domestic refugee resettlement program in a most cost-effective and equitable manner. We are in full agreement with the spirit of Congress to support the objective of helping refugees to become self-supporting and contributing members of the American society.

It is in this same spirit that we have come here today to offer our own insights and experience in the hope of assisting your deliberations.

Rather than reading our testimony, I would simply like to summarize the main points and request that the entire document be included in the record.

Senator SIMPSON. Without objection.

Mr. KHOA. From the perspective of the Southeast Asian refugee community, we support the establishment of an effective placement strategy, special assistance to impacted areas, emphasis on employment-related services, and better coordination between various organizations and agencies at different levels. In all of these activities, we consider the full participation of the refugee community as critical to the success of resettlement programs.

In our full statement, we have clearly indicated that refugee organizations, although inadequately and improperly used, have proved in many instances to be highly effective in resettlement activities. They have been able to deter secondary migration of refugees to impacted areas, reduce drastically welfare dependency rates, find jobs for new arrivals and, most significantly, provide services at the lowest cost possible. In addition, many essential services such as transportation, translation, and conflict resolution are provided voluntarily at odd hours and in emergency cases.

For the past 7 years, the joint public-private sector resettlement program has failed to draw upon the strengths of the refugee community as a resource in resettlement. Too much has been said, but little has been done in terms of proper involvement of refugees and refugee organizations in the resettlement system.

In addition, since refugee self-sufficiency has become an important issue which impacts on both the welfare dependency rate and community tensions, it is critical, in our view, that refugee self-help efforts be made in the context of community growth and establishing a sound economic base within refugee communities.

To this effect, we propose a gradual but definite shift in emphasis from income maintenance and social services to well-planned, community-based economic development initiatives. In this endeavor, Southeast Asian refugees have engaged in economic activities which, as shown in our written testimony, include a wide variety of commercial businesses and professions.

Numerous refugee success stories have been reported in the U.S. media. Those stories also imply large numbers of jobs for both refugees and others in America.

In consideration of the congressional mandate to refine the domestic refugee resettlement program so as to mobilize all available resources in the most effective manner possible, we would like to ask you to consider favorably the recommendations we have submitted in our full statement, particularly the three following:

One, formal recognition of the role of the refugee self-help organizations in the policymaking process and in the implementation of resettlement activities;

Two, reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980 for 3 years, in order to allow long-range planning and full implementation of new initiatives in the resettlement field; and

Three, continuation of refugee admissions at the current level, with special attention to those who have risked their lives for freedom and have been stranded in austere camps in Southeast Asia.

Thank you.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Khoa follows:]

Prepared Statement of Le Xuan Khoa

Mr. Chairman,
Members of the Subcommittee on Immigration
and Refugee Policy,

As a representative of the national consortium of Southeast Asian refugee organizations, I am very pleased to appear before you today to present the refugee viewpoint on the re-authorization of the Refugee Act of 1980. In the first place, I would like to say that we, refugees from the three countries of Indochina, are committed to offer whatever help we can in designing an improved domestic resettlement program and in carrying it out to the best of our combined abilities.

Toward an Effective Resettlement Strategy

From the perspective of the Southeast Asian refugee community, we support the establishment of an effective placement strategy, special assistance to impacted areas, emphasis on employment-related services and better coordination between various organizations and agencies at different levels. In all of these activities, we consider the full participation of the refugee community as critical to the success of resettlement programs.

While recognizing the high welfare dependency rate, we feel the need to point out that this rate generally refers to refugees who are on some form of public assistance, and that earlier refugee arrivals have now proved to enjoy a higher rate of labor force participation than the U.S. population.[1] Furthermore, the welfare dependency rate does not reflect the actual contributions of refugees who have been self-sufficient, and hence their contribution to the American society at large. A recent study by the Refugee Policy Group also indicates that welfare dependency rates, as a measure of program effectiveness, are not themselves very effective. They fluctuate - up and down - for a variety of methodological and statistical reasons that can have little to do with the operation of the program.[2] In mentioning these points, we are not suggesting that the welfare dependency rate be ignored. In fact, it is our interest and commitment to work jointly with other agencies for the reduction of refugee welfare dependency. We believe that innovative mechanisms must be developed to involve our refugee community resources in more effectively combating this problem.

The history of immigrants to the U.S. indicates that the success of new Americans depends highly on the existence and viability of an ethnic support system. Since a refugee placement strategy must take into consideration the economic and social factors affecting the resettlement process, refugee community organizations and resources must be mobilized to ensure a viable network of community support in order to achieve success. The capability of refugee organizations in the resettlement of newer refugees has proven to be by far the most cost-effective method of resettlement.

For example, a recent survey of the Cambodian Cluster Project showed that, of the 8768 Cambodian refugees who arrived in twelve cluster sites across the nation, only 880 individuals left the initial placement sites. Of these individuals, 10.6% moved to other cluster sites, thereby avoiding migration to impacted areas. More than 23% stated that they had close relatives in the U.S. and were moving to join them. Actual secondary migration rates among refugees resettled through this special project, therefore, must be viewed as similar to that of the general population. The survey results also showed that 47% of the Khmer population resettled at cluster sites was fully employed, 37% was dependent upon cash assistance while an additional 9% was dependent solely upon their private sponsors. In evaluating these data, it must be remembered that a majority of this population came from a rural background, were illiterate and have been in the U.S. for only six months or less.3/

Another example shows the effectiveness of job development services performed by a refugee organization: within the period of ten months, a branch office of the Lao Family Community, Inc., in Missoula, Montana, was able to relocate 130 Hmong families to Billings, approximately 340 miles from Missoula, following an effort by this organization to find employment for them. This relocation was conditional on the refugees' finding work, through the Lao Family Community, before they moved.

In an effort to reduce welfare dependency, only 15% of newly-arriving refugees sponsored by the Indochinese Service Center in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, are receiving any form of public assistance. This figure includes many refugees who are over 55 years of age and homebound women who cannot yet go to work because of small children or the language barrier. This Center, currently supported both in terms of financial contributions and voluntary services by 52 local churches and a membership of 900 refugee families, claims its success as running the most cost-effective service delivery program in the state. Under federal and state grants in the past three years, the Center was able to provide as many as four times the number of service units required by the government.[4/]

A New Approach: Refugee Community and Economic Development.

Employment for refugees has become an important issue in refugee resettlement, which impacts on both the welfare dependency rate and community tensions. On the one hand, low labor force participation rates among new arrivals have had a direct consequence on the use of various forms of public assistance - a costly expenditure for the federal government. On the other hand, successful competition for jobs and employment opportunities also causes resentment among other ethnic minorities - a source of community tension problems. Having been in this delicate position, we have sought effective ways to resolve both of these problems. In our view, it is critical that refugee self-help efforts be made in the context of community growth and establishing a sound economic base within refugee communities. This is particularly true in the case of the Indochinese who are making the transition from refugee status to culturally, economically and politically strong Asian-American communities.

What is desirable is a gradual, but definite, shift in emphasis from income maintenance and social services to well-planned community-based economic development initiatives so as to foster progress toward complete self-sufficiency among the refugee population. In this endeavour, Southeast Asian refugees have engaged in economic activities which simultaneously:

a. More fully mobilize human and financial resources within the refugee community;

b. Create new job opportunities for refugees, especially newcomers with limited language and survival skills; and

c. Contribute to the growth of the American economy.

Several examples illustrate the practicality of this logical approach:

- A preliminary survey conducted nationwide by the Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Program shows that there are approximately 500 Vietnamese hotels and restaurants, many of them deserve national attention such as the International Club Restaurant in Houston, Texas, with 300 seats, and the Carter Hotel in New York City with 700 fully-equipped rooms and suites.
- In Orange County alone, there are more than 200 Vietnamese businesses providing a variety of commercial, professional and other services.

Numerous individual success stories have been reported in the U.S. media. The case of Quang Tran is probably the most significant. Starting his new life seven years ago as a welder in Seattle, Washington, the 30-year old Quang Tran is now running his own ship-building and repair company. Tran's company grossed about $8 million last year and has provided jobs to both refugees and local Americans.[5/]

Nguyen Huy Han, whose story was printed in both Time Magazine and Money Magazine,[6/] went on welfare soon after his arrival in Pontiac, Michigan, in 1975. He and his sister saved $500 and used it to convert a disused root beer stand into the WE (for West East) Restaurant, which offers Vietnamese and other oriental foods. Introducing an enterprising notion, customer profit sharing, Nguyen keeps a running total of his regular customers' bills; the more they spend, the bigger their share at the end of the year. The list of customers, to whom he has distributed over $100,000 of his profits, has risen during the past five years from 230 to about 6,000. Nguyen has been on local and national TV networks sixteen times and acknowledged three times by the City Council of Pontiac, Michigan, as having "innovative ideas and concepts which deserve national acclaim."

Needless to say, these representative success stories mean large numbers of jobs for both refugees and others in America. Within the Indochinese refugee community, there have been energetic activities aiming at the establishment of a strong ethnic community in the American society. In response to these needs, the Indochina Refugee Action Center (IRAC) has designed a comprehensive community development program to assist the Indochinese in their transition from refugees to Asian-Americans. The newly-created Indochinese Economic Development Center has also developed several prototype economic development projects which can generate income and create new jobs for refugees without causing friction with other ethnic minorities.

As the refugee community begins building a solid economic base, they can effectively contribute to the settlement of new refugees in a less costly and more meaningful manner. Furthermore, economic development by refugees, through working with Americans and other ethnic minorities, also helps bridge the distance between new refugees and the mainstream of the American society.

By fully mobilizing refugee community resources in the resettlement program, the refugees' potential can be better utilized. Already many members of the refugee community have made significant achievements in areas other than economic activities. Two examples worth noting are: the 15-year old Nguyen Khoa, who brought fame to the five-member table-tennis team on their tour to mainland China in May 1982, and the 17-year old Minh Thai, who was recently sent to Budapest, Hungary, for an International Rubik's Cube Contest and won the first prize with a record of 24 seconds. In addition, Indochinese students have been generally rated very highly in terms of both behavior and talent. Many have graduated from colleges and become highly-qualified professionals in different areas of activity.

Recommendations

In consideration of the Congressional mandate to re-structure and refine the domestic refugee resettlement program so as to mobilize all available resources and talent in the most efficient manner possible, we recommend that the language of the Bill contain the following points:

- Formal recognition of the role of the refugee self-help organizations in the policy making process and in the implementation of resettlement activities
- Concrete efforts to strengthen the refugee community so as to enhance their capacity in terms of community organization and community-based economic development
- Formalized coordination mechanisms to include refugee organizations as one among public and private resettlement actors
- Inclusion of heretofore untapped or underused federal agencies such as the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, Labor and Housing and Urban Development in the refugee resettlement program.

We also recommend that the authorization for appropriations for refugee assistance be extended for three years in order to allow long-range planning and full implementation of new initiatives in the resettlement field.

Mr. Chairman,

In conclusion, I would like to stress that the Indochinese in America are not a long-term dependency problem for this country. They are an important opportunity. Yes, there are some initial needs which refugees have, and for which there must be some public support for a limited amount of time. But through their determination, their skills, and their love of independence and freedom, the Indochinese and other refugee groups are making and will continue to make a very positive contribution to the labor market, business, the arts, education, sports, and the other endeavors which are the core of this country's success. Let us not confuse the small amount of language and job training which are necessary for some when they come initially - with a long-term dependency scenario. That is not the evidence from the Indochinese or other refugee groups, and it is not the indications of their future in the U.S. The public funds we spend on refugees in their initial period is a wise and safe investment in their future and the future of this country. The return on the investment is already obvious, and will improve over the years to come: in labor supply, business, productivity, tax payments, and the purchase of consumer products. The Indochinese-American community also will become an active and cohesive group in the American political process; many have achieved citizenship and are voting in the current national and local elections.

Refugees come to the U.S. with very little. They work hard and over a short time contribute a great deal. Let us keep this in mind in the current debate around re-authorization of the Refugee Act and the consultation process. Refugees are good for America and we need to accept many more of them in the years ahead.

Thank you.

Notes:

1. Report to the Congress: Refugee Resettlement Program, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, January 31, 1982. Data on page 18 show that, as of October 1981, 76.0% of 1975 Indochinese arrivals and 70.7% of 1976-77 arrivals were in the labor force as compared to 64.0% of the general U.S. population.
2. "The Meaning of Refugee Welfare Dependency Rates", by Refugee Policy Group, September 1, 1982.
3. "The Cambodian Cluster Project: A Survey Report", by the Indochina Refugee Action Center, March 1982.
4. Information guaranteed accountable by the Indochinese Service Center, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.
5. The Washington Post, August 13, 1982.
6. Money Magazine, October 1977, and Time Magazine, June 12, 1978.

Appendix A

COUNCIL OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN REFUGEES

STATEMENT OF PURPOSE

The Council of Southeast Asian Refugees (COSEAR), formed on January 11, 1982, is a consortium of major refugee organizations from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam currently operating in the United States. It is a coordinating body through which various Southeast Asian refugee groups can discuss common issues pertaining to successful resettlement in the United States. Through meetings of COSEAR members and representatives at national or local levels, information and experiences will be shared, mutual understanding and cooperation will be promoted, and a common voice on special issues will be raised; but each participating national organization will maintain its own administrative and programmatic autonomy.

PURPOSES

The Council will pursue the following purposes:

a. To advocate for better programs and policies of refugee resettlement, providing input into the formulation and implementation of national and international policies affecting refugees from Southeast Asia;

b. To develop support networks among the various ethnic groups at national, state and local levels;

c. To promote more rapid attainment of economic self-sufficiency in refugee communities through assisting in the development of community-based programs and activities;

d. To identify resources for technical assistance and support, and to work with those individuals and organizations on specific development projects;

e. To promote mutual understanding and cooperation among Southeast Asian refugees, other ethnic groups and the American community at large, so as to prevent and alleviate community tensions;

f. To serve as a clearinghouse to provide accurate information and appropriate advice to public and private organizations with regard to Southeast Asian culture in general and refugee activities in particular; and

g. To foster cultural preservation programs within each Southeast Asian refugee community with a view to enabling them to significantly contribute to the American cultural heritage.

COMPOSITION

The Council will be structured as follows:

a. The Board of Directors will consist of twelve members, divided equally among the three refugee groups from Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam.

The Board of Directors will assign a small number of its members to form a Planning Committee, whose mandate is to prepare and develop a COSEAR plan of activities. Such committee is a working committee and will serve as a link between the board and the staff when financial limitations prevent the whole Board from being present.

b. An Advisory Committee will consist of thirty members: a representative of each of the three refugee groups from each of the ten HHS/ORR regions. The Committee members will provide a regional perspective on issues on which the Council focuses its activities and a network for the sharing of information and resources with refugee groups across the U.S.

IMMEDIATE ACTIVITIES

The Council's primary goal is to promote active participation of refugee self-help organizations in both the immediate task of refugee resettlement and in the continuing development of stable Southeast Asian communities. Refugee Mutual Assistance Associations (MAA's) are in a unique position to address both issues in an integral fashion.

To achieve this goal, COSEAR plans to foster and support the following programs and activities:

a. Income-generating and economic development activities ranging from craft and consumer cooperatives and refugee-owned small businesses to community development corporations.

b. Employment services (job development, orientation and training) that make use of refugee community networks and resources to counsel, train and place refugees in jobs.

c. Multi-service programs with broad-based community support.

d. Volunteer programs that mobilize resources both from outside and within refugee communities to provide mutual assistance and support.

COSEAR intends to work with the Indochina Refugee Action Center on their Refugee Community Development Project, one purpose of which is to identify refugee self-help projects and to share these programs models with MAA's around the country.

COSEAR affirms its willingness to cooperate with voluntary agencies, federal, state and local governments, the corporate/business sector, and the American community at large to achieve a cost-effective refugee resettlement program, to promote economic self-sufficiency of refugee communities, and to create a smooth integration of refugees into this pluralistic society.

Appendix B

RESOLUTION OF THE BIANNUAL NATIONAL CONVENTION OF THE VIETNAMESE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

During the first biannual convention of the Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Program in Pontiac, Michigan, on August 5-7, 1982, 225 delegates from 38 states met and discussed new directions and programs for 1982-84.

The Convention unanimously determined that after seven years of resettlement in the United States, it is now time for the Vietnamese refugees to begin a new phase of community consolidation and development in accordance with long-term goals and programs.

(1) Socially, we need to establish a solid base for the Vietnamese community in the American society so as to effectively provide newcomers with resettlement services and mutual assistance; at the same time to raise a common voice with popular support in order to protect legitimate interests of the Vietnamese community in the United States.

(2) Economically, we need to develop community economic activities in order not only to rapidly achieve self-sufficiency but also to bring about the prosperity for everyone, while making positive contributions to the American society.

(3) Culturally and educationally, we need to preserve and further our positive values and traditions in order to permanently maintain the Vietnamese cultural integrity within a highly mechanized and technological multi-ethnic society.

In order to achieve the above-mentioned goals, the Vietnamese Mutual Assistance Program will place particular emphasis on the following activities:

(1) Coordinate and assist social and community development programs in different geographic areas of the country.

(2) Conduct research, establish and implement practical business and economic projects which fully utilize manpower and financial resources available within the Vietnamese community, in order to create more jobs and enhance upward mobility for all members of the community.

(3) Advocate for and assist in the implementation of cultural and educational programs across the country, placing priority on preparing the younger generations for their role to maintain the Vietnamese cultural identity overseas.

The Convention calls for the active cooperation of federal, state and local government agencies as well as of private organizations currently supporting refugee community and economic development programs in the U.S., with particular emphasis on those with technical assistance capacity at both the local and national levels.

Senator SIMPSON. And now David North; it is nice to have you here, sir. I always enjoy hearing your testimony. You have been very helpful to the subcommittee.

STATEMENT OF DAVID S. NORTH

Mr. NORTH. Thank you, Senator. It is indeed a pleasure to be here again. I am David North, with the New TransCentury Foundation in Washington, D.C.

As an opening statement, I would like to remind all of us of something we sometimes, I think, forget. The refugees that we are talking about are, as far as I am concerned, a Federal population. The Nation has decided in an orderly way that it owes something special to this population.

This population, I think, is in the same category as the native Americans and veterans of our wars. For particular reasons in national history, there is a special place for these three populations and we have special programs for them, which I think is useful and appropriate and sometimes forgotten.

We should also remember that the refugees, at least since 1956 when the Hungarians came in, are predominantly our defeated allies in the international struggle with communism. That is why they are here; that is why we have let them in. They have, as a group, struggled against not only dictatorships, but particular kinds of dictatorships, and we feel sympathetic to them and have given them an opportunity to have a new life in this country.

Most of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is drawn from the report "Kaleidoscope" that Ambassador Vine mentioned a few minutes ago. Before expanding on that report, I would like to make three highly specific suggestions regarding the bill before you, which is H.R. 5879.

First, section 4 of that bill calls for the amendment of section 412(a)(3) of the INA by inserting the following, and I quote, "The Director shall compile and maintain data on secondary migration of refugees within the United States and, by State of residence and nationality, on the proportion of refugees receiving cash or medical assistance described in subsection (e)." I underline the word proportion in my statement.

I would suggest that the word proportion be struck, and I strongly recommend the substitution of the words actual numbers. This would be a message from the Congress to the Department of HHS that the Congress is unhappy with the slovenly statistics used by the Department in its estimate that 67 percent of the refugees are on welfare.

I will not bore you with the methodology and the numerators and denominators. All of that is spelled out in the refugee reports publication of July 30 which is appended to my testimony. And there is a clarifying letter from ORR in the current refugee reports that should be read as well.

One of the things that struck me about the conversation earlier today is why should we have a 9-State survey of refugees receiving welfare; why 9 States when there are 50 States? If the Federal Government is paying tens of millions of dollars, as it is for these assistance programs, why can it not simply demand an accounting of how the money is spent by the States?

Some of the States, of course, in league with the paperwork reduction zealots of the Office of Management and Budget, will object to this requirement. I think the Government again is shooting itself in the foot by denying itself data that it needs. So, I ask you, Senator, do not accept nine-State surveys in the future.

Second, section 3 of the bill calls for two reports from HHS on the use of case management to reduce welfare dependency, and on the separation of medical assistance from cash assistance with the ıme objective in mind. These reports are to be submitted by January 1.

My suggestion is that Congress give the Department, instead, 6 months to mount and 1½ years to operate two or three demonstration projects in each of these two fields, using two or three States in each experiment. A lot has been written on the subject; Julia Taft and I have written on the subject and a number of people have. And I think it would be much better to mount a demonstration project to see what can be done. If you were to do that, you should give the Department whatever it needs in legal freedom to mount these experiments, and then see to it that the refugees who are assigned to these programs do not have the option of leaving and making use of other programs.

Third, let me tell you a little story to buttress my view that Congress should encourage the Departments of State and HHS to spend more time talking to each other about the refugee programs mounted by the two departments. The gentleman from GAO spoke of the various programs.

My story is based on field work I did in Providence, R.I., but reflects a larger reality. In that city, there is a small population of Armenian refugees from the U.S.S.R. There is also a large and successful resettlement agency, the International Institute of Rhode Island. It has a Soviet Armenian, a wonderful woman, as its executive director. It has an Armenian-speaking staff to some extent. The members of the board are Armenian. It has a small sum of money, well spent, from HHS from their matching grant program for job development and ESL for the Armenian refugees. So far, so good.

Meanwhile, there is another vol ag with a couple of churches in the same area; no Armenian-speaking staff, no office closer than New York City. That is Church World Service. Now, I ask you, Senator, which of these vol ags receives the State Department's reception and placement grants for the newly arrived Armenians? Is it the International Institute, which is an ACNS affiliate, or is it Church World Service?

I also ask, where do you think the decision is made on that subject? As you might guess from the way I have expressed this, Church World Service gets the State Department money, and as you may or may not guess, the decision on the allocation of those refugees is made in Switzerland.

The State Department program for monitoring the voluntary agencies is moving along rapidly, as Ambassador Vine mentioned to you. But this is a single anomaly that I wanted to bring to your attention.

Before the red light goes on, I would like to thank you for inviting me to speak to you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. North follows.]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID S. NORTH

Most of my testimony, Mr. Chairman, is drawn from the report "Kaleidoscope" that Larry Lewin, Robin Wagner, and I wrote for the U.S. Department of State earlier this year on the work of the voluntary resettlement agencies. In that report we indicate that most of the voluntary agencies are doing a good and important job most of the time, but that more governmental monitoring is needed, and additional attention should be paid to physical examinations for arriving refugees, and their orientation to our complex way of life. Before expanding on those points I would like to make three highly specific suggestions to the Committee all based on HR 5879, as passed by the House Committee. This was the only copy of the pending legislation that I could locate over the weekend.

First, Section 4 of that bill calls for the amendment of Section 412 (a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act as follows:

> "(b) Paragraph (3) of such section is amended by inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: 'The Director shall compile and maintain data on secondary migration of refugees within the United States and, by State of residence and nationality, on the proportion of refugees receiving cash or medical assistance described in subsection (e).'"
>
> (Emphasis added.)

Instead of the word "proportion" I strongly recommend the substitution of the words "actual numbers." This would be a message to the Department of Health and Human Services that the Congress is unhappy with the statistical sleight of hand used by the Department in its "estimate" that 67% of the refugees are on welfare. Depending on how one defines the words "refugees" and "welfare," the percentage could be lower or higher than 67%, but the gross misuse of statistics by the Department, as described in Refugee Reports of July 30, 1982 should not go unnoticed by the Congress.

(A copy of that issue is attached to this testimony.) If the federal government is paying tens of millions of dollars for these assistance programs, the least it can do is demand an accounting of how the money is spent by the states. Some of the states, of course, in league with the paperwork-reduction zealots in the Office of Management and Budget, will object to this requirement.

Second, Section 3 of the bill calls for two reports from HHS, one on the use of case management and the other on the separation of medical assistance from cash assistance (two approaches designed to reduce welfare dependency). These reports are to be submitted to the Congress by January 1, 1983.

As one who is in the business of writing reports for the Government, I am tempted to simply applaud this section, or to suggest that you give the Department a little more time. But what we really need is action. It is clear to everyone in the field that case management is a good idea, as is the separation of cash from medical assistance. (We have seen how such a separation can discourage the use of cash assistance in a number of states where the two programs can be separated.)

I would like to suggest that Congress give the Department six months to mount, and a year and a half to operate, demonstration projects on each of these two areas in two or three experimental states. The Department would need the legal freedom to mount these experiments and assurances that newly arrived refugees assigned to these programs could not opt to use other cash and medical assistance programs.

Third, let me tell you a little story to buttress my view that the Congress should encourage the Departments of State and HHS to spend more time talking to each other about the refugee programs mounted by the respective agencies. (The leaders of the voluntary agencies gather almost weekly to confer on how best to cope with the U.S. Government -- the Government should do the same on how to cope with the volags.)

My story is based on field work I did in Providence, Rhode Island, but reflects a larger reality. In that city there is a small population of Armenian refugees from the USSR and a large and successful resettlement agency, the International Institute of Rhode Island. The Institute has a Soviet Armenian, a wonderful woman, as its executive director, and Armenian-speaking staff and board members. It has a small sum of money from the HHS Matching Grant program for job development and English language training for Armenian refugees. Meanwhile there is another voluntary agency with a couple of churches in the Providence area, no Armenian-speaking staff, and no office closer than New York City. That is Church World Service. Now I ask you, Senator, which of these volags receives the State Department's reception and placement grants for newly-arrived Armenians? And I ask, where do you think the decision is made on that subject?

As you might guess, Church World Service gets the State Department money. And the decision on the allocation of these refugees among the volags is made in Switzerland.

The State Department's program for monitoring the volags is moving along rapidly, but this is an anomaly that I wanted to bring to your attention.

Now I would like to return to some of the more general findings of our "Kaleidoscope" report. Before outlining our findings regarding the operations of the volags, which inevitably includes a number of criticisms and quibbles, it is important to state that the volags are generally doing a good job. The work they do is difficult, complex, and important. The volags, as institutions, are playing a valuable role in this segment of American life, a role they should be encouraged to continue.

That said, it is equally important to say that some of the volags are deficient, some of the practices are questionable, and that the whole process could benefit from more precise standards and more monitoring by the government.

Our findings are as follows:

1. There is considerable, in fact excessive, variation in performance, both among and within the volags. Some levels of performance are excellent, most are acceptable, some are poor. Despite this range in performance, we believe that the variety of approaches, especially among the stronger volags is one of the strengths of the R&P program.

2. The volags appear eager to perform well, although some lack the knowledge and resources to do so. The R&P program, in general, lacks a coherent and specific set of standards and expectations, and the weaker volags feel little external pressure in the form of State Department scrutiny to improve their performance.

3. The relationship between the federal government and the volags is changing. The government has learned more about resettlement and has taken a number of important steps forward recently. The need for public/private consultation and cooperation is greater, particularly at the state and local level. And the government's crisis-level dependence on the volags is, for the moment, over. We believe that the time has come for the major federal agencies, State and HHS, to develop a more positive, if still modest, role in managing refugee resettlement programs.

4. The relationships between the volags and state and local governments are badly in need of improvement and will benefit from federal leadership. While the State Department has had limited experience in this area, its involvement with the R&P program affords opportunities to learn about non-federal government problems (many of which are legitimate); and its generally productive relationship with the volags should enable it to establish cooperative planning relationships with state and local agencies.

5. At present, in both the planning and monitoring of the R&P program there have been too few opportunities for seeking the views of refugees, as individuals, or through refugee organizations. The current dialogue is largely between the State Department, on one hand, and the volags, on the other.

6. Current methods for assigning refugees to volags and to geographic locations are inadequate, particularly since initial placement is probably a major determinant of success. Little is known about the causes and costs of secondary migration, and in many cases, not enough effort has been made to match the needs of individual refugees with volag and local resources.

7. Existing financial guidelines and reporting requirements have allowed several practices to emerge that merit attention. Among the more important are the accumulation of large cash surpluses by a few volags, and the use of a large portion (varying greatly among the volags) of R&P funds for volag overhead as opposed to a pass-through of funds to the refugees. The problem of financing overhead out of the R&P grant is becoming increasingly acute for some of the smaller volags as the number of refugees declines.

8. The volags vary significantly in the extent to which they generate private funds for refugee resettlement, and a given volag will also vary in the extent to which it uses private funds among the refugee populations it serves.

9. As a result of volag financial practices, similar refugees in a given community receive dramatically different cash, in-kind, and service support. The refugees, local public agencies (and some volags as well) are becoming increasingly aware of, and disturbed by, these differences.

10. Some volags are relying on subcontractors, or free-standing sponsors, to settle refugees where the volag does not have a branch office or paid staff. Sometimes this practice works well; frequently

it does not. This practice, in our view, represents one of the program's most serious vulnerabilities and should be tolerated on an exception basis rather than as an accepted practice.

11. In a number of sites, refugees are being served by staff that are not culturally or linguistically appropriate, and in some cases by members of historically antagonistic cultural groups.

12. For certain of the core services, volag responsibilities are too loosely defined, specifically: orientation, medical and dental screening, and housing. It should be noted, however, that funding for some of these needed services, such as universal Stateside health screening, are not always available within the current system. The result of these definitional problems is often that too much responsibility is forced upon the refugees too soon.

13. The issue of public assistance dependency, while of great concern, is poorly understood. Volags are not clear about what is expected of them, and there is honest disagreement among experienced resettlement agency professionals as to whether well-planned, short-term use of public assistance and vocational and social services will reduce or increase the likelihood of long-term public assistance dependency. Most local volag officials are honestly perplexed on this issue, which includes many variables clearly beyond volag contro

14. While we believe most volags will respond favorably to federal standards for improved performance, some lack the staff and the technical capacity to do so without help. Some external technical assistance may prove helpful, but the volags have considerable capacities to help one another. Although the sharing of experiences and management systems among the volags, and even within the volags, is not common, it is likely to increase if the need for improved performance is made clear.

15. There is much about refugee resettlement that is not known. Important decisions are made without information and analysis that could prove extremely useful. More specifically:

a. Given the increasing scarcity of individual sponsors, and indications of at least some congregational sponsorship fatigue, it would be useful to know more about the group sponsorship experience of Operation Lifeline in Canada.

b. It would be helpful to know more about the scattering of U.S. experiments with the hostel model, notably the experience of BCRRR.

c. Many of the refugees from Southeast Asia, particularly from Laos and Cambodia, are farmers, people quite unfamiliar with Western urban life. Nevertheless they are almost uniformly settled in urban or suburban areas. The potential costs and benefits of resettling more of these rural refugees in rural areas could be explored.

d. To what extent do refugees, in fact, engage in secondary migration because of differential benefit levels? It would be useful to examine this question.

e. Does the front-end-loading model, of early concentration on ESL and vocational training (while the refugee receives public assistance) really work? There is enough on-going utilization of this model, and of the principal alternative model (almost immediate placement in an entry-level job) so that evaluative research could be mounted quickly.

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify.

Refugee Reports

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REFUGEE DEPENDENCY RATES: A MATTER OF NUMBERS

Consultations on refugee admissions for FY 83 are expected in September and a primary domestic consideration in establishing the number is expected to be the level of refugee dependency on public assistance.

The level is considered high. In testimony last September, Health and Human Services Undersecretary David Swope traced an increase in refugee dependency since 1976, agreeing with Senate refugee subcommittee Chairman Alan K. Simpson that "the dependency rate has been increasing rather dramatically." Subsequent correspondence between the two officials led off with inquiries about the dependency rate.

The figure generally cited to represent current refugee dependency is 67 percent. The percentage appears in the recently published *Report to Congress* of the Office of Refugee Resettlement for FY 81, and was cited frequently in March hearings before a Senate appropriations subcommittee.

Additionally, the media have picked up reports about welfare use by refugees, paving the way, perhaps, for a public view of refugees as a group that is reliant on public assistance. "The 67 percent is an easily cited, easily quoted, headline-making figure," affirmed Susan Forbes of the Refugee Policy Group (RPG), in Washington, D.C.

The current percentage contrasts sharply with previous levels (see Table 1) and statements of rate of increase in recent years--62 percent between 1978 and 1979 and 115 percent between 1979 and 1980--are even more stark.

Yet, although widely used, the dependency figure is not well defined or understood, sources say, and using it out of context masks subtleties in interpretation and deficiencies in available data. As any statistic, it is subject to manipulation. "We could make the figures look better," a federal official said. And a private researcher suggested, "You can play with the numbers any way you want."

Methodological Differences in FY 81 The surge in arrivals in 1979 and 1980, and the acknowledged greater

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State cumulative Indochinese totals.......... 8

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need for assistance and services among the newer groups of refugees contributed to the jump in nationwide dependency rates. Other contributing factors were methodological. For one, the numerator--representing benefit recipients, and denominator--representing the total population, of the FY 81 proportion were constructed differently from previous years (See Table 1, column 3).

Rather than including all Indochinese refugees in the U.S., the FY total population figure accounts only for the number of refugees who had been in the U.S. for three years--the "three-year eligibles" who could receive aid under regulations imposed in April 1981. "The smaller total population led to an inflated figure," Linda Gordon at ORR said. "It also excluded refugees who had been in the U.S. longer and who were less likely to be receiving aid." Several sources noted that the longer refugees have been in the U.S., the less likely they are to be receiving assistance.

The numerator of the FY 81 calculation changed, too, to include non-Indochinese assistance recipients. A significant number of Cuban refugees and much smaller numbers of other refugee groups were added in as aid recipients. But since reliable counts of non-Indochinese refugees who were three-year eligible were not available, their numbers were not reflected in the total population. "I know now there are significant numbers of Armenians in California and Poles and Romanians in Illinois," Gordon said. Had the numbers of "other eligible refugees" been included in the total population, the dependency rate might have been about 57 percent, she said.

Skewed Sample Another methodological issue is that only nine states were polled. Previously, all states participating in the refugee program were accounted for in this calculation.

No ill-intent is ascribed to ORR for not having a larger sample. The Office of Management and Budget's paperwork reduction regulations, which govern surveys supported by federal dollars, presented "the biggest hurdle," one source said. Since six to 12 months lead time for approval is required for surveys in ten or more sites, a decision was made to target nine states only.

But Gordon concurred that the sample of states is "definitely skewed." The nine states used were selected specifically because their dependency rates were high. "The purpose of last summer's survey," Gordon said, "was to get numbers to build ORR's budget request. The states selected represented about 80 percent of ORR's cash and medical assistance expenditures."

The sample includes California, with the largest Indochinese refugee population, high assistance benefits, and a 1981 dependency rate of 74.8 percent. Its inclusion is valid, RPG's Forbes said, because national rates will be determined by patterns in states where the population is large. "The national rate will always be affected by California. If it encourages welfare use, it will raise the national rate."

The sample excluded some states with significant refugee populations and in 1980 terms, lower dependency rates (See Table 2).

National data on welfare utilization like those collected prior to 1981 are "presumed to be fairly accurate," the 1982

Table 1

Refugee Welfare Dependency Rates
1975-1981 and Means of Calculation

Year	Rate	Recipient population "Total" population
September 1975	11.9	Indochinese recipients of AFDC, RCA Total Indochinese refugee population 1975-relevant year
September 1976	29.8	
August 1977	34.6	
August 1978	33.1	
August 1979	37.3	
November 1980	45.3	
November 1981	67.0	Indochinese, Cuban, and other refugee recipients of AFDC, RCA in 9 selected states Total population of Indochinese refugees in the 9 selected states for 3 years or less, adjusted for secondary migration, births, etc.

study *Kaleidoscope* states, because the nationwide total of refugees, based on admissions figures, is relatively certain. At the state level, payment data are good, but total population data is not, "because of the persistance of secondary migration." In its survey, ORR added 5,000 to adjust the total for the nine states' eligible population for secondary migration, though more recent data indicate the total was higher still, Gordon stated.

Table [illegible]
Dependency rates by state

States used in FY 81 Calculation	Dependency rate (in percent)*	Rank by size of Indochinese Population**	Monthly welfare payment/ rank***
California	94.[illegible]	1	$506/[illegible]
Florida	34.2	13	$195/40
Illinois	73.21	5	$302/27
Minnesota	120.47	4	$446/9
Oregon	91.11	9	$339/18
Pennsylvania	84.18	6	$332/20
Rhode Island	[illegible].23	40	$387/12
Texas	50.94	3	$118/49
Washington State	105.37	2	$415/10
Populous states not used in FY 81 Calculation	1980 figures****		
Louisiana	31.7	12	$173/44
Massachusetts	48.[illegible]	[illegible]	$379/11
Michigan	30.8	14	$464/8
New York	34.8	7	$517/2
Virginia	40.1	8	$310/35

* ORR-unpublished information

** ORR Report to Congress, January 31, 1982

*** Fortune magazine, June 28, 1982. Based on family of [illegible]

**** As of testimony to Congress, September [illegible], 198[illegible], pg. [illegible], Table [illegible]

New Figures: Higher or Lower? As if matters needed to be made more complicated, the refugee population eligible for aid decreased this spring when an 18-month limitation was imposed. Calculations of welfare utilization in FY 82 will have as their denominator refugees who have been in the U.S. for 36 months, but the number of aid recipients will reflect only refugees who arrived within 18 months of the survey date. Once again, ORR will collect data from nine states, selected because of their high dependency rates, Gordon stated. Massachusetts and Virginia will be substituted for Florida and Rhode Island, where dependency rates have declined, she said. She expects non-Indochinese refugees to be counted in the total eligible population this year, and SSI recipients to be reflected.

One source suggested that, largely for statistical reasons, the FY 82 dependency rate will be markedly lower than the FY 81 figure. It would be possible to come up with a higher figure for refugee use of aid. While current rates reflect AFDC and RCA utilization, they do not take account of refugees' use of Food Stamps, Medicaid-Medi-cal, state general assistance, or SSI. Some refugees get cash from Reception and Placement grants; these monies are also not reflected. "Someone else calculating the same concept (income transfer) could very probably come up with a higher figure," David North of TransCentury Foundation and co-author of *Kaleidoscope* stated.

What The Numbers Mean A February report to the House Appropriations committee suggests that in the absence of measures of the effectiveness of social services programs in reaching refugee self-sufficiency "the most basic measure used by ORR (to judge self-sufficiency) is the dependency rate of refugees on cash assistance." The National Association of Counties has suggested that dependency rates, and in particular the rapidity with which refugees sign up for aid, indicate a need for "a thorough examination of the role and administration of (volag's) refugee reception and placement grants."

Does ORR object to the use of its figures, gathered for budget-building purposes, as a measure of the effectiveness of refugee programs? "It was not our purpose," said ORR's Oliver Cromwell. "But the number is there. We know we have to get the down. It gives us something to aim for."

The RPG calls for more sophisticated understanding of the numbers. "Over and over, we hear we have to revamp the refugee program because welfare dependency is so high," said Forbes. "But we need to put the figures in context and get beyond glib statements. Then we can begin to make programmatic changes in an informed way."

Some of the refinements Forbes and colleague RPG Director Dennis Gallagher say are desirable are controlling for refugees' level of education and language ability at time of entry in the U.S. An increase in welfare use between 1975-77 and 1979-82 appears to be real, Forbes indicated. But the difference diminishes when such factors are taken into account.

The time frame of a particular statistic must be clear, Forbes said. Fertility rates among refugees may mean the size of the eligible population is larger that the number being used indicates. Better information is needed about how many refugees receive partial, rather than full, assistance; family composition; labor force participation; and what secondary migration means for baseline data about total populations. State eligibility requirements and states' levels of payment also affect refugees' use of public assistance, according to Forbes.

"When we understand more of the factors involved, then we can look at which programs are working well and which are not."

It is important that policy makers understand the numbers, Forbes and others suggest, especially as congressional deliberations on future refugee admissions approach.

Proponents of greater understanding may have their work cut out for them. A source on Capitol Hill indicated the generally accepted view in Congress is that half to two-thirds of the refugees in the U.S. are welfare dependent. "It's a little more sophisticated than that," the source said, "but the two-thirds figure is there."

Recent Developments

RELEASE OF HAITIANS COMMENCES

Seventeen Haitians were released from detention on July 23, the first to be set free since the U.S. began detaining Haitians a year ago. The release followed a ruling last month by U.S. District Court Judge Eugene P. Spellman, who ordered the Haitians freed.

Under Spellman's order, every Haitian must have two sponsors--a voluntary agency and an individual. At press time, the term, "individual sponsor" was undefined. Sources said that immigration and volag officials agreed that churches and halfway houses should qualify as individuals, but Spellman had yet to agree to such a definition. According to the government, most of the detained Haitians do not have relatives or employers who could act as sponsors.

Freed Haitians will be required to report to their individual sponsors a week after their release. The individual sponsor will report to the volag; the volag will report to a special master, who, in turn, will report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Judge Spellman had not yet identified the special masters, but it was expected that they would be named shortly. Also, every Haitian will be given a date for appearing for an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge. INS expects the hearing dates to be set within 30 days of release.

The government sought a stay of Spellman's release order from both the District Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals, but both requests were denied. The government has decided not to seek review of the stay denial in the Supreme Court, but is pressing an appeal of Spellman's finding that INS had failed to observe proper procedures when it implemented the detention policy.

New Arrivals to Be Detained The first freed Haitians came out of the Krome detention facility. It is anticipated that virtually all the Haitians covered by Judge Spellman's decision will be released eventually. But newly-arriving Haitians, as well as aliens from other countries may be detained pursuant to guidelines published in the *Federal Register* on July 9.

According to statistics from the Office of Refugee Resettlement, 40,023 Haitians had entered the U.S. as of May 1982. There were no new arrivals in that month, although there were 14 in April. INS reports that as of May, 178 Haitians had been apprehended and returned to Haiti since the inception of the administration's interdiction policy in December 1981.

Senator SIMPSON. I was supposed to ask the questions and you asked all of them of me; you did that. That has helped me learn a good deal in this area and I appreciate it.

Mr. Peterson, I have some questions and then I will come down the line. How might the State Department insure that the voluntary agencies remain in contact with refugees and become more actively engaged in offering job development and placement assistance to refugees? Would additional funds be required? How would it be best to promote that contact, in your mind?

Mr. PETERSON. I think the basic mechanism the State Department has is the agreements with the vol ags, and those should be made specific as to what the duties and responsiblities of each party under those agreements are, and I think that is how you would achieve that.

Senator SIMPSON. The contract itself?

Mr. PETERSON. Yes.

Senator SIMPSON. And I am interested to see what revisions are being expressed in those contracts, as we heard testimony moments ago.

How best might we assure that medical costs incurred by eligible refugees are fully reimbursed by the ORR?

Mr. PETERSON. That is a difficult problem. Many of the health departments that we contacted cited the fact that they were not reimbursed for the full cost, and it stems largely from problems with the State medicaid plan. If a service is not covered in the State medicaid plan, then the local health department could not get reimbursed. And our report has many examples where local health departments have not been reimbursed for the full cost.

The House, as you well know, put an extra line item in the reauthorization bill, authorizing some $14 million to go for State medical screening. Truthfully, we do not know whether $14 million is enough or too much or too little, but efforts are underway to close that shortfall.

Senator SIMPSON. The GAO study found that overseas medical exams were cursory and that the medical procedures used were not in accordance with U.S. standards. What is your recommendation to improve that situation? Do the Center for Disease Control guidelines need to be changed? Where are we on that?

Mr. PETERSON. Well, we think that they do; they think they do not. Essentially, the test for tuberculosis, for example, we do not think is particularly comprehensive, and the number of missed cases that are uncovered in this country, we think, stand as witness to the fact that the procedures are not that adequate.

There are some efforts that can be done to enforce the CDC protocal, but it is one other area where the management of this program gets kind of fuzzy, because CDC does not have any direct pipeline to the ICM physicians who do the actual physical examination. The State Department does that contracting, so it gets kind of fuzzy as to who can do what to whom to correct that particular situation.

Our recommendation, and we have coordinated this with ICM, would be to do a medical examination overseas comparable to what would be done in the United States, including tests for hepatitis B and for parasites. The estimate we got from the ICM was that that could be accomplished for about $3.2 million additional over what we are spending overseas now. When you compare that with the some $217 million that is being spent to treat those diseases here, we think that is an investment that is well worthwhile.

Senator SIMPSON. Does GAO intend to do any followup studies on the progress toward the self-sufficiency of the refugees in that sample?

Mr. PETERSON. I think that will depend on what happens in the near future. We have issued our report. The Department has 60 days from August 5th to respond to those recommendations. And depending upon that response and depending upon our consultations with Chairman Mazzoli and this subcommittee, we will decide what additional work might be worthwhile.

Senator SIMPSON. I think that one of the things of interest in your testimony was, you know, that the use of former refugees as sponsors has now become rather accepted practice by the voluntary agencies, and has effectively, or ineffectively replaced the more traditional approach of using a paid case worker or American volunteer.

In your sample, 58 percent of the refugees were sponsored by former refugees.

Mr. PETERSON. That is correct, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. Is there anything that ties you back to previous activity 20 years ago or 30 years ago in the refugee program and shows that more traditional approach being used?

Mr. PETERSON. Well, I do not have any percentages or figures, but I think all of the voluntary agencies we dealt with would acknowledge that they are having increasing difficulty finding the church groups and the civic groups that would normally sponsor these populations.

Senator SIMPSON. Certainly, the monitoring is something that concerns the House—limited monitoring of progress toward self-sufficiency. Despite the contract provision that they do so—and I am going to be very interested in looking at those provisions—you found in your figures that 30 percent had no contact with voluntary agencies beyond 30 days, and that by 90 days, there was no contact with 50 percent of the refugees.

I think that is a true deficiency and something that at least to me is an abrogation of function and duty. That is my thought, anyway.

Mr. PETERSON. We view it as a serious situation too, sir.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, they will have an opportunity to tell me why I am wrong, but we will get into that later.

Now, Dr. Forbes, if I may, after taking into account the methodological and statistical variations that you state, what do you think might be a more accurate estimate of the current refugee welfare dependency rate so that we might deal with it properly here in the Congress, as required in our oversight function?

Ms. FORBES. I think I get back to the statement I made before that an aggregate dependency rate—one where you get a single figure—is probably not in anyone's best interest to use. When you say 50 percent, period, or 60 percent or 30 percent or 20 percent, it does not really help very much.

I think that we are better off taking the time and using the resources to get a sense of what the dependency rate for given groups, given their particular circumstances. That means making assumptions about dependency based on the fact that some refugee groups who come here, because of characteristics upon their entry, will fare differently than other groups.

Otherwise, it means judging the entire effectiveness of the program on the basis of one prototype—generally, what happens is that in any refugee movement, the first people who come in tend to be the best educated and the ones with the closest ties to the host society. In the case of the Southeast Asians, that was certainly true.

Later arrivals tend to have less of those ties and to be from the less-educated and less-skilled parts of society. That does not mean that the later arrivals are going to ultimately fare any worse than the original arrivals. It just means that their patterns may be very different.

We should begin to build our expectations on realistic appraisals. If somebody comes in here who is preliterate—for example, the Hmong—we must build a set of expectations about their dependency that fits their characteristics and circumstances and not assume something that makes the program fail, whatever it does.

Senator SIMPSON. In line with that, have there been studies done of dependency rates among the non-Indochinese refugee groups admitted since the enactment of the Refugee Act?

I know that there have been such studies. Do you find them probative and helpful? In line with that, do you have any indication as to whether the matching grant program functions any better than refugee cash assistance in fostering self-sufficiency?

Ms. FORBES. The latter part of that question I would love to throw over to the other end of the table, since David has been doing a study of it, and I am not as familiar with the different patterns. I know that a number of States have been reporting an increase in their caseloads of non-Indochinese refugees—refugees that come from other parts of the world. To some extent, that is a function of the change in legislation which has permitted these individuals to participate in the cash assistance programs.

There have been a number of studies that have been inaugurated recently on the Indochinese which should provide the type of data that I was talking about before. ORR is now engaged in a study of the economic self-sufficiency of recently arrived Indochinese, in which the questionnaire I believe is sophisticated enough to get at some of the nuances and the differences.

I am not aware of very much that is being done for other groups, and I think that is a deficiency in the program. Because the bulk of the refugees tend to be Southeast Asian, we forget about those who come from other countries and we are certainly not giving them the attention that we should be.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you very much, Dr. Forbes; that is helpful.

Mr. Khoa, I know of your great assistance to the subcommittee too, in these last months. You are a very articulate spokesman on the issue.

We have heard proposals to enforce the provision of the act which makes refugees who refuse appropriate employment, ineligible for public assistance, and to begin to require that local welfare offices notify the voluntary agencies when their refugees apply for welfare.

Do you think that those steps would be effective? Do you have other recommendations to encourage refugees to take jobs rather than to go into public assistance?

Mr. KHOA. I am aware of the measures proposed in the bill passed by the House and I think that these could be effective if supplemented by some education provided by refugee organizations to their community members.

I think that by providing education and orientation to our own people, we can encourage them to realize the American work ethics and accept jobs even from the bottom.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me ask you this because this has come up in the past year and a half I have heard it referenced in connection with the MAA's that we are sometimes informed that MAA's often urge refugees to accept assistance and to attend school and acquire other training rather than to accept employment even though it is available. And then when that assistance is no longer available, then the refugee goes into the employment market.

Is that a common practice of the mutual assistance associations, or some of them? I will admit that it sounds like a wise thing to do, especially in the United States where we stress the importance of an education. Yet, it would seem to be contrary to what the assistance program was there for, since even a U.S. citizen student must work and often pay his way through school, and so on.

I sense that is causing conflict, and it comes trickling up to us in testimony, and down too. So, what is your thought there?

Mr. KHOA. I would like to suggest a differentiation between misuse or abuse of welfare and the proper use of welfare. Back to 1975 or 1976, for example, when the refugees just came to this country and found that there was such a system helping them learn the new language and receive vocational training, it is reasonable and understandable that the refugees preferred receiving language or vocational training rather than going to jobs right away, because they do not have the skills required by this country. So, then, I think that it is understandable to that point.

But when the situation becomes more difficult for the whole country, we MAA people realize that, too, and then we are no longer encouraging our people or orienting them to get welfare, but rather orienting them to be employed. So, we are aware of the situation and we are doing our best to accommodate to the situation.

Senator SIMPSON. Could there not be an emphasis on seeing that perhaps they could do both in that process—both the consideration of the schooling and the English, and also the employment at the same time?

Mr. KHOA. Whenever possible.

Senator SIMPSON. Whenever possible?

Mr. KHOA. Yes, sir, and we always have put emphasis on employment.

Senator SIMPSON. We also hear that the English language classes now being provided sometimes do not appear to be adequate. Do you feel that the existing allocation of resources to social services, such as English language classes and employment and training, are sufficient, and how might that system be improved, in your mind?

Mr. KHOA. The system can be improved with the participation of refugee organizations in the system. We have been providing services, but we have not been given enough means to do it in terms of technical assistance as well as starting funds.

Senator SIMPSON. You recommend that Federal refugee programs should gradually shift from the present emphasis on welfare payments and social services to an economic development approach for refugee communities. As you see that, how would such a program work and who would administer it? What type of assistance would be given to refugee who do not live in those areas of large refugee communities?

Mr. KHOA. We have many projects and programs for economic self-sufficiency. Actually, many programs have been run already, but from my contact with those business people, we need technical assistance, and especially the access to the resources available that could help us implement our programs more successfully.

So, different types of businesses are developing, but we need to coordinate those programs and have them improved in such a way that they could be achieved more successfully.

Senator SIMPSON. Would that be as the coordinator stated, a type of a small business approach to the situation such as that utilized by the Small Business Administration?

Mr. KHOA. Yes, sir, the Small Business Administration or MBDA, the Minority Business Administration Agency, could help.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you very much, Mr. Khoa.

Now, David North, you state that the time has come for the major Federal agencies and States and HHS to develop a more positive, if still modest, role in managing refugee resettlement programs.

Would you explain briefly how you believe that role should change?

Mr. NORTH. I believe it should change toward a slightly more assertive role on the part of the Federal Government vis-a-vis the various contractors who are doing things for the Government in this area. And as one of those contractors, I have experienced some monitoring myself and I find that a small research grant is probably monitored more carefully than millions of dollars in direct grants to States or voluntary agencies. So, the Government agencies I am talking about are quite capable of monitoring, and capable of doing so vigorously.

What I would suggest, and I think a lot of this is happening already, is that the Department of State vis-a-vis the voluntary agencies and the Department of HHS vis-a-vis all the various parties that it deals with should spend a little more time and a little more energy watching what is happening out there, and I am seeing that happening. Ambassador Vine was telling it as it is about what the State Department is doing with the vol ags.

Further, I would encourage something that I do not see happening yet, and that is the Government calling together the voluntary agencies and various other actors and getting people to exchange their own experiences in areas of common concern.

What happens is that the voluntary agencies get together very readily when there is a new regulation or a new law, and they get together and they talk about what they should do to take care of this new challenge.

What they do not do as readily, in my recollection, is talk about how to take care of the old problems. How do we go about staffing our district offices? How do we find the people with the proper skills in the proper languages? How do we encourage particular groups of refugees to accept employment? How do we cope with State government?

I think that there is a lot of lore out there in the voluntary agencies that they should exchange with each other, and I think they would be more likely to exchange it if the Government presided over such exchanges.

Senator SIMPSON. What do you see occurring with the voluntary agencies as the Indochinese program decreases and perhaps gradually phases to a much lesser dimension?

Mr. NORTH. I see a couple of things happening, and these are perhaps kind of business management observations as opposed to anything else. One of the things that I see is a reduction in staffs. Oftentimes, very dedicated people—I saw this in Boston with the Jewish agencies—will remain working, but they will work half time. That is a way of reducing the cost of the program, and I think that that is useful and I am seeing some of that.

At least one of the voluntary agencies, the YMCA, has decided that it will withdraw from the program. It came in when there was a great need for more voluntary agencies. It is withdrawing at the end of this fiscal year. That is another kind of adjustment.

As you may know, Mr. Chairman, there is another kind of adjustment on the horizon. If you are successful, as we hope you are, with your bill in the House of Representatives, there is likely to be a legalization program. The voluntary agencies are likely to be utilized by the Immigration Service to help in that program. That will also ease in this period of adjustment.

So, there are a whole series of mechanisms going on out there to take the drop of refugees into account.

Senator SIMPSON. What is your view of the advisability of moving the reception and placement function from the State Department to ORR?

Mr. NORTH. That is a tough question.

Senator SIMPSON. I know. That is the kind I like to ask you.

Mr. NORTH. Thank you. There is a very pragmatic, non-OMB sort of reaction to that, and I think it is of real significance. This is, as I said before, a Federal population. It is a population that we, as a people, have decided we owe something to.

I think the State Department is better situated to see to it that that obligation is met and is kept. I think the State Department is probably better able to raise the funds necessary to take care of the initial placement of refugees than the Department of HHS. I think the amount of money spent in that area is not unreasonable, and I think it is best kept there primarily for that purpose.

Senator SIMPSON. Then, finally, the House adopted an amendment requiring the GAO to audit the refugee programs and the Federal funding. How might Congress best insure that this strict accountability of the vol ags and the State and local governments—which seems to be the intent of Congress—is maintained in their use of those funds?

Mr. NORTH. Well, I suspect that the best word is imaginatively. One of the things that I think we need not worry about here, as we worry about in some other programs for people—I am thinking about the private, nongovernmental pension programs where we have enormous fiscal abuses. I need not go into that in great detail, but there are such abuses. I do not think that is the problem here.

There are clearly problems. Nobody is getting rich in the refugee resettlement field; we need not worry about that. What we need to worry about are the kinds of things that auditors have trouble finding, such as is everybody served: are people served in the way that is most likely to be fitting with their cultural heritage; are they being served in such a way that they can get a job fairly quickly. These are the kinds of things that I think a formal accountant-type auditor is unlikely to be able to handle very well.

So, I would suggest that whoever does it have a mixture of skills. I think that that is perhaps a primary answer in this area.

Second, any such audit should be mounted with a total understanding that the voluntary agencies and the State agencies have only a certain number of variables under their control.

Now, the most hard-working, brilliant, dedicated voluntary agency operating in the State of California has a very real problem out there, and it is the nature of the welfare system in the State of California and the way it is accepted out there. You cannot expect a voluntary agency with $525 to resettle somebody to cope successfully with that program without a lot of other help in addition to the funds allocated through the reception and placement grant.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much; it was very helpful.

Thanks to all of you. We appreciate your participation before the subcommittee. Thank you very much.

Our third panel consists of Wells Klein of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, of New York; Leonard Seidenman of the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society; Charles Sternberg of the International Rescue Committee; and Ingrid Walter of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugees Services of New York.

Let me also enter into the record at this time the regret of the ranking member of this subcommittee, Senator Kennedy, who had fully planned to be here for this purpose and made a special effort in his original scheduling to do so, until we had to change the date from September 16 to this date. He had a longstanding commitment in Massachusetts and indicates his regret that he is not present. This is a matter of great interest to him, with his background in refugee reform.

He has several questions to be entered into the record and I will submit those to the witnesses, and furthermore a statement which is submitted into the record.

[The prepared opening statement of Senator Kennedy follows:]

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR KENNEDY

AT HEARING ON REAUTHORIZATION OF REFUGEE ASSISTANCE

Few human dramas are more compelling, or more revealing of the troubled times in which we live, than the plight of millions of refugees around the world. And there are few greater tests of the democratic and humanitarian ideals for which we stand than our response to the resettlement needs of refugees -- especially those who are of special humanitarian concern to the American people.

In 1980, Congress took a giant step permitting the United States to meet the needs of refugees in a more humane and effective way with passage of the Refugee Act of 1980. Among the many essential reforms achieved in this legislation, none has been more important than the provisions which ended years of *ad hoc* refugee programs and different policies for different refugees. For the first time the Act gave United States refugee admission and assistance programs a firm and continuing foundation.

Essential to this goal is Title III of the Act, which provides authority for a full range of federal programs to assist in the resettlement of refugees. Because the admission of refugees is a federal decision, the federal government obviously has a responsibility to assist States and local communities in helping refugees become self-sufficient, contributing members of our society.

The authorization for this assistance expires at the end of this fiscal year, unless we act -- as we must -- to reauthorize it. Without it, the refugee program will come to an end.

Clearly, we will not allow this to happen. Hopefully, the Senate will soon follow the lead of the House of Representatives and pass this legislation expeditiously.

However, we must address a number of concerns that have emerged since the original authorization was enacted in 1980:

--we need to review how we can better assist refugees in becoming self-sufficient more quickly;
--we need to give greater priority to "up-front" funding of self-sufficiency projects before refugees are allowed to seek welfare; and
--we need to assess refugee dependency rates more accurately.

These and other issues will be addressed during the Subcommittee's review of this legislaiton. Thanks to the work of the voluntary and State and local agencies, I am confident we can and will respond more effectively to refugee needs -- helping them become the new citizens that they are.

Finally, I want to indicate my concern that the House version of this bill extends the reauthorization for only one additional year. Frankly, this defeats one of the basic purposes of the Refugee Act -- of ending the year-by-year, *ad hoc*, ever changing character of our refugee resettlement program. Obviously, federal assistance should be carefully monitored by Congress. But we can achieve this goal without requiring annual reauthorizations of what are essentially long-term programs and multi-year federal commitments to States and local communities. A three year authorization, with careful monitoring by Congress would make far more sense.

Senator SIMPSON. So, how do you do, Mr. Klein?

Mr. KLEIN. How do you do, sir?

Senator SIMPSON. You may shoot—not literally, of course.

Mr. KLEIN. Later.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes, later. It is nice to have you here. We are pleased to begin with your testimony.

STATEMENT OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF: WELLS KLEIN, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON MIGRATION AND REFUGEE AFFAIRS, AMERICAN COUNCIL OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES FOR FOREIGN SERVICE, NEW YORK, N.Y.; LEONARD SEIDENMAN, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, HEBREW IMMIGRATION AID SOCIETY, NEW YORK, N.Y.; CHARLES STERNBERG, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, INTERNATIONAL RESCUE COMMITTEE, NEW YORK, N.Y.; AND INGRID WALTER, DIRECTOR, LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, I am Wells Klein. I am testifying on behalf of the migration and refugee committee of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, which represents, I believe, all of the private voluntary agencies involved at the national level in refugee resettlement.

I believe you have the prepared testimony. I would like to submit that for the record and summarize, if I may, very briefly our comments.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, there are a couple of things from the testimony we would like to point out. First of all, we would like to reiterate once again our view that refugee admission is a Federal decision and that we believe the Federal Government cannot and should not place an undue burden on States and local communities in connection with refugee resettlement. That is something that goes all the way through our testimony and our thinking for some time.

Mr. Chairman, the bulk of our testimony represents some 12 recommendations which we made in much the same form to the House subcommittee and are making again to this subcommittee. We have all been trying to deal with refugee resettlement. The patterns of refugee resettlement that we use in this country have historical precedents.

The numbers and types of refugees have changed over the years. We think it is absolutely essential to look at refugee resettlement as a whole today, and look at what major policy changes might bring about more effective resettlement. We believe that more effective resettlement can be achieved at reduced cost if some major changes in resettlement policy at the national level are made.

You have 12 recommendations. They represent an interwoven fabric. They are conceptual; they do not attempt to dot "i's" or cross "t's." We believe that they need to be looked at seriously. We have had some difficulty for a while in getting anyone to look at them.

It is our belief that if we—and I note the comment was made about things under control of the voluntary agencies—but if we, collectively, are going to deal with the problem of refugee dependency—and although we recognize that the statistics may not be the 67 percent, we are still concerned with the levels that exist. If we are going to deal with that, then we have to do away with what is known as the waiver of categorical relatedness, which is a special entitlement for refugees which did continue for 36 months; it is now 18 months.

If we are going to do that, this, in essence, seduces the refugee into the public assistance system. If you do that, then you are going to have to compensate for the lack of that support mechanism, and our recommendations take this into account.

I think the recommendations have to be looked at together. I will not attempt to go through them now, but I do want to emphasize that on the dependency issue, the key here is the waiver of categorical relatedness and doing away with that, and then finding the correct mechanisms to deal with refugee assistance and getting the self-sufficiency in the absence of that.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to go on with just a few comments relating to the House bill that is before you. Let me read briefly from the testimony. We are somewhat concerned with the level of programmatic detail included in the House bill. Our concern is that such specificity will cause operating difficulties. We agree with the intent of a number of the amendments in the House bill. We would prefer to see the Reauthorization Act retain a generic form rather than try to deal with every problem in legislative form. There are some examples of this throughout our testimony.

We do believe that the focus for refugee policy and implementation of Federal policy needs to be retained within the Office of the Coordinator.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we have been, as I believe you know, somewhat concerned with some of the initiatives that took place in the Senate as amendments to the Simpson-Mazzoli bill. And in anticipation that these might come up again attached to the refugee reauthorization bill, we would like to note that placing refugee admissions under a single numberical limitation, we think would be disastrous in terms of this society. It would place ethnic group against ethnic group; it would place advocate against advocate.

We admit refugees for one reason; we admit immigrants for another reason. They both fall under immigration, but the national reason for these different admission programs is quite different.

Also, the concept of a legislative veto over admissions does trouble us. We think there is a system in the Refugee Act of 1980 which works pretty well. It can be fine-tuned, and fine-tuned probably in the process of the consultations. We look forward to seeing how they work this year.

But a legislative veto would deprive the administration of the ability to act and to deal with what might be very major national problems at the very time that the administration and the country needs flexibility to do so. Furthermore, it would have no relevance in dealing with something like the Mariel Cuban situation. This was, if you will, an invasion over which the administration nor the legislative branch of the Government really had control; it was a fait accomplis before we knew about it. So, it would not work there.

We do feel that the mechanism that exists in the current act is useful, it is being tested, and we would hope that the Congress would not fall prey to kind of quick solutions to complicated problems.

Mr. Chairman, that will conclude my summary. I do hope, sir, that you will, during the question period, come back to me on the question of the GAO report because I think we do have a couple of comments we would like to make on that, although we have not yet seen the report.

Senator SIMPSON. Fine; I certainly shall.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Klein follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF WELLS KLEIN

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee, I am Wells Klein, Executive Director of the American Council for Nationalities Service. I am here today representing the views of the Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service on the reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980. The agencies joining me in this testimony are:

American Council for Nationalities Service
American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees
Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement
Church World Service
HIAS (Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society)
International Rescue Committee
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
Migration and Refugee Services, United States Catholic Conference
Polish American Immigration and Relief Committee
The Presiding Bishop's Fund for World Relief/The Episcopal Church
Tolstoy Foundation
World Relief of the National Association of Evangelicals
YMCA of the USA

The Voluntary Agencies support the reauthorization of the Refugee Act and the thrust of the reauthorization bill passed by the House. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, we would like to share with you our views and suggestions for improving both the programmatic and cost effectiveness of refugee resettlement in the United States, and also to comment briefly on the current refugee admissions procedure.

The United States admits refugees for a combination of reasons, among which are humanitarian and foreign policy concerns, as well as domestic considerations, including concern for refugees with whom this nation particularly identifies. As a society, we owe refugees and the communities in which they reside assistance with the special problems that they have as refugees or as communities receiving refugees. Refugee admission is a federal decision and we believe that the Federal Government cannot and should not place an undue burden on states and local communities in connection with refugee resettlement.

The Voluntary Agencies do not believe that refugee resettlement currently is as programmatically sound or as cost effective as it could be. With notable exceptions, both between and within ethnic groups, refugees are not achieving economic self-sufficiency as rapidly as possible, which in turn makes refugee resettlement more costly than it need be. But this in no way should be allowed to foster indictment of the overall effort or its participants as has occurred in some quarters. Refugee resettlement is a means to an end -- the goal of rescuing vulnerable refugees and preserving the stability of friendly governments. While it is true there are real problems in resettlement, the program has been markedly successful at fulfilling its underlying goals. And with respect to the resettlement program's largest perceived problem -- that of increased refugee dependency on public assistance -- the latest available analyses indicate that the commonly utilized data have overstated the problem. In a report released September 1, 1982, the Refugee Policy Group, an independent research and policy analysis organization, concluded that the seeming increase in welfare dependency rates among refugees "can be attributed fully to methodological and statistical variation rather than actual change in patterns of welfare use."

Notwithstanding these facts, we continue to believe dependency rates among refugees are too high and can be lowered considerably. As agencies having a major role in resettlement and representing a variety of diverse religious, ethnic, and community-based constituencies, we are in agreement that a restructuring of domestic resettlement policy and a reallocation of resources is essential. To this end, we make the following inter-related proposals, the implementation of which we believe will accomplish the resettlement goals we all espouse. We are proposing a conceptual framework and are deliberately avoiding detail. If the framework makes sense, negotiation of specifics will have to take place between the concerned institutional parties.

The conceptual framework includes the following components:

1. Placement of refugees
2. Secondary migration of refugees
3. Refugee achievement of economic self-sufficiency
4. Cost effective refugee resettlement

Our recommendations are:

1. That the Federal Government and the Voluntary Agencies have a refugee placement policy which recognizes the realities of refugee resettlement and migration and, within these realities, equitably addresses the special strains placed on communities of high refugee concentration. Such a placement policy has been promulgated by the government. It is strong and resettlement agencies are obliged to comply.

2. That adequate financial provision be made for assistance to local communities or jurisdictions whose services are strained by significant refugee populations, despite efforts to avoid such situations, i.e. impact aid.

3. That all employable refugees be placed on jobs as quickly as possible after their arrival in the United States. Refugees should be encouraged to accept entry-level jobs as appropriate with the understanding that upward mobility and job advancement are possible, but require individual initiative.

4. That AFDC and SSI-eligible refugees who are, by and large, not employable by definition, be enrolled in these programs, as appropriate. The Federal Government should initially assume the full costs of these programs with a later phasedown of the federal contribution so that eventually the Federal Government and states are paying their respective share of costs in the same manner as for costs incurred for non-refugee recipients.

5. That it be recognized that some refugees are not employment-ready upon arrival in the United States and require a period of temporary support and services before they can be realistically expected to take and retain jobs. Such interim financial support should be comparable to the AFDC benefit level, but should be made available through a mechanism other than the public assistance system. This interim support should have a maximum time limitation with the length of time that any individual refugee receives such support being determined on a case-by-case basis. Refugees receiving support through public assistance mechanisms would automatically be ineligible for interim support. Such a provision is not intended to deny assistance to those properly eligible but rather to avoid inappropriate duplication.

Both philosophically and practically in terms of equity, we would like to see no more special refugee entitlements or resettlement-connected funding than are necessary to realistically assist refugees achieve economic independence. A necessary prerequisite for this approach is the elimination of the current waiver of categorical relatedness for refugee participation in cash assistance. However, to selectively implement this change would be inappropriate and damaging; such an action must only occur as part of a set of reforms. This is because there are refugees who are not categorically eligible for regular assistance who cannot be expected to be economically self-sufficient immediately after arrival. To leave them unassisted helps neither them nor their local community. Under our interim support proposal, appropriate case-by-case assistance could be utilized. The elimination of the waiver of categorical relatedness should not be effected without full consultation with state and local governments to assure minimal disruption to their efforts and minimal harm to dependent refugees.

6. That secondary migrants would not be eligible for interim support assistance except on a case-by-case basis recommended for valid resettlement reasons.

7. That eligibility for medical assistance be separated from eligibility for cash assistance and that, in the absence of other health resources, refugees be presumptively eligible for Medicaid for a period of 18 months. This proposal has been extensively discussed, and it is high time that it be implemented. If complicated policy decisions in this area remain to be made, creative demonstration efforts to test the alternatives should be fielded promptly.

8. That in those instances where refugees who are no longer eligible for interim support are both eligible for and utilizing General Assistance, the Federal Government should reimburse states or localities for General Assistance costs for a period of time, with a subsequent phasedown to a cost-sharing arrangement with states as with AFDC benefits.

9. That social service funds be focused on a) English as a Second Language (ESL), b) Employment Counselling and Job Development, and c) Case Management, with the understanding that major funding will be targeted for use during the interim support period of resettlement. With the exception of intensive ESL during the interim support period or for non-labor force participants such as the elderly, the home-bound, or those with other serious limitations, ESL should be available during non-work hours or in connection with employment. Limited social service funding should also be available for employment counselling and referral after the interim support period.

10. That, at the local level, Case Management be recognized as the responsibility of the sponsoring Voluntary Agency. By Case Management we mean planning and working with the refugee and support community to ensure the effective transition from initial placement to self-sufficiency and longer term adjustment. Case management is a continuing process which also includes monitoring of progress and coordination of services.

11. That ESL and employment counselling be provided by those entities best equipped to carry out these functions, with the understanding that these services are to be closely coordinated with case management planning.

12. That the financial provisions proposed above and time frames for their initiation should be negotiated with states and local governments well in advance of implementation. The provisions should be implemented in a manner consistent with appropriate fiscal and management planning on the part of state and local governments.

Mr. Chairman, these proposals are in outline form. They represent what we believe should be the conceptual framework for a national refugee resettlement policy. The recommendations fit together as a whole, are interdependent, and should be viewed as such.

The House-passed reauthorization bill does not address all of these proposals. It does, however, make progress on many. We are hopeful that it is your intent and that of Chairman Mazzoli to address our proposals further in the coming year.

As previously indicated, we support the thrust of the House-passed bill. We are, however, frankly concerned with the level of programmatic detail included therein. Our concern is that such specificity will cause operating difficulties. For example, the House-passed bill requires the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement to publish regulations on placement policy notwithstanding the fact that other less complicated mechanisms are now in place which fully accomplish the intent. Likewise the bill requires voluntary agencies to meet with representatives of state and local government on placement of refugees "not less often than quarterly," a requirement which may not be useful or realistic in many situations. As a final example, the bill conditions a refugee's receipt of cash assistance on participation in available, appropriate job or language training funded by the Office of Refugee Resettlement, notwithstanding the fact that other appropriate training funded from non-federal or non-ORR sources may be available. We recommend the final bill avoid such detail and that these particular provisions be modified.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, we would like to address the current process for setting admissions ceilings. The consultation procedure established by the Refugee Act of 1980 works. It has been in place only two years and during that period actual refugee admissions have declined nearly fifty percent. This is not the time to comment on the specifics of admissions levels. However, virtually every one would agree that world conditions in 1980 and world conditions in 1983 are sufficiently different with respect to refugees to justify some decline in admissions.

This being the case, it is hard for us to comprehend fully the motivation behind efforts to enact modifications to the process of determining admissions ceilings which are both radical and, in fact, harmful. A single numerical limitation on refugee and immigrant admissions would be domestically devisive and send dangerous signals to first asylum countries. A legislative veto of admissions numbers over a "normal flow" complicates the President's ability to react quickly at precisely those times when flexibility is most needed. Both proposals are irrelevant to mass first asylum emergencies, which are one of the public's major concerns in this area. Both in fact seem to be overreactions to the concerns of the Congress and the public regarding illegal immigration, overreactions which will ultimately penalize refugees whose entry here by definition is orderly, legal, and by the President's determination after consultation with Congress, in the best interests of the United States. We therefore urge this body not to succumb to superficial arguments on these terribly complicated matters.

We sincerely appreciate your willingness to consider our concerns on these important matters and acknowledge, Mr. Chairman, your past fairness and consideration. We look forward to working with you in the spirit of what we believe is our shared concern -- properly controlling and managing this program in a cost effective manner so that its underlying goals can continue to be met.

Senator **Simpson**. Mr. Seidenman, please.

STATEMENT OF LEONARD SEIDENMAN

Mr. **Seidenman**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is my first opportunity to appear before you and I welcome it.

My name is Leonard Seidenman and I am the executive vice president of HIAS, which stands for the Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, which is the worldwide Jewish migration agency.

Senator **Simpson**. Sir, would you mind pulling that microphone a bit toward you there, please?

Mr. **Seidenman**. Yes. Is that better now?

Senator **Simpson**. A little closer, if you would. That is helpful.

Mr. **Seidenman**. Sorry.

Senator **Simpson**. Thank you, sir.

Mr. **Seidenman**. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on HIAS and the Jewish community's experience with the matching grant program funded through the Department of Health and Human Services. Because of the positive results programs under this grant have produced in resettling refugees both from the Soviet Union and from other countries, I should like to propose that it continue to be considered a useful model for funding resettlement services.

Before describing the Jewish community's use of the matching grant, I should like to clarify the perspective from which I will be making my comments.

Our experience with the matching grant has largely been with a caseload having a strong ethnic constituency already within the United States. This constituency has long fought for the liberation of the Jews from the Soviet Union, and we welcome the partnership of the Federal Government implied in the matching provisions of the grant.

Furthermore, the HIAS resettlement network has long been a highly coordinated and professionalized system for resettling refugees, emphasizing centralized case management and careful guidance in tracking of the refugee through our resettlement process. Therefore, the matching grant is particularly suited to our caseload, our structure, and our constituency. This is not to imply that the grant may not be applicable to other situations and, in fact, HIAS does use matching funds for eligible refugees that do not have constituencies in this country.

It should be understood, however, that in speaking of the matching grant as it applies to the HIAS Council of Jewish Federations program for Soviet Jews, I am speaking from a particular point of view.

It should be noted, moreover, that the matching grant program did not cause our agency to build a new resettlement structure. It rather provided a method of assisting our affiliates to overcome some weaknesses in the program that was already in place.

Perhaps most important, the matching funds facilitated keeping the refugees within the affiliates' coordinated case management system. These funds minimized the utilization of public assistance and other programs that, in the case of nonmatching grant caseloads, have lessened the ability of the voluntary agency to carry through the case plan for the individual refugee.

I should like to add that HIAS also has experience with nonmatching grant caseloads. Our agency, like the other agencies in the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, has been eager to help in the humanitarian efforts of the U.S. Government and has taken responsibility for resettling Indochinese refugees and Cuban entrants.

In practice, the matching grant funds have been used by HIAS to provide an alternative to the cash assistance program provided to the Indochinese refugees through the public assistance offices.

In addition, the matching funds increase the private sector's ability to supply social services outside of those funded through the States by the Federal Government. More concretely, the agencies in the HIAS network have agreed to assure the refugees' avoidance of public assistance for at least 4 months if they are in the matching program, and have provided private sector/matching grant-funded job development and placement services, ESL and other social services for the refugees. While some medical services have been provided through private funds and matching grants, a substantial portion of the cost of medical services is still covered through medicaid.

The primary strength of the matching grant model is that it encourages a strong case management system and, at the same time, a highly coordinated program and package of services. Because the cash assistance is distributed by the same voluntary agency network that is doing the job development and placement, arranging for and supplying the ESL, and admitting the refugee into its own retraining programs, it is possible to conduct resettlement within a well thought-out plan worked out among the refugee, the relatives, and the voluntary agency. Furthermore, it allows the voluntary agency the latitude to apply sanctions for unreasonable violation of that plan.

This system contrasts markedly with the situation obtaining for Indochinese refugees in many areas. Cash assistance, medical assistance, ESL, job placement, and many other services are frequently handled in separate, autonomous offices. In addition, many of these offices view their services and programs as ends within themselves, and therefore encourage refugees to participate in them without substantial case planning and management.

In several areas of the country, the vocational service provider or the voluntary agency has found jobs for refugees which would at least theoretically disqualify them for continued cash assistance. However, the refugee has opted either to enter into or to remain in an ESL or training program and to continue to receive cash assistance. In spite of their best efforts, the voluntary agencies frequently lose control of a case and the refugee writes his own resettlement plan, frequently to his own detriment.

The matching grant program, since it keeps the refugee free, at least for an extended, initial period, from the public assistance offices and allows the same network of agencies administering cash assistance to control social services and vocational placement, results at least in the case of HIAS in appreciably more effective case management, quicker and more humane resettlement, and appreciably lower public assistance rates.

Unfortunately, we do not have hard data nationwide on public assistance rates for all of the refugee caseloads in all programs. However, in assessments made by the HIAS affiliates approximately 1 year ago, it was estimated that no more than 8 percent of the refugees in the matching program ultimately received public cash assistance. Even if this figure is underestimated by half, the record for the matching program is still appreciably lower than that which is offered by other resettlement models. In addition, those refugees who do receive public cash assistance generally do so for a very short time.

It should be understood, however, that rising unemployment rates nationwide have a more serious effect upon refugee populations than on the population in general. We have indications that the public assistance rate for matching grant eligible refugees has risen in the past 12 months. However, we are confident that when we receive these figures, they will be much lower than those for the nonmatching grant eligible refugee.

Although the HIAS sponsored refugees in the matching program tend to be better educated and more atuned to Western industrialized society than refugees in the public assistance/cash assistance model, these factors still do not account for the substantial difference in public assistance rates between the two groups.

It should be remembered that refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe come from countries fostering dependency upon the state, and experience has shown that without proper case management, these refugees can be just as welfare prone as any other refugee group.

In addition to encouraging and supporting a well-organized case management structure, the matching grant has been extremely useful to the HIAS network in maintaining Jewish community financial support of our resettlement program. The matching nature of the grant emphasizes the public/private partnership in the humanitarian work of refugee resettlement and is an important factor in assisting Jewish federations in raising private funds for resettlement.

In fact, Jewish community contributions have always exceeded the amount needed to call down the maximum Federal grant of $1,000 per capita.

Senator SIMPSON. Mr. Seidenman, excuse me, sir.

Mr. SEIDENMAN. I am at the end.

Senator SIMPSON. OK, fine. Go ahead, please.

Mr. SEIDENMAN. Our affiliates agree that raising private funds would be rendered much more difficult if resettlement were funded entirely along the model used for nonmatching grant eligible refugees. Moreover, the large percentage of Jewish community funds encourages very careful financial management of the program by the Jewish community agencies.

Thank you very much.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you, sir, very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Seidenman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF LEONARD SEIDENMAN

Mr. Chairman, my name is Leonard Seiderman and I am the Executive Vice President of HIAS, the worldwide Jewish Migration Agency, providing refugee and migration services for the organized American Jewish Community. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on HIAS' and the Jewish Community's experience with the Matching Grant Program, funded through the Department of Health and Human Services. Because of the positive results programs under this Grant have produced in resettling refugees, both from the Soviet Union and from other countries, I should like to propose that it continue to be considered a useful model for funding resettlement services.

Before describing the Jewish Community's use of the Matching Grant, however, it may be useful to draw a distinction between the Grant itself and the resettlement structure that it assists in funding. The HIAS resettlement network has long been a highly coordinated and professionalized system for resettling refugees, emphasizing centralized case management and careful guidance and tracking of the refugee through the resettlement process. This structure resettled large numbers of refugees considerably before the Matching Grant was instituted. The Grant, however, made it possible for the services offered through this structure to be enhanced and for the HIAS affiliates to continue to resettle substantial numbers of refugees over a protracted period of time. In addition, it facilitated intense service delivery upon the refugee's arrival, thus making it possible to move refugees to self sufficiency within a very short period of time.

For HIAS, therefore, the Matching Grant Program did not cause our Agency to build a new resettlement structure; it rather provided a method of assisting our affiliates in strengthening the Program that was already in place. Perhaps most important, the Matching funds facilitated keeping the refugees within the affiliates' coordinated case management system. These funds minimized the utlization of public assistance and other programs that, in the case of non-Matching Grant caseloads, have weakened the ability of the voluntary agency to carry through the case plan for the individual refugee. I should like to add that HIAS also has experience with non-Matching Grant caseloads: our agency, like the other sectarian agencies in the American Council of Voluntary Agencies, has been eager to help in the humanitarian efforts of the United States Government and has taken responsibility for resettling refugees of other faiths.

In practice, the Matching Grant funds have been used by HIAS to provide an alternative for qualifying caseloads to the cash assistance program provided for the Indochinese refugees through the public assistance offices. In addition, the matching funds increase the private sector's ability to supply social services outside of those funded through the States by the Federal Government. More concretely, the agencies in the HIAS network have agreed to assure the refugees' avoidance of public assistance for at least four months if they are in the Matching Program, and have provided private sector/Matching Grant funded job development and placement services, ESL, and other social services for the refugees. While some medical services have been provided through private funds and Matching Grants, a substantial portion of the cost of medical services is still covered through Medicaid.

The primary strength of the Matching Grant model is that it encourages strong case management system and a concommitantly highly coordinated program and package of services. Because the cash assistance is distributed by the same voluntary agency network that is doing the job development and placement, arranging for and supplying the ESL, and admitting the refugee into its own retraining programs, it is possible to conduct resettlement within a well thought out plan worked out among the refugee, the relatives, and the voluntary agency. Furthermore, it allows the voluntary agency the latitude to apply sanctions for unreasonable violation of that plan.

This system contrasts markedly with the situation obtaining for Indochinese refugees in many areas. Cash assistance, medical assistance, ESL, job placement and many other services are frequently handled in separate, autonomous offices. In addition, many of these offices view their services and programs as ends within themselves, and therefore encourage refugees to participate in them without substantial case planning and management. In several areas of the country, the vocational service provider or the voluntary agency has found jobs for refugees which would, at least theoretically, disqualify them for continued cash assistance; however, the refugee has opted either to enter into or to remain in an ESL or training program and to continue to receive cash assistance. There is little communication between the offices concerned: in spite of their best efforts, the voluntary agencies frequently lose control of the case; and the refugee writes his own resettlement plan, frequently to his own detriment.

The Matching Grant Program, since it keeps the refugee free, at least for an extended initial period, from the public assistance offices and allows the same network of agencies administering cash assistance to control social services and vocational placement, results, at least in the case of HIAS, in appreciably more effective case management, quicker and more humane resettlement, and appreciably lower public assistance rates.

Unfortunately, we do not have hard data nationwide on public assistance rates for all of the refugee caseloads in all programs. However, in assessments made by the HIAS affiliates, approximately one year ago, it was estimated that no more than 7% or 8% of the refugees in the Matching Program ultimately received public cash assistance. Even if this figure underestimated by half, the record for the Matching Program is still appreciably lower than that which is offered by other resettlement models. In addition, those refugees who do receive public cash assistance generally do so for a very short time.

It should be understood, however, that rising unemployment rates nationwide have a more serious effect upon refugee populations than upon the population in general. We have indications that the public assistance rate for Matching Grant eligible refugees has risen in the past 12 months; however, we are confident that when we receive these figures, they still will be much lower than those for the non-Matching Grant eligible refugee population.

Although the HIAS sponsored refugees in the Matching Program tend to be better educated and more attuned to Western industrialized society than refugees in the public assistance/cash assistance model, these factors still do not account for the substantial difference in public assistance rates between the two groups. It should be remembered that refugees from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe come from countries fostering dependency upon the state, and experience has shown that without proper case management, these refugee groups are just as "welfare prone" as any other refugee group. In short, people are people and refugees are refugees -- the differences between them are not as significant as the differences created by established resettlement structures.

In addition to encouraging and supporting a well organized case management structure, the Matching Grant has been extremely useful to the HIAS network in maintaining Jewish Community financial support of our resettlement programs. The matching nature of the grant emphasizes the public/private partnership in the humanitarian work of refugee resettlement and is an important factor in assisting Jewish federations in raising private funds for resettlement. In fact, Jewish Community contributions have always exceeded the amount needed to call down the maximum federal grant of $1000.00 per capita and have consistently covered approximately 60% of the costs of resettlement on the local level. Our affiliates agree that raising private funds would be rendered much more difficult if resettlement were funded entirely along the model used for non-Matching Grant eligible refugees. Moreover, the large percentage of Jewish Community funds encourages very careful financial management of the Program by the Jewish community agency.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, we view the Matching Grant as both a cost effective and humanitarian program for assisting the private sector in funding resettlement. Through its encouragement of strong case management structures, it helps move the refugee quickly along the path to self sufficiency. In addition, because it has produced lower public assistance dependency rates and encouraged private sector support, it has been successful in conserving scarce public funds.

Senator SIMPSON. And now, please, Charles Sternberg. It is nice to see you, sir.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES STERNBERG

Mr. STERNBERG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will not read my statement. I will not even summarize it, but I would like to touch on some of the items introduced in it. Perhaps I misunderstood the topic of my assignment because it was not previously touched upon here.

Senator SIMPSON. How is that? You see, as you spoke, they just shut all the camera lights off. [Laughter.]

I thought that would be good since they do not seem to be using the cameras and I am about to go blind. So, that may be helpful to the debate.

Mr. STERNBERG. Although I will not read my statement, I hope it will be read. I do not say that out of a sense of immodesty or because we are very important, but because some of the matters with which we take issue are sometimes legitimized by the term "the Congress wants it."

The administrators of the refugee program tend to do things in a certain way and, when questioned, say "That is what the Congress wants." I have never been quite able to figure out who the Congress is, but I do know that the chairmen of the subcommittees carry a great deal of weight, and that is why it is important that you be aware of the issues which cause problems, in our judgment, for the voluntary agencies, but mainly hurt refugees.

The three issues which I am trying to highlight, as it were, here today—there is little we can do about the first one. Refugees are not very popular these days. It is a tough time for refugees. Whenever there are economic stringencies or whenever there is economic malaise, let alone a recession, it is easy and predictable that, in the process, refugees will suffer.

We do not have to go back all the way to the 1930's which, of course, is the great example of a world unable to cope with a refugee situation developing in Central Europe, and the result was the mass slaughter of innocents.

We cannot change this situation, but those who are in situations of influence and control should make sure that our compassion does not disappear, and they should and must make sure that our interests are not disregarded while we are diminishing our input into the refugee problem. These interests are very tangible interests; they are interests of American foreign policy.

These twin concerns—our humanitarian concern coupled with foreign policy concerns—should, I believe, despite the economic problems we are facing today, move us in the direction of a very positive, forthcoming approach to the refugee problems we are facing today.

The second item I would like to touch on is the peculiar way in which we have disregarded the universal character of the Refugee Act of 1980. One of its beauties was that it was universal in an actual sense. Refugees of any nationality could claim access to the program; they did have a claim to be considered if they qualified for inclusion in the program.

In practice, we have always disregarded whole groups of refugees. Some refugees just happen to be more equal than others. It has always been quite difficult to understand why some refugee groups are put outside the scope of the implementation of the refugee program.

Since consultations are coming up, and since you will be involved, I am quite certain, it is almost an argument "ad hominem" I am making that if you agree with the desirability of an inclusive approach to the refugee problem—did I really speak that long? The light is going on.

Senator SIMPSON. It is not red yet.

Mr. STERNBERG. I will shorten it.

Senator SIMPSON. When it gets red, shorten it real quick.

Mr. STERNBERG. I will.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Mr. STERNBERG. Refugee groups not included right now should have access. I am not speaking of numbers. Whatever numbers you decide on, make it equal; equity would require no less.

The third aspect, of course, concerns these somewhat almost bizarre implementations we have now developed in terms of deciding who is and who is not a refugee, always under the terms of the law. And this has been especially troublesome with regard to boat people, the Cambodian refugees, and the whole Southeast Asian refugee population, where decisions have been reached that somebody is not a refugee, though both conditions of the refugee definition are given: persecution in the country from which these people fled, and the inability and unwillingness—"unwillingness" is in the law—to return to the country from which they fled because of fear of persecution. A rather arbitary decision can be made of a person's not having such a justified, well-founded fear, as if anybody knew what would happen to an Indochinese or a Vietnamese whom we, if we had the power, returned to Vietnam.

These are the three items which I believe justify my request that our testimony be read, and be read with a desire to understand the refugee complexity of today.

Senator SIMPSON. I thank you, sir, very much. I remember your testimony previously last year, and it is helpful and we do not lose sight of that; hopefully, we do not.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sternberg follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHARLES STERNBERG

Mr. Chairman, members of the Subcommittee:

The International Rescue Committee was pleased to join with its sister agencies in supporting the enactment of legislation which became the Refugee Act of 1980. We are equally pleased to join with our colleagues today in supporting the re-authorization of the Act.

In doing so, however, I cannot refrain from making certain comments and observations on the present climate in this country regarding refugees. In our half-century of activity in the cause of refugees, we at the IRC have seen their popularity and acceptability wax and wane. Today, after as intensive a few years as ever known in the refugee field, one sees signs of waning commitment to the cause of refugees everywhere. This may seem normal to many. For those of us who carry the memories of the past, however, such manifestations are the cause of severe anxiety.

There is a recent film, "The Boat is Full," which describes the fate of Jewish refugees during World War II who, having reached what they hoped was a safe haven in Switzerland, were handed back to the Nazis. There was no more room on the Swiss boat. And since the Jews were deemed to be economic migrants, they had no right to stay. Not on legal and not on compassionate grounds. It is a sad movie, and the saddest part of it is that it is quite timely and quite topical. Once again the boats are full. Most everywhere. And the justifications for trying to keep refugees out haven't changed much either.

About three years ago, the story of the Vietnamese boat people was headline news. "Don't let them drown" became a national slogan. There are still boat people. They still drown. They are still being robbed, and raped, and kidnapped, and killed by pirates. Yet not much attention is being paid, and boats are again being pushed back to sea. Those who do get through have a hard time establishing that they have a well-founded fear of persecution --the prerequisite for resettlement as a refugee.

The same holds true, alas, for Cambodian refugees, the survivors of Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. Two years ago, their plight prompted the wife of our former President to fly half-way round the world to express her concern. Now, by the hundreds, these same Cambodians are being rebuffed by our government and told they are not really refugees at all.

In the fall of 1980, Hong Kong and the British decided there was no more room for Chinese refugees. Since then, all escapees from the Mainland caught trying to enter the Crown Colony have been sent back. At the same time, the United States closed its doors to Chinese refugees and abolished the small Chinese refugee quota of about 100 a month. They are no longer of humanitarian concern to us, or otherwise of national interest.

And very recently, there has been a crack-down on Vietnamese boat people in Hong Kong. Refugees arriving are put in closed camps where, according to the South China Morning Post of July 16, 1.12 square meters of space has been allotted as a living area to each detainee. The refugees are not permitted to work. The immediate purpose of the closed camps--prison camps--is deterrence. Things should be made so unpleasant that when word gets back to Vietnam, all those who are thinking of escape for whatever compelling reason will reconsider and choose to stay.

One of the most appealing aspects of the Refugee Act of 1980 is its universal character. Yet somehow we have always managed to apply it selectively, to include in our yearly ceiling figures some refugee nationalities and to exclude others. And it has always been difficult to understand why. Take Cuba. As a reply to Mariel, as if Castro's mass expulsion of undesirables had been the fault of genuine refugees, we had no Cuban refugee admissions for close to two years. Only recently was our door opened slightly when it was decided to let in about 600 former political prisoners of Castro.

Recently a Vietnamese woman who had reached Malaysia by boat, having risked never making it across the South China Sea or, if making it, being subject to rape by pirates, was turned down by the INS Officer-in-Charge as not being a refugee within the meaning of the Refugee Act, even though she has two minor children in the United States. The rejection reads as follows:

> "Nguyen Thi Nhiem has no evidence of past persecution. As a woman with no evidence of past persecution I find little reason to conclude that her illegal departure would result in persecution. She sent

> children out as anchors. Stands to reason that they are not dependent upon her."

To read such a decision takes one's breath away. What is it that makes an official of the United States assume that a Vietnamese mother, any mother, would expose her minor children to the dangers of the flight from Vietnam by boat only for the purpose of having them, should they survive, act as anchors for her own admission to the United States. Would the facts of the case not require the opposite conclusion, namely that conditions in Vietnam must have been so unbearable for this family that this mother saw no other hope for the future of her children than to send them out on a voyage in which their chances of dying were better than their chances of surviving. And what is it that makes an official of the United States assume that she has no well-founded fear of persecution were she to be returned to Vietnam. There is no experience he, or anybody, has with regard to what the Vietnamese authorities would do to her. All we do know is that punishment for attempted illegal departure from Vietnam is meted out with increasing severity.

The oddest aspect of this policy is that denials cannot be properly reviewed, that the decisions of the INS officers who are in charge of approving or denying applications are practically not appealable. Thus, an Administration that is quite vocal about its determination to curtail bureaucratic control in general has, in the refugee field, given absolute power to one of its bureaucracies. The trouble with absolute power is that, in addition to its other consequences, it can make well-meaning individuals mean-spirited.

Beset with all sorts of ills, we and many other nations have been adopting an increasingly harsh attitude toward refugees. Each country has the right to set the limits of its generosity. But in setting limits, we do not have to trivialize the refugees' motivations, and in the process deny them what gives dignity to their suffering.

Whatever other misfortunes befall refugees, they stopped being free when their countries turned totalitarian. This in itself is oppression. Beyond that, there is the loss of livelihood (the goal of economic betterment is not in itself reprehensible), the loss of educational opportunities, the fear of arrest, and often enough the fear of death. We cannot welcome all the refugees who clamor to be let in. What seems petty is to keep down the numbers we admit by making light of their persecution and their fears if forced to return to their country.

None of this is easy to understand, much less tolerate--especially for those of u who have long memories. We can rationalize, and we do all the time, by saying that the country is experiencing a refugee "backlash" produced by the extraordinary numbers of refugees--especially Indochinese--we have accepted since 1975.

But with age (the IRC is about to celebrate its 50th Anniversary--a half-century of work devoted exclusively to the refugee cause)--comes, one hopes, perspective and even wisdom--and with them, an obligation to speak out even though it may not be popular or fashionable.

We support the re-authorization of the Refugee Act as proposed in HR-5879 because it provides a legislative framework through which the United States can continue to exercise its responsibilities towards the homeless and dispossessed. At the same time, we support the recommendation contained in the testimony provided by the American council of Voluntary Agencies, in particular as regards ways to improve domestic resettlement.

The private, voluntary resettlement agencies provide a unique structure, in our view, by which large segments of the American public, representing the major religious and secular areas of society, can participate in the successful integration of refugees from oppression no matter where they come from. In a sense, the agency structure acts as an interface between the federal government, and especially its foreign policy concerns, and domestic society as a whole. This relationship has withstood the test of time, both in lean years and in periods of crisis. Time and again, the agencies have risen to the task, only to know that, as each particular emergency wanes, there will be a period of contraction.

Our concern today is not one based on fear of contraction. Indeed, many of us would welcome a respite from the almost unceasing pressures of the last seven years. What we fear is that the job is not yet done, especially as regards refugees from Indochina. The fragile balances achieved, involving first asylum for those fleeing, and continued resettlement programs on the part of our friends, are based on a continuation of the leadership the United States assumed in 1975.

We must never forget that becoming a refugee is an act of desperation. It means cutting oneself off from one's homeland--most likely forever--and seeking a new land with the opportunity to begin again. These are not steps that are taken frivolously. On the whole, this nation has done well by refugees--and indeed has benefited from its generosity. As we move towards a re-authorization of the basic Refugee Act of 1980, let us not lose sight of these facts. Rather, let us take pride in our humanitarianism over the past and rededicate ourselves to a commitment to the oppressed.

Senator SIMPSON. Now, Ingrid Walter, please.

STATEMENT OF INGRID WALTER

Ms. WALTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Ingrid Walter, the director of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service. With me are Mr. Walter Jensen, who is the director of administration and finances of my parent agency, the Lutheran Council of the USA; and Mr. Martin Soevik, who is with the office of governmental affairs of the Lutheran Council, USA.

Mr. Chairman, I came here to have an opportunity to explain how LIRS, as it is called, generates the private support for refugees and how it motivates the congregations to become involved with refugees and to help them become adjusted, economically self-sufficient and self-reliant in their new country.

Mr. Chairman, in 1979 we made a study, as indicated in the written testimony, which showed that of every $100 the refugee received, $23 came from LIRS R&P grants and $77 came from the private sector. This is a calculation on the figures given in the report; namely, $375 from LIRS R&P funds as opposed to $1,064 from private funds.

We have not made an extensive survey of current contributions by congregations to refugees, but I have provided you with some samples of a recent telephone survey we made and I think they are quite impressive. I would ask you to read the samples.

To take out the fear from the congregations in sponsoring the refugees, LIRS set up a network of regional consultants. We also said we were going to assist financially the refugees as the needs arose. Since 1975, LIRS has sponsored about 60,000 refugees enter under the reception and placement grants.

If we look at the big movements, we see that in 1975 we had the biggest movement. At that time, we received about $8.9 million in reception and placement grants; we still have $1.4 million as an unspent balance. In 1980, we received $7.9 million, out of which $4.4 million has not been used. In 1981, we had about half of the amount, $4.2 million, as a R&P grants out of which only $700,000 is left over, coming to a total of $6.5 million and $200,000, from other programs.

However, we also note that it takes us right now one-third more than the R&P grants to keep our support services. The question was raised here, what do we do to monitor the use of the R&P grants and to see that there is no fiscal abuse. Mr. Chairman, I would like to assure you that the money is used and will be used for the Indochinese refugees under the refugee placement grant. Incidentally, currently, the R&P agreement covers all refugees.

We have a plan in which $2.2 million is to be used this year; $2.9 million next year. We have a reserve of $1 million for loans. Thus, if we did not have the reserve right now, we would need to dismantle our whole suppport services system since we are in deficit spending. We can now look into the future and see the use of these moneys, and we have a long-range plan in place, of which you have a copy.

Mr. Chairman, if we speak about self-sufficiency, especially in this fiscal year, $1.5 million has been set aside for special projects to get sponsorship and to get employment projects going.

If we had a recommendation, it would be that if the future reception and placement grants would be time limited in order to avoid the accumulation of funds, my suggestion is that the time limitation should be at least 3 years in order to provide flexibility to the programs.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Walter follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF INGRID WALTER

Mr. Chairman:

I thank you for this opportunity to be here today. My name is Ingrid Walter, and I am Director of the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, which is part of the Lutheran Council in the U.S.A. LIRS is charged with providing immigration and refugee resettlement services on behalf of the Lutheran Church in America, the American Lutheran Church, the Lutheran Church--Missouri Synod, the Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches and the Latvian Evangelical Lutheran Church in America, which together comprise some 17,000 congregations with over 8.1 million members in the United States.

In providing resettlement services to refugees, LIRS endeavors to combine the human and material resources these congregations and church bodies provide with the per capita Reception and Placement grants provided by the federal government. In this way we enable the Lutheran community to serve both the refugees themselves and the desire of the American people, as manifested by federal policy, to provide humanitarian assistance to those displaced by war or oppression.

In hearings on this bill held by the other body, questions were raised about the allocation and expenditure of R & P grants by voluntary agencies in general, and LIRS in particular. LIRS views the partnership mandated in the Refugee Act of 1980 between the federal government and the voluntary agencies as an important and fruitful one. We would not be upholding our side of the partnership as you consider reauthorization of the Act if we did not provide you with as much information as possible concerning LIRS' expenditure of the resources available to us, and our projected allocations of the unexpended portions of the Federal contributions to the total of those resources.

In 1975, at the beginning of the programs to resettle large numbers of Indochinese, almost all sponsorships were obtained from congregations which undertook to provide for the initial needs of refugees, such as temporary housing, food, clothing, job placement, assistance in registering children for school, orientation to communities, transportation systems, etc. With subsequent admission programs, more and more Indochinese refugees claimed relatives in the United States, and hoped to be resettled with them. Thus, in 1980, the Standing Committee of LIRS approved the use of anchor relative sponsorships, and guidelines for such sponsorships were developed. A provision was made that when no congregational support was available, a cash grant of $200.00 for each single or $150.00 per capita for multiple member families was available. We continued to provide other financial assistance as needs arose.

To facilitate this process, LIRS has a network of 36 Regional Consultants, usually connected with Lutheran social service agencies all over the United States. For LIRS sponsored refugees, sponsors and congregations have covered most of the initial costs of the resettlement. In 1979, LIRS surveyed its program and found that it spent $375.06 per capita from U.S. government funding and that $1,263.68 came directly to the refugee from Lutheran congregations or other sponsors. I have provided you with typical examples of congregational expenditures for the resettlement of refugee families.

Because of the commitment of our sponsors and congregations, as of February 28, 1982, LIRS had an unspent balance from the Reception and Placements Grants for Indochinese, European, African and Near Eastern refugees of $6,701,706.00. The greatest balances were accumulated during the movements in 1975 and 1980, when the plight of the Indochinese refugees was highly visible in the media and the response to refugees was most generous.

Nonetheless, it has become apparent that the current Reception and Placement Grant income no longer covers as many services provided by LIRS as it once did. As a matter of fact, by February, 1982, the current program used one-third more than LIRS received in R&P grants.

After considerable deliberation from January through July, 1982, regarding the continued need for service to refugees and the unliklihood of increased funding, the Standing Committee of LIRS adopted a Long-Range Planning Document, which I have also provided you with. Because of the generosity of the Lutheran Community in the past, LIRS will be able to use much of the unspent balance to make up for the funding shortfall in the near future. We project the use of the $6.7 million unspent balance as follows:

--$1,000,000.00 will remain obligated to a revolving loan fund to assist refugees. Since 1976, LIRS has made loans totaling $946,531.49 from this fund. Currently some $585,000.00 is outstanding, with about $415,000.00 available for further loans.

--$2,202,149.00 will be used to cover the deficit from March of this year to February, 1983.

--$2,900,000.00 will be used to cover the deficit in LIRS' fiscal 1984, from 3/1/83 to 2/29/84

This will leave a little over $500,000.00 to cover other contingencies.

In addition, LIRS has approved a number of special projects to help in job development and case management for refugees. I an also providing you with descriptions of some of these projects.

LIRS encourages speedy economic self-sufficiency as an important aspect of resettlement. A recent study of refugees resettled by LIRS as well as a study regarding the system the Regional Consultants use to follow-up on resettled refugees demonstrates the effectiveness of our monitoring system. This information had been shared with the Department of State.

Mr. Chairman, I hope the background information I am enclosing is helpful to you. In my opinion, it cannot reflect adequately the generous response from the private sector which is generated by LIRS turning to congregations and other sponsors asking them to help directly the refugees.

The Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service believes that a congregational ministry to refugees based on loving response to human need remains the best form of resettlement, not only from the standpoint of the resources and talents which are mustered, but also for the warm and supportive community of friends which provides for the refugee, easing his transition into our society and sustaining him as he continues to build his new life. A few examples of this ministry at its best are also included in the packet of background information.

LIRS remains fully committed to support of its refugees and sponsors, and will continue to support them as the need arises, in accordance with its program, and in continuing partnership with the federal government.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony.

APPENDIX

LUTHERAN COUNCIL IN THE USA

Department of Immigration and Refugee Services,
Division of Mission and Ministry

Lutheran Center
360 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010
212/532-6350
800-223-7656(7)

September 17, 1981

Mr. James M. Purcell, Acting Director
Bureau of Refugee Program
Dept. of State
Washington, DC 20520

Dear Jim: Re: Anchor relative sponsorships

This is in response to your letter of September 14.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service started to use anchor relatives as sponsors in the summer of 1980. The governing board of LIRS (i.e., the Standing Committee of the Department of Immigration and Refugee Services, LCUSA) passed a resolution in September 1980 "endorsing the policy of encouraging refugees (who are self-sufficient) to act as anchor sponsors for their own relatives and providing financial assistance (if necessary) according to guidelines."

For your information, I am enclosing the guidelines and the anchor relative sponsorship form. Please note point 4 in "Criteria" which states that "Anchor relative should be employed, not fully dependent on cash assistance."

I should add that next week the governing board will meet again to consider the need to "reiterate its present principle of strong preference for congregational sponsorships in as many instances as possible, including involvement of congregations in anchor relative, unattached minors and other special resettlement cases."

Let me assure you that LIRS' intent is to back-up anchor relative sponsorships either with congregations or staff workers of LIRS Regional Consultant offices.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Ingrid Walter
Director
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service

IW:hn
enc.
cc: Mr. T. Van Scoter, ACVA
Dr. Franklin Jensen, LIRS

GUIDELINES FOR ANCHOR SPONSORSHIP

General

1. Anchor sponsor should be interviewed to discuss what is expected of a sponsor and to evaluate capability.
2. Regional Consultant and anchor sponsor should outline what each have agreed to provide.
3. Both the Regional Consultant and the anchor sponsor should sign the agreement form.
4. LIRS-NY should provide a copy of the match memo to its Assistant Social Services Coordinator to record that an anchor sponsor agreement has been set up.

Criteria

1. Anchor sponsor should possess adequate English to introduce refugee to community life and services.
2. Anchor sponsor should have knowledge of and know how to access community services.
3. Anchor sponsor should have access to transportation.
4. Anchor sponsor should be employed, not fully dependent on cash assistance.

Anchor Relative Responsibilities

1. Anchor sponsor should provide for adequate housing and other immediate needs.
2. Anchor sponsor, in consultation with staff members, should plan for all necessary services -- physical examination, medical assistance, English classes, etc.
3. Anchor sponsor should agree to make every effort to help refugee find employment leading toward self-sufficiency.

ANCHOR SPONSORSHIP (cont.)

4. Anchor sponsor should agree to consult with staff members before refugee applies for cash assistance should such assistance be necessary.
5. Regional Consultant or local pastor should agree to complete the 90 day Report in conference with the Anchor Relative.

Regional Consultant Responsibilities

1. Regional Consultant should provide support services by staff members.
2. Regional Consultant should provide counselling to refugee regarding advisability of cash assistance should such assistance be contemplated.
3. Regional Consultant may reimburse the anchor relative up to $150.00 per member of a family or up to $200.00 per single person if needed for early expenses on the basis of adequate documentation.

Facing this sheet is a copy of the LIRS Anchor Relative Sponsorship form.

of ANCHOR RELATIVE) LIRS CASE # (if any of ANCHOR RELATIVE)

# of PERSONS:__________

ADDRESS______________________________

TELEPHONE________________(HOME)________________(WORK)

ALTERNATE CONTACT______________________________
NAME TELEPHONE

AIRPORT WHERE REFUGEE WILL BE MET______________________________

ANCHOR SPONSOR AGREES TO PROVIDE THE FOLLOWING:

____ ADEQUATE HOUSING

____ HELP IN FINDING EMPLOYMENT

____ ACCESS TO ENGLISH TRAINING

____ FOOD, CLOTHING, ETC.

____ ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE

____ ACCESS TO COMMUNITY SERVICES

____ Anchor Sponsor agrees to provide the Regional Consultant with information necessary for the completion of 90-day report.

____ Anchor sponsor agrees to consult with LIRS staff before refugee applies for federal cash assistance.

TO BE FILLED OUT BY INTERVIEWER

NAME OF INTERVIEWER IF OTHER THAN REGIONAL CONSULTANT____________________

ADDRESS______________________________ TELEPHONE____________________

____ Anchor sponsor understands sponsorship responsibilities

____ Anchor sponsor not dependent on cash assistance ____ is employed

____ Anchor sponsor has access to transportation

____ Anchor sponsor has adequate English and the ability to introduce refugee to community life and services

Anchor sponsor will
need assistance with:____________ Finances________________ other (specify)

____________________ ____________ ____________________
Signature - Anchor Sponsor Date Signature - Regional Consultant

7/81

use reverse side for further comments

LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE
360 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010

USE OF U.S. GOVERNMENT RECEPTION AND PLACEMENT GRANTS

In order to help voluntary agencies defray the cost of resettlement operations, the U.S. Government provides per capita funding assistance. While this may vary, the average amount is about $500.00. Each voluntary agency uses these funds in a different manner. Some voluntary agencies are themselves the only local sponsor and utilize these funds for the purpose of defraying costs of reception, initial placement and core services. Other agencies routinely pass through varying amounts of money to local sponsors whom they secure through their system. Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (LIRS) does not pass through money to local sponsors or refugees.

Unlike some voluntary agencies, LIRS conducts no fund raising drives. It has a limited budget from the Lutheran Council in the USA (LCUSA). For the 1981-82 fiscal year, LIRS expenditures will be about $8 million for all purposes. About $300,000 of this will be provided by the church bodies participating in the LCUSA for use in ministries for which no federal assistance is received. The rest will come from federal government monies. All funding needed to support the refugee resettlement operations of LIRS and its local Regional Consultant offices, as well as financial assistance to sponsors and refugees, must derive from the U.S. Government grant income. The major program support given by the Lutheran congregations to resettlement comes from their direct contributions of time, goods and money to the refugee families they sponsor.

This does not mean that a local sponsor cannot receive financial aid from LIRS. While most sponsors will need no financial assistance in their sponsorships, some will incur expenses above and beyond what they can afford. LIRS uses funds it has available to assist congregations and other local sponsors in these situations. Assistance may include grants or loans for excessively high medical expenses, help with down payments for automobiles or housing and assistance with rent and food in emergencies. LIRS will provide some initial start-up assistance to local sponsors when absolute necessary.

The major use of government grants by LIRS is providing services. LIRS maintains a network of over 35 Regional Consultant offices (usually Lutheran social service agencies) to provide assistance and information to local sponsors. Sometimes, this may consist of information and referral services. In other cases, it may extend to intercultural counseling, English As A Second Language services, employment assistance and general counsel and advice. Often the need for these services continues for an extended period of time and such services are planned accordingly. In extraordinary circumstances, and after due consultation and consideration, assistance may be given to refugees who have moved away from their original local sponsors and have encountered difficulties.

The LIRS network is committed to undergirding the ministry of refugee resettlement and to facilitating all efforts which enable refugees to become independent and self-supporting members of American society.

LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE

Grants given to or for refugees

1975 - 1976*	$632,975
1976 - 1977	$480,308
1977 - 1978	$119,580
1978 - 1979	$190,611
1979 - 1980	$381,049
1980 - 1981	$727,828
1981 - 1982	$925,968
1982 - 1983**	$256,987
TOTAL	$3,715,360

* These dates represent the fiscal year of the Lutheran Council in the USA, ending Feb. 28th.

** This represents the amount expended between March 1, 1982 and July 31, 1982.

9/7/82

Loans to refugees

Year	Amount
1976	$373,409.50
1977	$125,204.00
1978	$175,421.99
1979	$130,220.00
1980	$ 9,000.00
1981	$ 68,775.00
1982	$ 64,501.00
TOTAL	$946,531.49

9/82

LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE

SUMMARIZATION OF TRANSPORTATION LOANS

Balance as of December 31st, 1977 to
August 31st, 1982

	Balance 12/31/77	NEW BILLING	RECEIPTS	END OF YEAR BALANCE
1978	$224,606.94	$ 711,810.76	$ 85,141.74	$ 851,275.96
1979		1,138,807.77	184,704.25	1,805,379.48
1980		4,267,345.23	483,777.97	5,588,946.74
1981		2,590,435.31	739,409.47	7,439,972.58
1982 (8/31/)		1,674,100.95	458,070.71	8,656,002.82
		$10,382,500.02	$1,951,104.14	(18.79%)

PAID IN FULL TRANSPORTATION LOANS

INCLUDES: MISCELLANEOUS INDO-CHINESE
& INDO-CHINESE CASES

ARRIVED	NUMBER OF CASES PAID IN FULL	AMOUNT BILLED
1976	21	$ 3,245.63
1977	64	44,003.44
1978	207	146,376.94
1979	683	342,820.06
1980	481	268,593.90
1981	99	53,920.00
1982 as of 8/31	3	1,440.00
	1,558	860,399.97

TT
9/2/82

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service

Telephone survey of multiple sponsors

to determine level of private

contributions

September 1982

1643 Yates Avenue
Beloit, WI 53511
September 6, 1982

Dear Jackie: RE: Your telephone conversation with Mrs. Florey.

Listed below in rough order of arrival are the Indochinese refugees that have been resettled by the First Baptist Church with brief comments regarding Church assistance. I understand the accusation is that these people are not taken care of by the sponsors and are put on some form of public assistance immediately. That may be true elsewhere - but not by our church. It could be pointed out that many of these people become in very short order contributors to the economy. (Our family of Kien Duong paid over $4,000.00 in Federal income tax in 1981.) I would hardly call them a burden. And this is true of many of the people that we have sponsored.

The last year has seen a radical change in the public assistance factor in Beloit. Rock County has the distinction of being in the top ten counties in the U.S. with high unemployment percentages. 17.5% three months ago. My rough estimate would be that the percentage of refugees getting assistance is about the same as the general population here.

KIEN DUONG family. Wife, 4 children. Arrived Oct. '75. Church furnished complete support, housing, food, clothing, money, furniture, etc. for 5 months. Helped them find employment. Since then they have built a $49,000 home, own two cars, and both parents have excellent jobs.

KHUE NGUYEN Arrived Oct. '75. Church furnished complete support for 5 months. Has excellent job in Rockford, Ill. Married now with a child. (Include in support data that the Church furnished tutors for most refugees, and also assisted them in attending technical schools.)

KIEU NGUYEN. Single man. Church furnished complete support for five months. Now employed.

LE HUU DO family. Wife and 3, (now 5) children. Church furnished complete support for the family, including some extremely high medical and dental bills totaling over 5 thousand dollars. This family received about $1,200.00 in cash assistance from LIRS with dental bills. Arrived Beloit, Oct. 1977. Employed by Beatrice Foods, Beloit

LONG HAC TRINH. Arrived U.S Jan. '78. Church has worked closely with Long. Never been on public assistance. Now Married.

HAI THANH TRINH Arrived U.S. Feb. '78. (Long's brother) We have worked, and are still working with Hai. Hai built a $50,000 home in Clinton Wisconsin. He was laid off from Besley Wells 2 months ago and is now getting public assistance.

HUONG QUE HUYNH. (CHUONG VUONG.) Lived with his brother in law after arrival in May, 1978. Now employed, married, and father of one. Never been on relief. Church has worked with Chuong in many ways, including his purchase of a home and the furnishing of it.

NGUYEN THI HAI (Wife of Hai Trinh, shown above.) 4 children. Family reunification. We have assisted this family extensively. And are still assisting them.

NGUYEN HUU TO Arrived in May, '79, and left for Elgin IL almost immediately. Now living in Chicago. Our efforts of assistance were not accepted and the family moved to a location where the father could get a job at his trade; tailoring.

THI ANH THU VU, VAN-THI ANH VU, DUNG ANH VU. Family reunification. First named is the wife of Tuan Anh Tran, a refugee settled in the U.S. in Aug. of '75. Tuan well able to take care of his people. Owns a home here in Beloit and has good job. The Church was limited to furnishing tutors, getting the daughter entered in school, and other minor items. A very self sufficient family unit. Arrived June, '79

HUE DINH BANH Arrived Aug. '79. Wife of XA VAN TRAN who arrived in '75. Family reunification. Xa works in Rockford, IL and Hue has job with U.S. Shoe Comp. Bought new home in Beloit in 1980. QUYEN LE BANH, TINH THIEN BANH, MINH TIEN BANH. (sibs of Hue.) The Church assisted in finding housing, furnishing the apartment, tutoring and entering them in school, and other support. We are still working actively with these young people. All are employed, 2 on a part time job, and Minh has a full time job.

VAN LY MY Now the wife of Huong Huynh listed above.) Was his fiancee in Vietnam. The Church worked with them in furnishing, painting, repairing the home they bought here. Van employed by Freeman Shoe Co., Beloit. The church was the scene of the marriage. HANH GIANG AND SON GIANG. Nephew and niece of Van. Hanh living with American family and working at Freeman Shoe. Son, High School age boy now with relative in California.

VUONG TRAI KIM and 3 children. Wife of DE DUONG of Beloit. Arrived Dec. 29, 1979. Family reunification. DE was the first refugee in the area in 1975. Employed at Colt Industries in Beloit. Owns 3 homes in Beloit. Outside of the paperwork involved in this reunification the Church has only assisted in getting the children enrolled in school and other minor supportive activities. A self sufficient family.

DUONG MUOI arrived Mar. '80. Sister of De Duong, (above). Working at Freeman Shoe and living with American family.
Duong DINH PHONG. Arrived same day. Brother of De Duong, (above) now working in Chicago. Both above cases family reunification.

XUONG THANH TRIEU, wife and 5 children. Arrived May, 1980. The Church furnished housing, furnishing, food and clothing. These people have been the recipients of much public assistance because of the father's inability to find any but part time work. Both the mother and father have part time but poorly paid jobs. The Church has assisted in getting the five children in school, furnishing clothing and food, and are still monitoring the well being of these people. This family has been our biggest problem.

TRINH THANH DUNG Arrived May, '80. Family reunification. Brother of Hung Trinh. Both brothers are employed and are self sufficient. The Church has done nothing to assist these young men - they are very competent people.

TRAN THI CHIEU THUY. Arrived July '80. Family reunification. Sister of Mrs. Co Nguyen of Janesville. Thuy married a young refugee in Madison 18 months ago, and he was killed in a car accident 3 weeks ago. She is now living in Janesville with Co.

NGUYEN THANH MINH Arrived July, '80 Nephew of Le Do. (Previously listed) Church obtained tutor only. He lived with his Uncle. Now living in Morgan City, LA. Employed there.

HA TAN TAI Arrived July, '80. School age. Legal guardianship to a member of our Church where Tai is now living and going to High School.

HUYNH HA MUOI. Arrived October, '80. Living with half brother, Ha Dao. They moved to California in 1981. Church worked with Muoi in getting her in School, furnishing such items as a sewing machine, etc.

NGUYEN THI DUNG. Arrived Nov. 1980. Wife of Nguyen Huu Tu previously listed. Family reunification. Joined her husband in Chicago. She was listed as a T.B. case when she arrived and the Church transported her to Janesville for treatment before she went to Chicago to join her husband.

TRAN TAM AND TRAN KHANG. arrived Jan. '81. Relative of Mr. Tin Le of Beloit. Family reunification. Tam moved to California in 1981. Khang is in Beloit, employed at the Dim-Sum Restaurant and attending Vocational School. Living with the relative.

TO DU THANG and 3 sons. Arrived Feb. '81. Family reunification. Thang is the brother of Mrs. Kinh Phung of Beloit. The Church assisted them in renting ahouse and furnishing it. The father is emplyed by Western Container Co. of Beloit, and the two older sons have seasonal work at a canning factory. The youngest son is in Beloit High School. Tutoring for the family was arranged by the Church. As with the other refugees that the Church has sponsored, we are continually rendering assistance in such things as medical and dental appointments, income tax preparation, home purchase agreements, legal questions, court appearances for such things as speeding tickets, etc. etc.

TRUONG TAN LOC arrived Mar. '81. High school age. Living with cousin Mrs. Co Nguyen, in Janesville and attending school.

NGUYEN THI CHO. (Mrs. Rua Van Pham) Immigrant directly from Saigon. (One minor son.) Rua has been in the U.S. for 6 years. Family reunification. Rua has a new home under construction in Beloit. $53,000.00. We have assisted in getting the boy in school and obtaining a tutor for Cho. Rua is employed by the Beloit Corporation.

VU ANH MINH Arrived July '81. Brother of Tuan Anh Tran's wife. (see previously listed entry.) Living with them. Obtained tutoring for him. Self sufficient people - never ask for nor apparently need any help.

DO HUU NGHIA. Entered U.S. Aug. '81. Family reunification. Nghia is the 72 year old father of Mr. Le Do of Beloit. (Previously listed) and makes his home with the son. DO KIEM DIEM, elementary age grand daughter arrived with him. We entered her in the Beloit School system.

VU MINH CUONG Arrived Aug. '81. Family reunif. School age boy. Cousin of Tuan Tran's wife. We entered him in Beloit High School where the teachers said he was a brilliant student. He moved to California in late fall of 1981 to live with a closer relative.

HO VO, wife and child, and HO VAN. Arrived Aug. '81. Nephew of Mr. Hoa Ho of Beloit. Unable to find a job in Beloit the HO VO family moved to Cal. in Ap. '82. HO VAN, 10 year old (no relation) is attending elemntary school in Beloit and living with Hoa Ho.

NGUYEN VAN NAM Arrived Aug. '81. Brother in law of Le Do. Lived with the Do family until Jan '82 when he moved to Morgan City, LA because of a job opportunity. Church only assisted in English tutoring.

NGUYEN NAM HAIArrived Sep't '81. Sponored at the request of Mr. Phoi N. Vo of Fond du Lac, Wis. Mr. Vo has been in the U.S. since 1975 and has an excellent job with the C.N.W. R.R. in Fond du Lac. Living in Fond du Lac now

TRINH QUAN DAT, DAI MUÓI, AND TRINH QUAN TAI. Arrived Oct. '81. Church has furnished apartment, furnishings, food, tutoring and usual Doctor and Dental assistance since arrival. They are still living in the Church furnished Apt. Since arrival they have had a son, Thanh. (Adorable baby) Father and brother have part time jobs at two restaurants.

TRAN NHAN Arrived Jan. '82. Family reunification. Brother Khang Tran. (see previous entry.) High School age boy. We have entered him in high school and have provided tutoring service for him. Living with his brother.

PHAM THI YEN and daughter, 5. Family reunification. At the request of Mr. Hai Tran of Brookfield, Wis. (half brother) The Church was nominal sponsor only.

Any allegations that we have abandened any of the refugees can be refuted by the fact that on any given Sunday a goodly number of Indochinese people are in attendance. A part of the service is in the Vietnamese language. A bible study class in Vietnamese is popular with them. Our people have been very supportive of the resettlement program. A special 'Vietnamese Refugee Fund' is kept by the Church treasurer.

In addition to the named refugees, we have assisted in many ways and on many occasions refugees who have moved to the Beloit area from other locations. People whom we did not sponsor. In the areas of home rental and purchasing, tutoring, schooling, medical problems, transportation, etc.

Hope the above can be of some help, Jackie, but don't ask me to do this again - -

Bob Florey

Rev. August Bernthal
Grace Lutheran Church
4th and Ave. C, SE
Winterhaven, FL 33880

Tel. 813/293-8447

This congregation has sponsored at least 32 families since 1975, Vietnamese and, most recently, Polish.

Pastor Bernthal estimates that $1,000. worth of furniture was donated to each family. Other initial needs have also been met through donations.

Cash outlay over the past seven years has been around $200,000. This included the medical and dental needs of a child who required complex surgery at a cost of approximately $50,000. to the congregation.

Volunteer time is currently estimated at 60 hours a week.

The congregation has never used or endorsed the use of any welfare assistance.

Zion Lutheran Church
749 Pine
Holland, Michigan 49423

Contact: Roberta Hufford
Tel. 616/396-1327

This congregation has sponsored three Cambodian families, totaling ten people, over a three year period.

Initial medical care for all the refugees was donated by a physician who is a member of the congregation.

All three family groups received furniture and clothing in donations. One family was given a car, valued at $600.00.

Cash outlay over the three years amounted to $3,600.

Initially, there were 14 volunteers on the sponsoring committee. Four people are currently active. Roberta Hufford estimates she personally has spent at least 5 hours a week working with the refugees over the past three years.

All the refugees are now employed and self-supporting. The longest period of unemployment for any of them was 3 months, immediately after arrival.

The only public (government funded) service used has been the Department of Health. None of the refugees have received any federal assistance including Food Stamps.

First Evangelical Lutheran Church
1206 Whitehall Rd.
Muskegan, Michigan 49445

Contact: Eva Jeanne Osborne
Tel. 616/744-5461

Over the past 3 years, the congregation has sponsored two extended families who arrived in many smaller units and totaled about 40-50 individuals, as well as a group of 10 single young men with military background. Most of the refugees were Vietnamese.

Initial cash raised amounted to $1,800., which was used for a down payment on a house. The church then made the monthly mortgage payments as well and finally donated the house to one of the refugee families.

The initial $1,800. raised was matched by $1,800. from the Aid Association for Lutherans (AAL). Since then, "several thousand" more has been raised and spent.

The ten soldiers who were sponsored by the congregation were placed in homes to live. Their length of stay in these homes has varied - anywhere from 8 months to 3 years. Some are still living with their inital hosts.

While it was needed, the congregation took donations of food monthly for the refugees.

The refugees were taught ESL by volunteers from the congregation.

One of the families the church sponsored has become self-sufficient, moved to Dover, Delaware and purchased a home.

King of Glory Lutheran Church
16980 Duck Lake Trail
Eden Prairie, MN 55344

Tel. 612/934-1708

This congregation sponsored one Afghan family of 7. All were immigrants, with the exception of an elderly grandmother, and therefore ineligible for special refugee benefits.

Cash raised to help resettle the family amounted to $7,000. In addition, initial needs such as food, clothing and furniture were met through donations.

Mt. Olivet Lutheran Church
5025 Knox Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55419

Contact: Mary Vickerman
Tel. 612/941-7230

Over three years, the congregation has sponsored about 100 Cambodians.

Cash raised amounted to $12,562.

Mary Vickerman averaged 20 hours a week of volunteer time over the three year period. There were12 other volunteers whose time spent with the refugees varied. At least one other person spent as much time with the refugees as Ms. Vickerman.

All initial needs - clothing, furniture, household goods, and food were met through donations.

Rev. Rollander
St. Andrew's Lutheran Church
2650 148th Avenue SE
Bellevue, WA 98007

Tel: 206-746-2529

This congregation has sponsored four families -- Chilean, Vietnamese, Lao and Polish -- over a five-year period.

All initial expenses were donated, including clothing, food and furniture. Hundreds of volunteer hours were spent in many ways including providing transportation.

The pastor estimates a total cash outlay of $8,340, as well as at least $2,500-$2,700 if he were to place a value on the donated goods.

The congregation reports a positive sponsorship experience.

Rev. Edward Marquart
Grace Lutheran Church
22975 24th Avenue South
Des Moines, WA 98188

Tel. 206/878-2460

This congregation has sponsored about forty families since 1975, most of them Lao.

Pastor Marquart estimates that the cash outlay per family has averaged $500. - $1,000.

For each family all initial needs for food, clothing and furniture were met through donations.

Initial and routine dental and medical services are donated by members of the congregation.

Of the forty families, only two have employment problems. The congregation has always emphasized employment with successful results.

Rev. Edgar Kaiser
St. Mathew Lutheran Church
8330 212th St. SW
Edmonds, WA 98020

Tel. 206/778-1104

The congregation has sponsored four families since 1975.

1) The first family, in 1975, was Cambodian, and cash outlay for the sponsorship was about $3,000. In addition, the congregation bought the family a car.

   At least 1,000 volunteer hours were spent with the refugees. Initial food, clothing, and furniture needs were donated.

   The wife in the family had Laubach ESL tutoring in her home free of charge; her English is now excellent.

2) The second family sponsored was also Cambodian; cash outlay amounted to about $500. in addition to donations to meet initial needs and volunteer time.

3) The third family was Lao. Initial cash outlay was $1,200. along with donations to meet initial needs and volunteer time.

The family's son was killed in a traffic accident soon after arrival at age 2½. The congregation paid all funeral costs, amounting to about $500.

Shortly after this tragedy, the child's mother bore a daughter who only lived for two days. The funeral home donated all its services, including the casket. The hospital where the mother and daughter stayed for a few days, Children's Orthopedic in Seattle, charged the family only a nominal fee and donated the bulk of its services.

4) The fourth family sponsored was Vietnamese;cash outlay was $1,200. The congregation loaned the family $800. to purchase a car at no interest in addition to the $1,200. donated.

Hundreds of hours of volunteer time were spent with the family, some of them in driving lessons. Furniture, food and clothing were donated.

Ezekiel Lutheran Church
Grace Swenson
202 S. 2nd Street
River Falls, Wisconsin 54022

Tel. 715/425-5866

This congregation has received a grant from LIRS to resettle 40 refugees. Twenty six have arrived to date, mostly Vietnamese.

$9,000. has been received from LIRS in R&P funding, amounting to $225/capita. An additional $7,500. was donated by the American Lutheran Church (ALC), $100. by the American Lutheran Church Women (ALCW), and $600. by a private individual.

An affiliated community organization called FISH collects needed goods from the community, such as furniture, and clothes. About $750. worth of bicycles has been donated.

The project has 20 volunteers, and 10 ESL tutors.

Prior to receiving the LIRS grant, the congregation sponsored 8 Hmong families.

An estimated $10,000. was raised for their resettlement in cash and another $10,000. was donated in goods. Every family received furniture and kitchen supplies in addition to initial clothing and food needs.

Thousands of volunteer hours were spent with the refugees, in part driving an average distance of 10-15 miles each way to job interviews, medical and dental appointments, etc.

ZS:jv

9/7/82

LUTHERAN IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE SERVICE
LONG-RANGE PLAN
ADOPTED BY STANDING COMMITTEE
JULY 26, 1982

MISSION STATEMENT

To implement the concerns of Lutheran churches and their congregations for refugee and immigration policies and programs by:

Encouraging Lutheran congregations to respond to the needs of refugees, immigrants, undocumented persons and other aliens as an integral part of their total ministry.

Enabling congregations to effectively carry out such a ministry by providing necessary support services.

Promoting the emotional well-being and economic self suffiency of refugees and advocating for the needs of undocumented persons and other aliens.

Alerting Lutheran church bodies, synods, districts, congregations and constituents to the needs of refugees, undocumented persons and other aliens.

Serving as ombudsman between government and the immigrant or refugee in matters of legislation and its administration.

PREFACE

LIRS and its system of RC offices provide a structure and organization which has, over the past years, effectively facilitated the work of the churches. Now, however, changes in government policy and new economic realities require LIRS to modify its structure and organization if it is to continue to facilitate effectively this work.

GOALS

1. To develop a greater consciousness within the Lutheran churches that the ministry to refugees, immigrants, undocumented persons and other aliens be recognized and included as integral to the total ministry of the Lutheran churches and their member congregations.
2. To streamline and maintain an effective regional service system to accomplish the mission.
3. To promote self sufficiency among resettled refugees, and to discourage reliance on public assistance. When services are needed, to refer refugees to local community services or to Lutheran congregations and agencies if possible, with the aim of decreasing direct LIRS service provision.

SPONSORSHIP DEVELOPMENT

Premise

In the next several years, the U.S. will, according to best estimates, be reducing the size of its refugee program considerably. Consequently, the size of the LIRS caseload may also be reduced resulting in the need for fewer sponsors.

LIRS currently resettles about 6.7% of the total refugee caseload. As volume decreases, LIRS is increasingly capable of producing quality sponsorships with efficiency. LIRS should, therefore, consider maintaining a capacity to resettle 4,000 to 4,500 refugees annually in the coming years which would require providing 1,450 to 1,600 sponsors.

Task

The immediate task of LIRS is to bring its sponsorship development efforts into line with its projected future caseload. A reduced caseload will, of course, mean a reduced need for sponsors and a subsequent reduction of income. LIRS will, therefore, have to rearrange its sponsorship development efforts from its present scope and, instead, concentrate its resources in limited geographic areas. The object is to have in place a system that can provide the necessary number of sponsorships with maximum effectiveness and efficiency, while retaining the flexibility to expand or contract in the future, as the volatile nature of refugee flow dictates.

LIRS will, therefore, focus its sponsorship development activity by realigning or adjusting the location, function, and number of its regional service areas. These changes will be accomplished by taking into account the following considerations:

1. Past performance - The number of sponsors developed in FY '80, FY '81 and FY '82 to date will be compared against the projections made by each area for each FY. Special attention will be given to quality congregational sponsorships.

2. Future family reunion caseload - We can predict that some areas will have heavy family reunion caseloads. These areas should retain a sponsorship development capacity.

3. Responsiveness to special need - This is a less quantifiable item but refers to the ability and willingness of areas in the past to respond to special sponsorship needs of LIRS such as overdue, hard to place or medical cases.

4. Economic climate - The ability of an area to develop sponsorships will depend largely on the economic climate of the area. This refers specifically to the availability of jobs and housing.

5. Sponsorship potential - An area must demonstrate sponsorship potential. This can be shown by the number of Lutheran congregations in the area, past use of non-Lutheran congregations or successful past use of congregational-type sponsors. Attention will be given to areas with untapped sponsorship potential.

6. Previous impact by other refugee groups - Impact by other refugee groups (e.g., Cubans) in an area may have a deleterious effect on future sponsorship development, particularly if the level of reliance on public assistance is high.

7. Cost correlation - There must be a realistic correlation between the number of sponsorships projected and the cost to develop them in a given area.

8. Caseload projection - Any planning for sponsorship development must take into account what the projected future caseload will be. Projecting future refugee flow is a somewhat hazardous proposition given the constant flux of world events and United States refugee policy. However, LIRS projects that for the federal FY '83, LIRS will have a caseload of approximately 5,000 people. This will necessitate a system that can produce about 1,800 sponsors during that time frame. Projections for FY '84 and '85 becomes more hazy. Assuming that there is no new outbreak of refugees needing resettlement, the United States ceiling on refugee admissions will continue to decline. If LIRS continues to take a 6.7% share of the total number admitted, FY '84 might see an LIRS caseload of 3,600 and FY '85 a caseload of 3,000.

ONGOING RESETTLEMENT SERVICES

Premise

LIRS policy is that sponsors should move refugees to self sufficiency as soon as possible. LIRS should not presume that refugees need to receive special services beyond those reasonably involved in resettlement (e.g., language and job training) which are not available generally to all members of the community.

Reliance on public assistance is specifically discouraged. Use of services such as Medicaid or Food Stamps is endorsed if needed as a stepping stone to self sufficiency. Similarly, refugee-specific * services need to be provided by LIRS for a limited period of time.

Task

The task is to define appropriate ongoing services and to set guidelines for their provision and duration. They are as follows:

A. Initial resettlement services as specified by the Department of State's cooperative agreement with LIRS will be provided for the first 90 days after arrival. The provision of these services will be agreed upon with the congregation, group, or relative sponsor prior to the refugee's arrival. These services pertain to:

   1. Pre-arrival
   2. Reception
   3. Counseling and referral
   4. Consultation with public agencies

   During the first month of resettlement, particular emphasis is placed on the sponsor's responsibility to meet these immediate needs:

   1. Housing
   2. Basic care and maintenance
   3. Medical and dental check up and treatment, if necessary
   4. Social Security card application

   Once these needs have been provided for, employment counseling and job development are stressed as an essential part of successful resettlement and a natural first step towards self sufficiency.

   The following services which fall under the counseling and referral category of ongoing services are also emphasized during the first three months:

   1. Provision of ESL classes
   2. Provision of support network to aid the refugee in the acculturation process
   3. Provision of these services through grants and loans from LIRS when needed

B. The following assistance will be made available to sponsors and refugees for up to two years after arrival:

   1. Counseling and referral to mainstream services

   2. Service with respect to immigration, family reunification, adjustment of status, and other INS-related matters.

   3. Establishment of special services to aid a refugee or group of refugees where initial resettlement work and mainstreaming ** cannot be sufficiently accomplished in the first 90 days. These services can be provided in a variety of ways -- for example, through Special Project agreements with LIRS; Lutheran

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* specifically geared to the needs of the refugee population for the period of acculturation

** The integration of refugees into the existing social service structure available to the general population

Social Service agencies; national or local Lutheran church bodies or their congregations; federal or local governments; and other private sources such as foundations or corporations.

4. Transfer of files for secondary migration cases to the new location. These cases will be referred to mainstream services. In heavily impacted areas, some special consideration may be given for services other than referral on a case by case basis.

C. The following guidelines are set down for the benefit of heavily impacted areas that must cope with a large secondary migration caseload:

1. Secondary migration is to be firmly discouraged and refugees should be made clearly aware that LIRS is in no way obligated to assist them once they have voluntarily left a sponsor. However, exception can be made if the refugee is in urgent need of assistance and no other resources exist, on a case by case basis.

2. As a matter of policy, LIRS-provided refugee-specific services will cease after two years. It is assumed that the secondary migration caseload coming to LIRS for assistance more than two years after arrival will be relatively small, and that the LSS agency will exercise discretion and restraint in aiding such individuals, in emergency situations only and on a case by case basis.

D. Refugee-specific social services should not be necessary after two years and will be discontinued. It is suggested that files of refugees who are in their third year of resettlement be considered inactive and kept separate from those of more recent arrivals.

However,

1. A file in New York will remain active until the travel account is closed.

2. The regional service area office will be asked to assure the continuation of change of address notifications to LIRS for the purpose of travel loan collection.

3. Immigration counseling or referral will continue to be available, either locally or from New York.

E. LSS agencies and not LIRS will be encouraged to be the primary service providers after the two-year termination date, upon recognition that an unmet need exists in a community's refugee population.

Services may include:

1. Establishment of referral process for refugees who experience difficulties not directly related to resettlement, e.g., child welfare problems, family counseling needs, drug addiction, difficulties with cash assistance, and so on.

2. If the need is great, alerting the Lutheran church network in the area and calling for cooperative response in the meeting of that need.

LIRS will serve in a consultative and information-sharing role to facilitate the development of these services when necessary. Where the need is great and where LIRS retains resources that can be applied towards the establishment of projects to meet the need, special LSS projects will be given particular consideration and funded where appropriate.

L.I.R.S.

REGIONAL STRUCTURE

Region #	States
1.	Washington, Alaska
2.	Oregon
3.	No. California, No. Nevada
4.	So. California, So. Nevada, Hawaii, Arizona
5.	Colorado, Utah, New Mexico
6.	North Dakota
7.	South Dakota, Montana, Wyoming
8.	Iowa, Nebraska
9.	Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma
10.	Texas, Arkansas, Louisiana
11.	Minnesota
12.	Wisconsin, Upper Michigan
13.	Michigan (Lower)
14.	Illinois, Indiana
15.	Ohio, Kentucky, West Virginia
16.	Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Tennessee
17.	Florida
18.	North Carolina, South Carolina
19.	Washington D.C., Virginia, Maryland
20.	Western Pennsylvania
21.	Eastern Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware
22.	New York
23.	Massachusetts, Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire Rhode Island, Connecticut

* The agencies with which LIRS will contract are located in the underlined states.

L.I.R.S. REGIONAL STRUCTURE


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Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service
Special projects funded from
supplemental funds
authorized by Standing Committee of LIRS
for FY 82-83

A PARTIAL LISTING
September 1982

New York

Volunteer Refugee Casework Team (VRCT)
Rochester Area Only

The Voluntary Refugee Casework Team would be a group of individuals recruited from local organizations, churches or other interested groups and trained in specific aspects of refugee resettlement. For example, components of this team would specialize in the Social Services sector, coordinate medical and chest clinic appointments and follow up leads on housing and employment.

It is hoped that this new project will provide new enthusiasm and some relief to the four or five volunteers who now assist the office. An organized and coordinated volunteer team effort could lesson the burden of those currently assisting in resettlement and a renewed project should bring others back who had previously been volunteers, as well as pumping new blood into our efforts. A critical factor in volunteer "burn-out" has been a feeling of helplessness and isolation felt by volunteers when given the immense task of refugee resettlement. A VRCT effort focusing volunteers on specific components of the resettlement process will lessen the burden on our volunteers and help sustain a viable work force.

The primary need is for a full-time Refugee Volunteer Organizer. The person would perform the following tasks:

1) To identify, train and coordinate a team of volunteers willing to assist refugees within the community.
2) To identify other target groups for a potential pool of volunteers.
3) To identify and train people within the group of volunteers with leadership potential who will eventually take command of the volunteer team.
4) To coordinate efforts in Rochester with other agencies and volunteer groups to eliminate duality of purpose and increase the quality of assistance to the refugee community.
5) To develop and write (with the Refugee Coordinator) a standard operating procedure format for refugee assistance covering an 18 month segment, which deals with assisting refugees from arrival until mainstreaming into the society. This plan should be a documented step-by-step procedure that identifies essential tasks as well as gaps in service, with recommendations on how to correct them.

A secondary need for the VRCT project would be a dependable means of transportation to be used by both the team and the Refugee Volunteer Coordinator in order to transport both personnel and materials. It is recommended that a used van be purchased that will have the dual function of assisting in the movement of people and commodities in the operations area.

taken from VRCT proposal

MN

Vocational ESL Project
Westcentral Minnesota

Refugee students in secondary schools require continued support in ESL if they are to be competitive in education and employment. They need assistance in career planning and basic employability skills. However, currently refugee secondary students are not a priority for services through state grants.

Therefore, the projected activities of this project are two-fold: English Training and Career Planning. For both parts of the project the activities will be closely coordinated with area schools.

Projected Activities:

English Training:

1. Recruit and train volunteer ESL tutors.
2. Provide technical assistance to volunteer tutors and school personnel re: goals, methods, materials, including vocational ESL material.
3. Provide in-service to tutors and school staff throughout the year.

Career Planning:

1. Conduct career planning workshops for students and parents.
2. Conduct job search and other employability skills workshops.
3. Develop career plans for youth in conjunction with families.

taken from proposal

LIRS grant: $10,630

Minnesota

Case Monitoring System

With the advent of larger numbers of refugees coming into communities, the activities of new resettlement agencies who used the agency model of sponsorship with strong dependency on cash assistance, the increasing influences of refugee relatives already here who saw the cash assistance system as an entitlement, and the arrival of refugees less able to achieve independence quickly, the job of sponsors to achieve self-sufficiency by way of employment became increasingly difficult. A 45-day or 90-day report no longer is adequate monitoring of the resettlement progress. Today we recognize the need for a far more active stance in terms of follow-on services - not to provide the direct services necessarily, but to monitor the progress being made and where necessary, help to facilitate that progress.

Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota has worked closely with other voluntary agencies in the state to develop a case management (monitoring) system. Jackie Olson of the LIRS staff assisted with its development. Two months of concentrated effort to develop and implement this system will provide the impetus for on-going monitoring by the staff in resettlement.

The information to be summarized on a quarterly basis will demonstrate self-sufficiency according to date of arrival as well as ethnic group. It will also chart differences between urban and rural resettlement, and between groups/church sponsorship and anchor relative sponsorship. It will indicate what financial resources have been used and for how long.

All of this information relates to the need by Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota to have statistics upon which to develop program and monitor progress. Such information is also badly needed by the national LIRS staff as resettlement practice and procedures are being challenged.

taken from proposal

NOTE: This project was funded for a two month trial, only.

LIRS grant: $2,597
9/7/82

MN

Employment/Monitoring Project

The purposes of this project are to provide intensive employment efforts for Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service sponsored refugees in Minnesota and to track their progress to self-sufficiency.

At latest reports, 5,550 jobs are needed for refugees in Minnesota. To meet this need Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota along with other volags and service providers has developed a cooperative program for employment efforts. At present, the equivalent of 2.2 staff are under contract in the impacted area for employment specific services through the Minnesota Refugee Program office. Additionally, another equivalent of 2.5 staff are serving in that capicity under the same contract in the outstate areas.

It is increasingly apparent that for staff efforts in employment to be effective, someone is needed to coordinate all employment activities for Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service cases. With such focus from Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota along with like efforts by other agencies, as well as a new interest on the part of public agencies to support such efforts, we will move many of Minnesota's refugees from welfare to employment.

Finally, we have begun this summer for a two-month period to put in place a monitoring system so that the information on how Minnesota's Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service cases are progressing, can be effectively managed, utilized in planning, and ultimately serve to the benefit of the entire Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service program.

Therefore, the objectives of this project are:

1. strengthen congregational involvement in employment efforts for those Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service refugees whom they sponsor
2. develop a job bank through congregational contacts
3. coordinate and supervise the refugee employment efforts of Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota staff
4. provide linkage to other refugee specific employment projects in Minnesota

5. facilitate innovative employment efforts
6. monitor effect of employment and case management efforts on dependency rates of Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service cases.

taken from proposal

LIRS grant: $41,568 (Employment Coordinator, Bilingual Caseworker, Clerical III)

9/7/82

Oregon and S.W. Washington

"Refugees off Welfare" Employment Project

This project would be the first of its kind in the Portland area to bring the office, church volunteers, Job Services and Language Support Services of the Indochinese Center together in a concerted effort to achieve successful resettlement and refugee self-sufficiency.

The project works in the following manner:

1) Two half-time sponsorship developers will be in frequent contact with churches in their area introducing this program. Each developer will set a goal of 48 congregational sponsorships over a period of 12 months.
2) For each congregation that sponsors a maximum of $500.00 will be offered as a matching grant for initial resettlement.
3) The Church's contacted will be encouraged to participate in the special job search part of this project. A volunteer from each church will serve as a Contact Person seeking to find jobs for refugees by means of contact with other church members and the community. When a position is discovered, the contact person will notify the Job Services Coordinator at the Indochinese Center who will keep a file of the positions available.
4) When a refugee family arrives for one of the churches sponsoring under this program, the sponsor and refugee family will have a bi-lingual caseworker from the Indochinese Center available to them. The caseworker will interpret and offer counseling and help the refugee with a job skills and interest assessment with the Job Services Coordinator. The coordinator will then match the appropriate job (from the church contact file) for the refugee.
5) The Caseworker will conduct a 30 and 90 day follow-up on the status of the refugee's employment.

taken from proposal

LIRS grant: $54,099
9/7/82

South Dakota

Project EARN

EARN is an eight month creative effort to design and test a refugee securement model. EARN is a four step endeavor intended to maximize refugee employment opportunities and capabilities. The project will be developed and tested by professional staff and thereafter will be a guide for volunteer efforts of sponsors.

The EARN acronym encapsules the four steps of EARN activity:

Explore refugee employment possibilities with past, present and potential employers of refugees.

Advance job application and retention skills of unemployed refugees in the Sioux Falls area and at other selected sites.

Run a pilot business project that utilizes unemployed refugees and enables them to develop their own self-employment possibilities.

Note results and learnings of the EARN project as basis for a printed guide to assist sponsors in their own refugee employment efforts.

taken from EARN proposal
by Walt Webber

LIRS grant: $17,956

North Dakota

Emergency Housing

This project is based upon South Dakota's model of the Refugee Inn. Its purpose is to eliminate wasted time and concern of staff as they try to find housing for refugees sponsored under "blanket assurances" when a sponsor is not found immediately. Blanket assurances, and consequently, this emergency housing proposal, is directed at cases that would appear to resettle quickly, usually singles or persons with English language proficiency and/or occupations which would allow for employment in rapid time.

Also, the availability of this housing would enable Polish, Romanian and Hungarian refugees who have become self-sufficient to become sponsoring agents. Many who are expressing an interest do not have financial resources, but are willing to do the work of sponsorship.

taken from request for funding

LIRS grant: $1,700

North Carolina

Church-Volunteer Resettlement Program

This program is designed to combine the resources of the church in whatever form they take, and the use of volunteers in the Greensboro, North Carolina area. It can also be readily adapted to any new group of refugees that needs to be resettled.

Under the direction of a Coordinator who is supervised by the Director of Refugee Resettlement for Lutheran Family Services in North Carolina, churches are approached for both volunteers to work directly with the program and for resources to bring about the physical resettlement of refugees.

To channel the work of the volunteers, the tasks to be accomplished are broken down into the five general areas that churches use often for their committees: employment, housing, transportation, language and social serivces. To give continuity and direction, it is important to have five people to head the specific areas. These people are paid $4.50 for a maximum of 10 hours per week, (for their many additional hours they are not paid). They are called Volunteer Coordinators. In each general area other volunteers work directly with them and are called Daily Living Specialists.

In addition to a staff person and minimum monies for volunteer coordinators and expenses, $150 per person is being requested to take care of the costs of initial housing rental, food, clothing that is not donated and additional household items which cannot be procured through churches. Finally, the nearest Lutheran church to the new refugee's home will be contacted. We will encourage the church to invite and assist the refugees in participating in church functions.

taken from proposal

LIRS grant: $39,877

Pennsylvania

Telephone Helpline

A proven effective, life supportive, Telephone Helpline has provided statewide language communication between non-English speakers and emergency and other public/private services since 1978.

In the last 12 months 5,730 calls were logged; and average of 478 calls per month. 3,334 calls were from non-English speaking persons seeking help. 2,396 were service agency oriented: medical facilities, fire and police departments, crisis centers, Immigration Services, legal services, legislative offices, federal, state and county offices and other public and private sectors.

The Helpline, as an established and well known service, is a focal point for communication, information and referral to services which help protect and save lives and property. Referral to services assists non-English speaking persons in becoming participating and contributing members of Pennsylvania communities.

taken from Tressler-Lutheran
Service Associates, Inc.
request for funds

LIRS grant: $12,566

Wisconsin

Western Wisconsin Refugee Orientation Center (WWROC)

The WWROC is a project to provide a short term residence for newly arrived refugees and three months of orientation as preparation for independence. The project employs a member of Ezekiel Lutheran Church as a director and a part-time ESL instructor of the local technical school. Project oversight is by an advisory committee made up of community representatives primarily from a variety of churches. The project also utilizes a strong volunteer force for English tutoring and some orientation activities.

Primary funding for the WWROC comes from two grants given by the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee service and the Development Assistance Program of the American Lutheran Church ($7,500). To date (June 1982) the Center has received $522 in gifts from local sources including the Catholic Womens' Auxiliary, the American Lutheran Church Women and several anonymous donors.

Not included in these figures, of course, are the hundreds of items of clothing, furniture, appliances, etc. donated by River Falls residents to help set up the WWROC residence.

from: WWROC News Briefs

LIRS grant: $9,000
9/7/82

LUTHERAN COUNCIL IN THE USA

Department of Immigration and Refugee Services,
Division of Mission and Ministry

Lutheran Center
360 Park Avenue South
New York, NY 10010
212/532-6350
800-223-7656(7)

May 26, 1982

Mr. Frank Sieverts
Office of Reception and Placement
Department of State
Washington, DC 20250

Re: Monitoring

Dear Frank:

LIRS uses a form called 90-Day Report to monitor the progress of resettlement. A sample is enclosed.

When it is received in New York, the following procedure is followed:

1. It is reviewed by the staff member responsible for securing assurances in that specific geographic area
2. It is then referred to the Coordinator of Social Services who reviews it to determine whether there are special problems which need follow-up on the local level
3. The information in the report is recorded on a statistical tally sheet
4. A copy of the report is shared with the local Regional Consultant office for information and/or follow-up if problems are indicated
5. The report becomes part of the New York case file

Time pressures have not made it possible to follow up on cases for which no 90-day reports have been received. However, at meetings in April, LIRS requested the Regional Consultants to give greater importance to assuring that 90-day reports are completed for all cases.

Incidentally, a LIRS study of Indochinese refugee women over the age of 17 who had arrived in September 1979 and who had been in the United States for one year revealed the following:

> "In the analysis of the frequency of continuing contacts between the local sponsors and refugee women, six questionnaires were eliminated since the women were living in the home of their Indochinese sponsor relative. The breakdown for the balance was as follows:
>
> 76% at least daily, weekly, monthly or bi-monthly
> 16% infrequently
> 4% never
> 4% refugee moved away
>
> "This seems to confirm the report made by Dr. Young Yun Kim in a 1979 Illinois study indicating that refugees who had one year of residence had retained contact with sponsor in 80% of the cases. The replies also reconfirmed that local sponsors extend their care for the refugees over a long period of time."

An additional monitoring tool for LIRS is the enclosed Program Contact Report which the Regional Consultant completes for each case contact. Two copies are sent to New York where they are reviewed by appropriate staff members.

A further monitoring tool for the New York office is a requirement that Regional Consultants submit Quarterly Operations Reports. These narrativesreports list the cases served and types of services rendered in the quarter. They provide the New York office with a good understanding of what particular Regional Consultant offices have been doing in the quarter reported. They also convey the trends the Regional Consultants see developing in service needs for refugees.

Last week, LIRS wrote to all Regional Consultants seeking information regarding their local monitoring systems, procedures, time tables, etc. As of today, responses received cover 12 states.

I am sharing with you forms used by the Regional Consultant in North California:

follow-up report form
follow-up services flow shart.

In many areas, a telephone contact is made with a local sponsor one month after the refugee's arrival to get a progress report and ascertain any problems.

In other areas, new arrivals are placed on the mailing list of the local office's Newsletter. This keeps refugees informed of the availability of the Regional Consultant for assistance.

In some areas, clusters of refugees are established with a single person in each cluster with whom the Regional Consultant keeps in touch.

In some areas, the Regional Consultant remains in regular touch with sponsoring pastors and congregations through circuit-level meetings and visitations.

If you are interested in any responses which may come in later on, please let me know.

I would like to assure you that LIRS believes in responsible resettlement and will continue to work toward improving its procedures and systems. The objective of LIRS resettlement is to assist refugees to become self-sustaining and contributing members of the community as quickly as possible.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. Ingrid Walter, D. Hum.
Director
Lutheran Immigration and Refugee
Service

IW:hm
enc.

June 3, 1932

Mr. Frank Sieverts
Office of Reception and Placement
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Re: Monitoring

Dear Frank:

I am sharing with you additional information regarding the systems local LIRS offices use for monitoring resettlement.

In one of them, in addition to the 90-Day Report, services to the refugee are checked for 18 months. In that area the case manager is able to tell, at any given time, what services (ESL, employment, health, special programs, etc.) are being provided.

In another area, the office records post-arrival visits on the enclosed logsheet (Appendix A) and follows the following timetable:

1. Within 2 weeks of arrival, an "orientation visit" is made to explain LIRS role, check on any problems or unforeseen needs, and verify that Social Security cards have been obtained, health exams taken, employment leads followed-up, etc.

2. Every 2 weeks thereafter, until the 90-Day Report, the office telephones to check on progress of the resettlement and identifies and resolves problems.

3. After 3 months, a home visit is made to the family and a "90-Day Report" completed.

4. The refugees are informed that they can call the agency for assistance at any time thereafter.

5. Every contact is recorded on a client sheet.

For your information, I would like to quote from that Regional Consultant's letter:

> "We have found that most problems are more easily resolved if caught by a skilled and sensitive worker at an early stage. (This is a truism, of course, but an important one to bear in mind when organizing service delivery systems for programs like ours.) Our ongoing contact call seems to be reassuring for all concerned, even when there are no problems. With refugee programs, services and regulations changing almost from day to day, there is a terrible insecurity which exacerbates all other problems. These include cross-cultural problems, between church or American sponsor and refugee or anchor relative, and also internal family disagreements and misunderstandings between anchor relative and new arrival. Our assistance is both immediately practical-assessing the situation and accessing appropriate resources - and long-term supportive-assisting new arrivals in adjustment, and encouragement and help in beginning to plan a new life directed to self-sufficiency...
>
> "One should be strongly reminded that a resettlement grant of $525 is not even enough to move a person into an apartment (with first and last month's rent, cleaning fee and security deposit considered), much less provide food, clothing or casework contact for any period of time. The fact that we are able to do this at all is a tribute to the concern and self-sacrifice of the private sector: The agencies themselves, which raise additional funds to help; and the sponsors, both churches and anchor relatives, who save and raise money themselves, and provide large amounts of in-kind donations in furniture, clothing, food and housing."

From the Ohio area I share with you a 6-month follow-up inquiry. (Appendix B) That office made a survey in 1980 (Appendix C) and plans to send similar cards to the 1980-82 arrivals in the near future.

As a further sample, I am enclosing a follow-up plan (Appendix D) which was submitted to us in January 1981.

Another area uses a postcard (Appendix E).

At this time. I have received responses from LIRS Regional Consultants covering 23 States. As a matter of fact, we are reviewing our 90-Day Report and simplifying the procedures and possibily revising the form.

I hope that the above information is helpful.

Sincerely yours,

Mrs. Ingrid Walter, D. Hum.
Director
Lutheran Immigration and
Refugee Service

[From the Southern District of The Lutheran Standard, Aug. 7, 1981]

VAN ANH LE KNOWS PRIVILEGE OF EDUCATION

(By Aleta Chossek)

In June, at North Division High School, Milwaukee, seniors gathered to hear speeches and receive their diplomas as usual. But something about this graduation ceremony was unique. The valedictorian Van Anh Le, couldn't even speak English six years ago. Now she stood before her classmates and, in perfect English, reminded them of the privilege of education, given them by their parents and teachers.

Exactly six years before her graduation, Miss Le, the eldest daughter of Ke Van Le and Nguyen Thi Mong Lien, came with her family to Milwaukee as a Vietnamese refugee. The Le family was among the first wave of refugees to be placed with sponsoring congregations by Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Services. The sponsoring congregation was Lincoln Park, Milwaukee.

In the audience that graduation evening with Miss Le's parents and grandfather was her first English teacher, Mrs. Nancy Lorch, who also serves as Lincoln Park's church secretary. The Le family's first home in Milwaukee was a small house next to Lincoln Park Church.

During their first summer in the United States, Van and her brothers and sisters spent each afternoon learning English in the church office with Mrs. Lorch. From that good beginning, Miss Le went on to junior high school and then completed high school in three years, always at the top of her class. She already has begun courses at Marquette University where she was given a full four-year scholarship to pursue a career in dentistry. To that end she also works part-time in a dentist's office.

FACED MANY CHALLENGES

The Le family members have faced many challenges, but they have responded admirably. Medically, they have had a number of problems, the most serious being a child who has undergone surgery a number of times and who now wears a body brace. Le was unable to work for some time. The children were not fluent in English when they began school. Transportation often presented difficult problems. In their first years in Milwaukee, members of Lincoln Park Church provided them with their home, transportation to doctors and dentists, and a place to turn for help and support.

Today, the Le family has met all their challenges. The mother and father and all the children are fluent in English. Le works fulltime as a skilled laborer. Mrs. Le has received her beautician's license and works full-time in a local beauty salon. They are taxpayers and home owners. They solved their transportation problem by getting drivers' licenses and purchasing a car. The children have all done very well in school. This winter, in the first year they were eligible, they chose to become United States citizens.

While the family was Buddhist in Vietnam, the children have faithfully attended Sunday school. The three eldest have been baptized and two have been confirmed.

The people of Lincoln Park Lutheran Church were able to share their resources with the Le family. It has been their blessing to see the fruits of that sharing in this diligent and sincere family.

[From the Milwaukee Sentinel, June 8, 1981]

VALEDICTORIAN UPDATES THE AMERICAN SUCCESS STORY

(By Lennox Samuels)

When she arrived in the United States, Van Anh Le was held back a year in school because she couldn't speak English; now she is scheduled to address her graduating class.

In English.

Miss Le, 18, will update the fabled American success story Friday when she speaks to peers and parents as valedictorian of the 1981-graduating class of North Division High School.

Along with her parents, two brothers, two sisters and paternal grandmother, Miss Le fled South Vietnam in 1975 as the country was falling to the Communists from the North.

"My uncle was a captain in the navy and he got a boat, but it didn't have an engineer," Miss Le said in an interview at her home Sunday. "A friend of his had a boat with an engineer, but no captain, so they got together."

The Le family, along with others on the boat, were picked up by a Chinese ship and taken to the Philippines. A flight to Guam and then to Fort Chaffee, Ark., followed.

In Arkansas, the family waited a month for their papers and sponsorship procedures to be completed.

Milwaukee's Lincoln Park Lutheran Church came to their rescue. "We're not Catholic and they didn't have a Buddhist organization, so Lutheran sounded pretty good," said Miss Le, who is now Lutheran.

The greatest problem the new valedictorian encountered in Milwaukee was the English language. "The first year in school was pretty hard," she said. "It was hard to comprehend the teacher."

Her father, Ke Van Le, and mother, Nguyen Thi Mong Lien, had her held back one year to give her a chance to catch up.

"But I'm graduating on time," Miss Le said. "I started as a junior at the beginning of the year, but I had enough credits to graduate."

After attending Silver Spring Elementary School and Edison Junior High School, she chose North Division because of its medical technology program.

Beginning this summer, she will attend Marquette University, where she wants to pursue dentistry. "I didn't want to be another doctor," she said. "I have uncles who are doctors and pharmacists."

When Miss Le decided to attend North, she was unfazed by the swirling controversy about whether the school should be primarily black vs. integrated, or a citywide specialty school vs. a neighborhood facility.

"In my opinion, the school is what you make out of it," she said. "It's within you, it's not the school. You could go to Nicolet (a brother and a sister attend the highly regarded suburban school) and if you don't want to work, it won't do you any good."

North Division is several hundred pupils below capacity, which boosters blame on the reluctance of white parents to send their children to the school.

Miss Le said she has very little patience with racial issues and said she got along well with most people, although there might have been a few who resented a Vietnamese refugee who performed exceptionally.

"I just say to myself a person is a person," she said. "I talk to some of my friends who are white and they say they're (at North) for a reason and they like it.

"I think North is just like any other high school. In my opinion, it's a very good high school."

Miss Le's more rigorous Vietnamese educational background held her in good stead here. She said the curriculum in South Vietnam was more difficult and intensive.

"In Vietnam, I was a fair student, not good," she said.

Miss Le expects to graduate with about a 3.9 average. She maintained a 4.0 average for years, but her average dropped after a teacher, observing her boredom in a mathematics class, enrolled her in a more advanced class where she didn't do as well.

"I'm surprised that I made (valedictorian), because I was competing with someone else," she said. "Being in the top 10 would be fine with me. I don't care about being No. 1."

In fact, Miss Le takes her distinction lightly. She said she was not very concerned about grades. "You can't do anything with them," she said.

"Some people asked me, 'Why can't you be like everybody else?' " she said "I said it's not my fault. I try."

[From the LIRS Bulletin Board, December 1981]

FORMER REFUGEE HEADS NEBRASKA OFFICE

The special challenge facing him today is to "revive flagging enthusiasm of congregations to participate" in the ministry of refugee resettlement, states Hai Nguyen of Omaha since last September 1 the LIRS regional consultant serving Nebraska.

Nguyen is the first former refugee named to head a consultant's office. He had worked with his predecessor, Keith Schmode, since April 1980. Schmode has moved to Dallas to direct the North Central Texas regional office of Lutheran Social Services of Texas.

As a child Hai lived in Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, where his father was attached to the Vietnamese embassy and was a purchaser of military equipment for Vietnam. Hai was the only one in his 11-member family to escape when Saigon fell to the communists in 1975. His father was imprisoned and has not been heard from since. One of Hai's priorities now is to be reunited with his mother, brothers and sisters.

During the past 6 years the new LIRS regional consultant has held numerous jobs—bus boy, waiter, longshoreman, fish canner, doughnut maker and electroplater. In 1977 he moved to Lincoln, Neb., to join a friend and college roommate from Vietnam days. He worked a 3 to 11:30 p.m. shift to be able to take daytime classes at the University of Nebraska. He hopes eventually to get a master's degree in the human services field.

[From the LIRS Bulletin, December 1981]

SPONSORSHIP—IT'S LIFE-CHANGING

(By Vickie Ream)

With the help of my churches, St. Mark's Lutheran in Harrisburg, Pa., in 1975 and Trinity Lutheran in Mechanicsburg, Pa., in 1979 and 1980, my partner Mary Louise Smith and I have been responsible for resettling 23 Vietnamese and three Cuban refugees. We have had to deal with many different situations, each of which we have met head-on. If we couldn't solve the problem, our help came from above. We have been strengthened and renewed in our desire to reach out to unfortunate people and to give them a new chance in life.

When I started in sponsorship, I never realized how much joy and satisfaction would come from working with a family whose members arrive with nothing and helping them to become active, contributing citizens. The refugees have gotten a new start, and I have received a new purpose and direction. I hope now to continue my education in the social work field and be involved in this way with refugees.

What is sponsorship to me?

It is feeling deeply grateful for what I have in our wonderful country and particularly for the fortunate circumstances I have had in my earlier years and now with my own family. I've realized how materialistic we Americans have become and how we need to take an honest look at our lifestyle.

It is the love that grows from steady caring and sharing—something that cannot be equaled. When you first bring "your" family home, you find their dependency on you is like that of children depending on their parents. I live at a distance from my own extended family, and the refugees have become an adopted family group. We have helped each other in many ways, respecting our differences and growing close together.

A year ago this fall when I temporarily worked full time teaching English to Cuban refugees at Indiantown Gap, Pa., I got a call that the life of the mother in our first Indochinese family was threatened in a bad domestic scene that had been brewing for years. I helped her find temporary shelter, and she gave invaluable help to me with cooking and babysitting while I worked. Once again I was the "halfway house" during another difficult time in her life. She subsequently moved to California to live with her son.

Sponsorship's greatest influence on my family was our decision to adopt a Korean orphan. When my husband Dale and I first visited our first Indochinese family at Indiantown Gap in 1975, I was awe-struck by the beautiful Asian children. I made inquiries about unaccompanied minors who may be available for adoption and learned that more were being released. But the seed was planted. We went to an international adoption agency and after three years and mountains of paperwork were matched with a three-week-old Korean girl. Andrea has fulfilled many dreams for us, and we truly are a family completed by love.

The open door policy we have established in our home has given all three of our children, now 11, 8 and 2, an awareness of the many differences and similarities of the human race.

Our 11-year-old, Brian, is currently studying Spanish. He's always eager to try his new words with the Cubans, and they delight in his attempts. Recently Brian and his brother Brandon were able to share with their classmates pictures of the space shuttle and an exact duplicate of the pen used by the astronauts. The items were gifts from one of the sons of our first refugee family, who earned a degree in electrical engineering at Drexel University in Philadelphia, was hired at Rockwell International in California and became part of the team working on the shuttle. The same children who sneered when we had "Chinese" living with us were now awed at the exciting information my boys had to share.

Sponsorship has provided an education in how working class people are treated. As we waited in endless lines, filled out form after form, dealt with the prejudice and stigma of "refugee" and learned the hard way about the many procedures required by governmental agencies for giving assistance, I became very frustrated.

My frustration resulted in our initiating such programs in our church as a food bank, through which we distribute food to needy families, and the Bethesda Mission, a home and counseling center for homeless men. Our church has gained a reputation for having a very active social ministry, and many members have gotten the satisfaction of helping others in one way or another.

Sponsorship has also enriched our marriage—even though at times my husband Dale has accused me of caring more about refugees than our own family. A happy, fulfilled wife is bound to reflect on a marriage. Dale has been very understanding and supportive. At times he has kept me from going overboard.

I hope that many more people will take the step to sponsorship. The world has so many hungry, tired human beings who don't ask for the political situations in which they find themselves. If we do not help them, who will? Doing nothing is no different from being on the shores of Malaysia—or Florida—and shoving boats filled with refugees back into the sea to die.

ST. LUKE LUTHERAN CHURCH,
Richmond, Va., February 8, 1982.

Lutheran Council in the U.S.A.,
Lutheran Center,
New York, N.Y.

Attn: Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service.

DEAR MRS. SEINER: Please refer to your case reference number T-500321 B 53034 Huynh Nhu Qunynh (5).

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that the Huynh family is now self-dependent and that the congregation of St. Luke considers the project to be complete.

The male head of the family is fully employed in an automobile engine rebuild facility. His performance of duty for more than a year has been satisfactory and with increases in individual skills he is assured continued advancement under the employers personnel plans. A son, now ten months old, has been added to the family since their arrival in the U.S. and as their ability to speak English improves they will more fully enjoy their new life.

St. Luke is pleased with the progress to date and with having offered new hope to the family in this resettlement experience. We also have been honored to be a part of establishing a responsible and productive member of American society and above all, in extending the loving care of our maker.

Your truly,

FRED FLUCKIGER,
Chairman of the Refugee Resettlement Committee.

[From the LIRS Bulletin Board, March 1982]

"WE'RE FINE NOW", SAYS REUNITED FAMILY

"I love all of these people for caring enough about a refugee and his family to go out of their way for no other reason than they are about God's work. I thank each and every one of them from the bottom of my heart."

So declared Cuu Van Nguyen, resettled in Kinsley, Kans., since 1976 under sponsorship of Our Redeemer Lutheran Church of Kinsley and the Methodist church in nearby Lewis, when last October he was reunited with his wife Tam and sons Cuong and Dung.

The happy ending to their long separation took place at the Wichita airport and has continued at the home in Kinsley Nguyen purchased for his family.

The last time he saw his sons, they were one and two years old. Now they are eight and nine. "We've missed so much of each other," he says. "My sons are in school, and we're fine now."

The former South Vietnamese sailor became a machine operator in Lewis, Kans., with a manufacturer of hydraulic systems. He especially praises his co-workers for keeping "hope in my soul. I know that many prayers have been said on our behalf."

When Saigon fell in 1975, Nguyen was on duty on a military ship diverted to Hong Kong. He spent his first three years as a refugee trying to find the whereabouts of his wife and sons, who had escaped to South India. He placed an ad in a Vietnamese publication widely circulated in refugee communities, and she spotted it.

Frustrating bureaucratic confusion through the intervening years was finally resolved by the intervention of U.S. Rep. Pat Roberts of Kansas. Bad luck even plagued the departure of Tam Nguyen and her sons from India. They were removed from an Air India plane because their travel documents were missing. The documents were later found on that same plane.

THEY SIGN A PROMISING TOMORROW

(By Naomi Yocom)

The stocky, blond Pole and the tall, dark, young Vietnamese have more than their refugee status in common.

Both fled their native countries within the past few months; both wound up here in Lancaster. Both want to become auto mechanics as soon as they can communicate adequately. And both are deaf.

The New Era met them recently at the home of Janet and Joe Adams, 1357 Calvert Lane, and it proved to be an interesting interview, since questions and answers sometimes took the form of American Sign Language, Polish Sign Language and Vietnamese Sign Language. The Rev. Robert Collins, local Lutheran pastor to the deaf—and himself hearing-impaired—served as translator.

Pyotr (now Peter) Bocwinski lives with the Adamses and their two small children, Laurie, 8, and Matthew, 5.

Peter was born in Trompole, Poland, 30 years ago. He became deaf at the age of 6 as a result of a fall from a tree.

In a school for the deaf in Poland, he learned sign language; he also learned welding, got a job in a motorcycle factory and worked as a bus mechanic.

He was, and is an athlete. Indeed, it was this ability that gave him the opportunity to defect. Last summer he was on the Polish soccer team at the Deaf Olympics in Koln, Germany. Three of his teammates decided to defect, and, at the last minute, Peter decided to go with them.

After a few months in Austria, he came in contact with Catholic Social Services.

Meanwhile, the Adamses had told Catholic Social Services that they were interested in taking in a Polish refugee.

In January, Peter arrived in Lancaster. Janet remembers being baffled because he didn't speak. However, she didn't realize that he was deaf until she noticed that he was not responding to the radio in his room.

The Baptist Adamses with their Catholic protegee contacted Collins and launched on what promises to be an entire new direction in their lives.

Suddenly Janet, 33, is studying sign language and how to teach English to non-English speaking people. She labels her tables "table" and her chairs "chair" so that Peter can learn written English. Though she is shy about signing in front of strangers, she is earnestly trying to improve communications with Peter.

While she is doing all this, she is also learning a lot about the Polish community, the deaf community and other refugees in the area.

Tang Le, Peter's Vietnamese counterpart and a not-infrequent visitor to the Adams' home, is a great help to Peter.

Le's story is even more dramatic than Peter's. Born deaf 24 years ago in Saigon, he attended the School for the Deaf in Lai Thieu until the North Vietnamese took over in 1975, at which time he got a variety of jobs, first as a custodian, then as a fisherman. He was learning to work on motorcycles, but something happened and he ended up a a locksmith.

Like Peter, he is an athlete—he won a prize for swimming in Vietnam.

In April 1978, he tried to escape from Vietnam through the jungles of Thailand. He was captured and placed in a "squat box," a box with dimensions so small that he could neither stand up straight nor lie down.

After six months, he was returned to his home.

In October of 1980 he tried again to escape, and again he was captured, tortured and sent home.

At last, a year ago, he made good his escape and arrived in Lancaster in September. He lives with his uncle, Ngo Hai Trien.

Eager to begin a new life, Le's first move was to try to find someone else who was deaf. He was in luck: There was another deaf person living right around the corner.

It wasn't long before he found himself at Collins' signed services at St. Matthew's Lutheran Church.

Le and Peter met at the church and became fast friends. As Le is three months ahead of Peter in learning American Sign Language, he has styled himself as Peter's mentor.

When Peter starts signing in Polish rather than American Sign Language, Le corrects him. When Peter is talking with Collins, Le watches like a hawk and often insists on replaying the conversation making sure Collins understands Peter and vice versa.

The communications problems are, of course, multi-layered. American Sign Language does not spill over into written English, so the refugees each have two new languages to learn.

Le is fluent in both Vietnamese and Chinese sign language, but says he can't expect an American to be knowledgeable about either of those. "It is very important to me that I learn the language of America," he signs. He is becoming comfortable with American Sign Language and indicates that he is sure Peter will too, in the near future.

Sometimes they will talk about what they left behind, hands flying, eyes dark with pain. But mostly they are interested in now and tomorrow. Both are eager to become self-supporting, and both hope to go into auto mechanics as they each have training and experience in the field.

Meanwhile, Janet has scouted up a possible soccer group for Peter, and mentions that one of the deaf men at church wanted to know if Peter would play on the deaf softball team.

Peter smiled and nodded—but before he can play, he'll have to learn what softball is.

Even the Adams children are getting into the act. Laurie went to the library and picked up a book on sign language, and is teaching herself. And Matthew—well, he has already learned two signs: "Friend" and "I love you."

[From the St. Paul Pioneer Press, May 30, 1982]

HMONG TELEVISION SHOW WINS HIGH RATINGS FROM REFUGEES

(By Nancy Conner)

EAU CLAIRE.—No one would mistake this for a typical evening news program.

When cameras start rolling, wailing strains of oriental music accompany a photograph of two bulls fighting head-to-head in a dusty ring during a New Year's celebration.

They quickly fade from the monitor, replaced by a stream of Hmong-language words.

"OK, focus on his face," the television production manager urgently tells an amateur cameraman through his headset. "That's good. Zoom out. Zoom out a little more. Perfect."

Yer Vang's face materializes in the television monitor as he calmly co-anchors the latest segment of "The Hmong Community Report."

The half-hour program conveys local and national news of particular interest to the 500 Hmong refugees who have made Eau Claire their new home.

Beside Vang at the desk is Doua Vue, a 19-year-old Memorial High School student, who is glancing through his notes one last time before his turn on the air.

Doua Xiong, 18, also a Memorial High student, is operating the television camera for his first time, taking explicit directions from production manager Harry Carnes.

This is one news program the network television programmers didn't dream up. Neither did their local affiliates.

"The Hmong Community Report" was begun in mid-April to fill a crucial information gap caused by language difficulties. In their native tongue, the announcers tell viewers about a wide range of topics: governmental regulations; upcoming Hmong events; American and Hmong cultural customs; and health, educational, employment and general refugee information.

At least half of the local Hmong community watches the show regularly, according to Vang, 31, regional refugee coordinator for Lutheran Social Services.

They tape the program each Monday afternoon in the studio at Eau Claire's Public Access Center. The program is aired at 5:30 p.m. Monday and Thursday on Channel 8 for the city's cable television subscribers.

As part of last week's show, Vang explained how he could help with procedures for bringing in relatives from Thailand refugee camps, but that U.S. policies soon might be reducing the numbers allowed to immigrate.

Vang also explained to viewers that licenses are needed for the fishing and upcoming hunting seasons, and he discussed other warm-weather needs.

"For parents, I tell them summer is coming, so don't let their kids play in the street and be careful to watch them," Vang said.

Vue's news included the latest Hmong soccer teams' scores, news of an upcoming Hmong community picnic and the graduation of several Hmong high school students this week.

But the average American-born listener wouldn't have a clue as to what was going on.

"Occasionally, you will hear Vue say something about bustrip or 'St. Paul'—they have no Hmong words for things like that," said Elwood Karwand, who helped Lutheran Social Services and the Public Access Center launch the program.

Maggie Foote, access center executive director had suggested using the public cable channel a year ago, when the urgent need for translators was brought up by local health officials.

This spring, Robert Novotny of Lutheran Social Services and Karwand heard what the Hmong needed, and set the program in motion. Karwand serves as the contact between the center and the program's Hmong cast and crew.

There is no charge for using the center's facilities, which are funded by the cable company, Wisconsin CATV, and by the city of Eau Claire. And as for any group using the facilities, the nature of the programming is up to the Hmong.

"It's their show. They have to do it," Karwand said. "I think one of the biggest mistakes we can make is to think we have to do everything for them."

Foote said that, except for one person, public reaction to seeing the Hmong-language program has been favorable and supportive.

"I'm pleased with its acceptance," she said. "It's unusual, especially in this community. to watch a complete program in another language—no subtitles, no sign language—so it's strange."

And it has been a strange experience for the cast and crew, who are like other amateurs when it comes to television production.

"That first show was interesting—trying to get three of them cued when to come in and which camera to look at," Karwand recalled with a smile.

Novotny appeared on the first show to introduce the program, and occasionally a District One Technical Institute student, Kou Xiong, also has announced the news. It began as a 15-minute show, and last week was expanded to a half-hour. There are plans for filming events, such as dances, outside the studio soon.

One show featured Vue's rock band, which played a soft rock music accompaniment as he sang a traditional Hmong song.

Vue, an intense and darkly handsome young man, introduced the song with an explanation of how his people lost their homeland when the Communists took over in Laos and began killing the Hmong, who had aided the United States during the Vietnam War.

He translated the song's words, saying it exhorts the Hmong people to "join together and live happily" and to keep their customs alive.

"We are crying because of the loss of our country and our life," Vue translated, and he began singing the Hmong words as he softly strummed an amplified guitar.

[From the LIRS Bulletin, June 1982 Vol. 8, No. 2]

THANK YOU, GOD, FOR REFUGEES

The following is by Dona Krienke of the Osseo, Wis., Lutheran Church. She and her husband Melvin have three children, the youngest of whom is in high school, and three grandchildren.

One day last December Harriet Hong, president of our circle of American Lutheran Church Women, telephoned to ask if I would transport a group of Hmong refugees back to their homes in Eau Claire, Wis., after our meeting the next week. I said I would.

After I hung up. I thought: "Now why did I say yes?" I was tired of hearing the word "refugees." When our community had a clothing drive for them a few months earlier. I purposely avoided having anything to do with the drive.

At first at the ALCW meeting I did not see anyone who looked like a refugee to me. I was relieved. But soon the group arrived. I believe they numbered 17. I looked at the eyes of the beautiful children dressed in clothes several sizes too big for them, the proud smiles of their parents and the tired look of the older women.

I will never forget the feeling that came over me. My heart went out to them.

I learned who the Hmong refugees are and why they are here. This information probably would have helped me to be more understanding in the beginning.

The Hmongs are a mountain people in Laos. During the Vietnam War they were friends of the United States. Their secret guerrilla army effectively prevented shipments down the Ho Chi Minh Trail from reaching South Vietnam for 13 years. But 12,000 Hmong people were sacrificed. For every Hmong who died, an American reportedly lived.

The Communists who took over Laos are driving the Hmongs out of the country and gasing, killing and torturing them. Over the past two decades the number of Hmong tribal members in Laos dwindled from 500,000 to 70,000.

Among the Hmongs who have escaped, many have been resettled in such larger cities as Chicago, Los Angeles and Denver. They have found themselves in a new kind of terror. They have lived in neighborhoods where they dare not leave their homes even in the daytime.

The Hmong refugees have found that they feel more secure in smaller communities such as Eau Claire. At last count 600-700 were resettled in the area. The Eau Claire school district has a very good program to help them adapt to everyday life here. Its Vocational Training School offers English as a Second Language, "Community Living Skills" and related courses.

The Hmongs are family-oriented people. Their need to be together and to interact with each other is also more easily met in a smaller city.

Since that eye-opening ALCW meeting back in December, I have shared so many experiences with the Hmong people. I have grown to love them so. Now all I can say is, "Thank you, God."

Thank you for You Xiong, a nurse who works in the Eau Claire City-County Health Department, and her husband Sy Moua, who serves as a Christian pastor among the refugees in Eau Claire. They have been my main contacts and have led me to meet more and more of their people.

Thank you for Yer Vang, the Indochinese refugee coordinator for Lutheran Social Services of Wisconsin and Upper Michigan who has an office in Eau Claire and who can give information about sponsorship of a family or individual.

Thank you for Tong Van Thao, Doua Xiong Thao and their children, whom our church sponsors.

Thank you for their teacher at the Vocational Technical School, Ginny Leadholm, who led us to Tong and Doua.

Thank you for the company in Minneapolis which sold me draperies at a very low price so that we could cover some cold windows in the houses of the refugees and for the ladies who have sewn quilts to keep them warm in winter.

Thank you for the way people have responded so generously with many loads of clothing, furniture and bedding delivered to the refugees.

Thank you for Bob and Sue Komes, the young couple from Eau Claire who gave us a washer and dryer for Tong and Doua.

Thank you for the life of Doua's half brother, Teng Xiong, 14, such a clever boy. While riding his bicycle he was hit by a car and killed.

Thank you for the family member who at the prayer service before the burial spoke of this very sad day but nevertheless expressed thanks to the American people for being so good to the Hmong people and for the freedom found here.

Thank you for the success of the Hmong booth at a fair where they were able to show off and sell some of their fine handwork.

Thank you for the young lady who came over to the booth that day and offered to tutor a family in English.

Thank you that when we took some of the Hmong women with us to a retreat, the Bible study, without our anticipating it, touched on refugees and their needs.

Thank you that my family has also become part of this ministry.

Thank you that my grandchildren use the word refugee in their everyday conversation and know firsthand what it means.

I could go on and on, God, but you know better than I the joy and blessing of being able to serve these new neighbors and friends.

Senator SIMPSON. Let me ask a general question and those that wish to respond on the panel could, if they would briefly. Let's just try that for a few minutes.

What impact do you think that the changes in local government coordination and cooperation will have on voluntary agency activities? Would anyone care to respond to that?

Mr. KLEIN. Why do I not take a stab at it? I think it is fair to say that there was probably inadequate coordination and consultation at the local level a couple of years ago and before. I would like to go back to 1975 and 1976 when the agencies found it difficult to get any responses out of local government. I think we kind of gave up trying and that it was inadequate consultation a few years ago.

I think now that we have pretty good consultation all the way around between the agencies and local and State governments. For instance, we held a meeting, the third of its kind, about 4 weeks ago with something like 19, I believe, State coordinators. It was in sharp contrast to the one we held a year-and-a-half ago. This was a working session; the ambience was productive and cooperative.

In short, I think we have good consultation. I think it can always be improved and there are a number of mechanisms now extant to facilitate that consultation.

Senator SIMPSON. In the course of my time with the subcommittee, we have been told not infrequently that a refugee will leave a job obtained through the sponsoring voluntary agency to obtain assistance through a local welfare office. We are advised that that is a practice.

I would be interested if you could advise how common you think that practice is and what might be done to try to correct that, because we do hear that. Could you comment on that?

Mr. KLEIN. The practice is too common and our recommendations are contained in the ACVA testimony.

Senator SIMPSON. Good.

Mr. KLEIN. I will pass that over to my colleagues.

Senator SIMPSON. I appreciate that candor because, you know, we cannot exist without the voluntary agencies. But there has been enough evidence to come to my attention in a year-and-a-half to know that there is some concern there.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, voluntary agencies dealing with the Federal Government is a little bit like dealing with a fickle lover. You know, one day you are just great and the next day you cannot do anything right.

In 1979 with the boat people, everyone was concerned, including ourselves, with getting these people here and safe. The systems were used and stretched, but the people were brought here. We just began to get ourselves out from under that when we were hit with the Mariel Cuban crisis.

I do not think that any of us would question the fact that there are improvements in refugee resettlement that can be made, and I think a lot of those are taking place and I think, individually, we could present you with documentation on that. I know that my own agency can.

But there are generic factors which impinge on our ability to do the job we feel we ought to do. Again, we would urge this committee and the Congress as a whole to look at those factors because there have to be some national policy changes in order to assist us to do the job that we know we should do.

Senator SIMPSON. I hear that very clearly, Wells; I really do.

We often hear, too, and perhaps unfairly so, that some voluntary agencies have a vested interest, if you will, in the perpetuation of a sizable U.S. refugee program, because without a refugee program, their very raison d'etre would end and they would have to dismantle the organization developed exclusively for refugee assistance.

I want you to know that that is not Alan Simpson's hard shot. I always try to present the various issues that come up regardless of how fraught with emotionalism they are, and try to get a focus on those things or a comment. I would be interested in your response.

Mr. STERNBERG. Mr. Chairman, since we are an agency that is exclusively a refugee agency, we have no other mandate; we do nothing but refugee work, not just resettlement, but we do refugee work in the camps in Pakistan, in the Sudan, and in Thailand, unrelated to the flow of refugees to the United States.

I am quite willing to answer your question. We are committed to the refugee cause. We want to alleviate refugee suffering. To say we have a vested interest out of the working of some bureaucratic "givens"—in a way, yes, we are a bureaucracy. Alas, everything one does these days becomes bureaucratized.

However, to assume that it leads us to having a vested interest in refugees is similar to assuming that because—I am thinking of a good parallel—because the International Committee of the Red Cross is concerned with alleviating the suffering of prisoners of war, it has a vested interest in war.

If we had a way of solving all refugee problems, whether it be resettlement or refugee problems elsewhere, right now and overnight, we would be the first ones to do that, because that is underlying our mandate.

In terms of a practical way, do we need refugees in the United States for a structure which we might have? Well, the structure is, as most things in refugee work, quite amenable to building and destroying. To tell the truth, building is easier; it is not true that destroying is easier.

We are all undergoing a very serious process of retrenchment. It is not pleasant, but we do not control the level of admissions. That is a myth I have heard thrown about, that voluntary agencies decide who comes to the United States. You control the level of admissions.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes, that is true. I have another question, for you, Mr. Sternberg. In your testimony, you indicated that the refugee program might be used unfairly, presumably to the exclusion of some refugee groups. You stated something to the effect that some refugee groups are more equal than others.

The act is very clear. It states that we will admit refugees who are of special humanitarian concern to the United States. I would query which refugee groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States are not being considered under our present refugee program?

Mr. STERNBERG. We have selectively excluded whole groups of refugees. There has not been a Chinese refugee admitted to the United States since the Refugee Act was passed. Prior to that, we had a quota of 100 a month. I am not pleading for Chinese refugees because I believe we should bring hundreds of thousands of Chinese refugees to the United States. Yet, for reasons that do not fit the Refugee Act, none have come over for 2 years.

We did exclude, and this is almost an oddity, Cuban refugees until very recently. As a wrong reaction to Mariel, we decided that no Cuban refugee, whatever legitimacy he has or how well he might fit the refugee definition, will be admitted to the United States.

Recently, a change was made. About 600 former Cuban political prisoners are being admitted right now, but we have no guarantee whatsoever that at least in a token way genuine Cuban refugees will be admitted in fiscal 1983. For years, and certainly since the enactment of the Refugee Act, we have had no Yugoslav refugees admitted into the United States, as if they did not exist—Yugoslavia is also a Communist country.

And now we have Albanians from Yugoslavia—mind you, Yugoslav citizens of Albanian nationality—coming out. There happens to be a great deal of repression in that part of the country. Yet, thus far none have been admitted to the United States.

Let me repeat, I am not talking of numbers. I am talking of the principle. Obviously, we cannot admit all of the refugees who would like to come to the United States.

Senator **Simpson**. I think we can develop that a little better in the future, but I think when we refer to refugee groups of special humanitarian concern to the United States, I want to be certain that we are not involved in some being a little less or more equal than others. We can get into that at a separate time.

I had a question for Ingrid Walter, because it also affects other denominations in addition to the Lutherans. I happen to be an Episcopalian and I know what our church is doing and has done in the past.

But you state in your testimony that in 1975, almost all of the sponsorships were obtained from congregations, which then provided the initial needs of the refugees with subsequent admission programs. However, as time went on, more and more of these Indochinese refugees were resettled by anchor relatives and former refugees themselves, and the congregational sponsorships diminished. I think that has happened in many denominations.

And then, as you indicated, when the congregations were the sponsors, your organization did not expend all of the funds and was able to accumulate the reserve funds of some $6 million that you described. Then you indicated that, indeed, those will be expended for refugee resettlement, and the investment income from them, I assume, too, whatever that may be. I want to be assured that that is the case. Is that so?

Ms. **Walter**. Yes, it is. These are discrete funds for resettlement purposes only. They are not going for, for instance, church administration. They go into the administration of the refugee resettlement program, and they are discrete resettlement funds.

Senator **Simpson**. So, if you put some of it in the money market or in investments, those funds will be used also for that purpose?

Ms. **Walter**. Yes, they will.

Senator **Simpson**. I think that is important to us.

Ms. **Walter**. Mr. Chairman, could I say something about the vested interest part?

Having been now for 32 years in the employ of the Lutheran Immigration Refugee Service, I have seen many, many programs since 1950 in the United States. There have always been contractions and expansions.

I can tell you, for instance, that in 1950 when I joined the Lutheran Resettlement Service at that time, there were 150 employees. Later in 1967, we were only four employees. As the need increases, staff increases; it is not to keep it an institution alive. We respond to the humanitarian need as necessary.

Senator **Simpson**. I am sure that is true. You have a reputation for that, and a fine reputation. It is interesting to note, however, that as we look at the reduction in congregational response and those deficits there, it is a curiosity as we see the compassion fatigue that I have defined before as congregations do not respond. Sometimes, the deficits come because those congregations are not as forthcoming as in previous years in participating in the refugee resettlement.

Mr. **Seidenman**. Mr. Chairman, would you permit me to just endorse for just a brief moment Ingrid Walter's comments about the vested interest part, because our agency is 102 years old now.

Senator **Simpson**. Yes, I know that.

Mr. **Seidenman**. I must say that the ability to move up and down with fluctuating movements is almost an impossible task, since no one has a crystal ball. If you try to preserve some structure, particularly with workers who know the language of the people that you are going to receive, you make some effort to do some kind of planning in the event that you are going to have some increase of activity.

Yet, we all cut back at a very, very great rate and we cannot build up again in the event there is a big emergency. So, we do have an interest in trying to keep a structure, but certainly not a vested interest in producing more refugees. This would deny our whole humanitarian philosophy that has kept us alive as a human rights organization and a humanitarian organization.

Senator **Simpson**. I thank you for that. I just felt I must let you have the opportunity to address that because it has come up in the last year and a half in actual testimony.

Mr. **Seidenman**. Yes.

Senator **Simpson**. So, here is one final question and you can all fire up. Wells, you are ready. If you all might respond briefly, and then we will have a rollcall vote here shortly, but I will get into the next panel and we will start that.

The GAO report has indicated that the use of former refugees as sponsors has become an accepted practice by the voluntary agencies and is increasingly replacing the more traditional approach of using American volunteers or professional caseworkers.

In this sample you heard in the earlier testimony, 58 percent of the refugees were sponsored by former refugees. I would like you to give me your explanation of this shift. Is it a direct result of the availability of Federal funding under the Refugee Act, which might, in turn again, decrease dependency on private sector resources, or is it that American volunteers are just not forthcoming;

that the volags attempted it in a certain community and it did not go, it did not stick, no one got aboard? Is it a lack of compassion? What are the reasons that you see in that just very quickly?

Mr. KLEIN. Well, since I asked for that question, I will lead off. Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the GAO report. I hope to see it and have an opportunity to comment on it before it is cast in concrete. I have seen the testimony that GAO gave before the House committee.

Let me speak directly to your question and then come back to the broader report, if I could. There has been a shift—I do not think it can be denied—across the board, and I am not sure that I place a value judgment on it, good or bad, between the individual American sponsor, whether it be an individual family or church, and a more institutional approach—what we call an agency sponsorship. It is still a mix.

The agencies, long before the GAO presented its testimony, but under some inquiries from the Department of State, reiterated both to the Department of State and to our own affiliates down the line the fact that the sponsor, whatever terminology we use—the person having the responsibility on the local level for insuring that the services are provided to the refugee—is the national agency which delegates that responsibility to its local affiliate but does not—I repeat, does not in any way—absolve itself of that responsibility. So, the responsible agency is the national agency or its affiliate.

Now, where did the GAO get its figures? As a matter of philosophy, I think all of the national agencies try, where there is a family, to urge and get that family to provide as much assistance to the incoming refugee as possible. We consider this good; we consider it part of the enculturation process; we consider it desirable and healthy for the future.

Where I found myself in strong opposition to the GAO in a private discussion with them is on their definition of "sponsorship." They define the local sponsor—and you will need to check this with them—as the person who seemingly was providing the services.

We feel that if the family can provide services, that is desirable and should be fostered and is good for the program, the refugee and the society. That does not eliminate our responsibility to see that those services are provided, but if the GAO uses that definition of sponsorship, it is a totally different definition of sponsorship than we are using and it does not recognize, I believe, the fact that we assume responsibility for seeing that those services are provided.

This becomes now a definitional problem between ourselves and the GAO, but also a philosophical one which we think is very important to deal with.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you. Yes, sir, Mr. Seidenman.

Mr. SEIDENMAN. There is another aspect that has to be examined to actually see who the sponsors are, because this is in many ways a positive development. If you consider that a person is able financially and now so situated so that the sponsorship is acceptable to those who are going to issue the visa to bring him in, it means that he has well established himself within the country. He now has a job, he now has savings, he now has the kind of record that can produce sponsorship.

This is, in many instances, a positive thing and it is something that, depending on which framework you take it in, should definitely be encouraged. Also, many of the refugees are today becoming citizens, so that they are fully in a position to be able to come forward, as one might for a close family reunion, and say that they want to sponsor somebody into the country.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes, Ms. Walter?

Ms. WALTER. I would like to add it is a reality that congregational sponsorships have gone down. Our recent studies indicate that they are one-third; one-third is congregational, one-third is agency, which utilizes congregations for volunteers or getting furniture or services, and the rest are anchor relatives.

You will have in your packet, again, guidelines that LIRS uses for anchor relative sponsorships. We ask regional consultants, pastors, or others who approves an anchor relative sponsorship to check into the situation.

When I spoke about the decrease in congregational sponsorships, one has not to forget that we had in 1980 a situation where the press came out with many negative reports because of the Mariel situation, and a negative climate was created so far as refugees are concerned.

Mr. KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, could I make one more comment on the GAO report, because I do not think we should dismiss it?

Senator SIMPSON. Yes.

Mr. KLEIN. After the testimony came out on the House side, we pulled nine of our largest agencies together to discuss the report and we spent the morning ventilating about the inequities and the problems with the report and how they were not fair—this, that and the other thing. That is how we spent the morning.

Then, in the afternoon, we began to deal with some of the contents of the report, and where there were holes, I would like to submit for the record some of the things that we and the other agencies have done to pick up those holes.

For instance, one of the damning things in that report was we had lost contact with refugees. Now, you said that was inexcusable. Three months ago, we said it was inexcusable.

So, I do not think we can dismiss the GAO report, but I think there are some problems with it from our perspective.

Senator SIMPSON. I appreciate that, and let me just share this with you and then we will recess a moment while I go and vote. But I think the issue, really, to all of us working with the voluntary agencies—and I am pleased you blunted some of that criticism that has come up, and you have done that very nicely—is not a question of producing more refugees to be sure that the agencies stay in existence. That is not even the question, because there are 15 to 16 million human beings ranging the Earth. There is no need to be searching for refugees, and that need will never arise in anyone's lifetime or the lifetime of every American to come.

So, that is not the issue. It is rather one of keeping a very significant and good and well-run refugee program in the United States, and the best way we can do that and to continue that is to have one which has the support of the majority of the American people.

They will support it if they understand it, and if they understand that a refugee is not a person that leaped off a boat and took an instrument of terror and began to cut a swath from Florida to New York.

That is the unfortunate image we have of a refugee in this country. Many persons do not know the difference—I have said it a hundred times—between a refugee, an asylee, a permanent resident alien, a temporary resident alien—the whole works. So, this makes it tougher.

But with a program that has the support of the American people truly telling them what a refugee is, they will respond without question. And you the voluntary agencies, bless you, will help them do so, and I am sure, because like any other professional group, you will weed out from your own group those people who take advantage of the system and who are in it for something less than the real humane reasons.

Thank you very much. We will have a 10-minute recess and then we will proceed with the final panel of the afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 4:13 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 4:38 p.m.]

Senator SIMPSON. We will proceed now with the final panel of the afternoon: Harvey Ruvin, who is commissioner of Dade County, Fla., with the National Association of Counties; Barry Van Lare of the National Governors' Association of Washington; Marion Woods, the State refugee coordinator of California. You have had a long haul today, have you not, coming here?

Mr. WOODS. Yes.

Senator SIMPSON. And we have Paula Stark, the refugee coordinator of the State of Michigan.

I believe, Mr. Woods, you said you had a previous commitment or a need to testify?

Mr. WOODS. That is all right. I am prepared to follow the order.

Senator SIMPSON. OK, fine. Then we will go in that order and, Harvey, if you will proceed, please, recognizing the time limitation which is going to get worse instead of better. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF: HARVEY RUVIN, COMMISSIONER, DADE COUNTY, FLA., ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES; BARRY L. VAN LARE, STAFF DIRECTOR, COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RESOURCES, NATIONAL GOVERNORS' ASSOCIATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.; MARION J. WOODS, DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, STATE OF CALIFORNIA; AND PAULA STARK, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF EMPLOYMENT DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Mr. RUVIN. Senator Simpson and members of the staff, Mr. Day, Ms. Alvarado and others, it is again a privilege to be here before you, as I have on other occasions, to testify on behalf of the National Association of Counties. I appreciate this opportunity today to testify before you on the Refugee Assistance Amendments of 1982, which would extend the funding authority for the Refugee Act of 1980.

NACo is supportive of the reauthorization bill, H.R. 5879, as passed by the House. We believe that it makes needed improvements to the Refugee Act. Our specific recommendations on the reauthorization are as follows.

Consistent with H.R. 5879, NACo supports a 1-year extension of the funding authority for domestic refugee resettlement activities under the act. We would oppose a longer reauthorization period because the Refugee Act of 1980 requires a more thorough reexamination than time permits in this session of Congress. Our recommendations today assume a 1-year extension and we would recommend more changes if reauthorization was for a longer period of time.

We support the funding levels for fiscal year 1983 that are contained in the House action: $100 million for social services, $14 million for medical screening and treatment, and "such sums as may be necessary" for Federal reimbursement of state and local cash and medical assistance costs. We believe that these levels are adequate to assure Federal financial responsibility for these costs in the coming year.

NACo strongly supports the "such sums" language because it recognizes the inherent difficulties in projecting these costs before the fact.

In enacting the Refugee Act of 1980, it was the intent of Congress that the Federal Government be fully responsible for the cost of assisting refugees during their initial 36 months in the United States. A strong possibility now exists that fiscal year 1982 refugee appropriations may not be adequate to meet all State and local cash and medical assistance costs for this year.

To prevent an unfair shift in costs to counties and states, NACo strongly recommends that the Refugee Act be amended to permit retroactive reimbursement of state and local costs that were not reimbursed in the previous year. Such an amendment would enable fiscal year 1983 funds to be used to reimburse expenses incurred by the States in fiscal year 1982 if, in fact, a shortfall in Federal refugee funding did occur. I assume that the State of California will discuss that more in detail.

NACo also believes that Congress should reexamine the time duration for financial responsibility for refugee costs. When the Congress held hearings in 1979, 36 months appeared to be a reasonable length of time, based upon a refugee welfare dependency rate that existed at that time of 37 percent. However, since the passage of that act, the welfare dependency rate of refugees has nearly doubled.

A major problem which hinders the effective resettlement of refugees is the lack of sound refugee placement policies. And even though it is the locality which ultimately must absorb the incoming refugees and deal with all the problems and backlash that exists, neither the Federal Government nor voluntary agencies have coordinated the placement of refugees with local officials.

NACo urges that the Senate adopt language similar to H.R. 5879, which requires the Director of ORR to develop and implement placement policies in consultation with representatives of the vol ags and State and local governments to insure that a refugee is not placed into heavily impacted areas unless the refugee has an immediate relative there. I think this is a key point, that we not overburden those areas that are already overburdened, like south Florida.

We also would support a provision in the bill which would promote greater communication between welfare officals and the vol ags. These provisions include a requirement that the voluntary agencies notify welfare offices of job offers to refugees, and a provision which would require welfare offices to notify the sponsoring vol ag whenever a refugee applies for welfare.

NACo supports requiring the ORR Director to study the feasibility of establishing an impact aid program to assist States and localities affected by refugee resettlement.

However, we object to the language in H.R. 5879 which would limit the study to assessing only the feasibility of an impact aid program that is based upon the concept of net outlays. Instead, NACo recommends that a wider range of impact aid alternatives be explored. Further, we believe that the ORR Director should be required to consult with representatives of State and local governments to design and implement the study.

In closing, again I would like to thank you for this opportunity to testify here today, and to express the great pleasure that the National Association of Counties and all the other public interest groups have had in working with this committee, and particularly with its Chairman. We very much respect the kind of statesmanship that made a compromise possible in the language in the Simpson-Mazzoli legislation dealing with the legalization program, which now sets up a system which we feel will at least be a beginning for reimbursement to local governments and the States for the costs that will result from a legalization program.

In light of that cooperation, we sense an increasing responsiveness on the part of Congress to deal with these problems that we have cried out for at the local level in terms of understanding that this should be a Federal responsibility not a local problem, sir.

I thank you again and we would be open to any questions.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, thank you for those remarks. That must pass directly on to the staff—Dick Day here to my left, chief counsel and staff director; Donna Alvarado, counsel, seated behind me; Arnold Leibowitz, counsel; Chip Wood and the whole crew; and, in the minority, Jerry Tinker. You know, they make it go on a daily basis while the rest of us are galloping around voting and running around madly. I thank you for those remarks very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ruvin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HARVEY RUVIN

MR. CHAIRMAN, HONORED MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM HARVEY RUVIN, MMISSIONER, DADE COUNTY, FLORIDA, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES TASK FORCE ON REFUGEES, ALIENS AND MIGRANTS. NACo APPRECIATES THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE YOU TODAY ON THE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AMENDMENTS OF 1982, WHICH WOULD EXTEND THE AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980.

I WILL BEGIN BY STATING THAT NACo IS SUPPORTIVE OF THE REFUGEE ASSISTANCE AMENDMENTS OF 1982 (H.R. 5879), AS PASSED BY THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON JUNE 22. WE BELIEVE THAT H.R. 5879 MAKES A NUMBER OF NEEDED IMPROVEMENTS TO THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980.

OUR SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT ARE AS FOLLOWS:

1. ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF AUTHORIZATION FOR REFUGEE FUNDING

CONSISTENT WITH H.R. 5879, NACo SUPPORTS A ONE-YEAR EXTENSION OF FUNDING AUTHORITY FOR DOMESTIC REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES UNDER THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980. NACo IS OPPOSED TO A LONGER REAUTHORIZATION PERIOD BECAUSE WE BELIEVE THAT THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980 REQUIRES A MORE THOROUGH RE-EXAMINATION THAN TIME PERMITS IN THIS SESSION OF CONGRESS. OUR RECOMMENDATIONS, TODAY, ASSUME A ONE-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION PERIOD. WE WOULD RECOMMEND MORE CHANGES IF REAUTHORIZATION WERE FOR A LONGER TIME PERIOD.

NACo SUPPORTS THE AUTHORIZATION LEVELS FOR FY 1983 THAT ARE CONTAINED IN H.R. 5879:

- $100 MILLION FOR SOCIAL SERVICES TO ASSIST REFUGEES IN BECOMING SELF-SUFFICIENT;
- $14 MILLION FOR INITIAL MEDICAL SCREENING AND TREATMENT;
- "SUCH SUMS AS MAY BE NECESSARY" FOR FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS.

WE BELIEVE THAT THESE AUTHORIZATION LEVELS ARE ADEQUATE TO ASSURE FEDERAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COSTS OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE COMING YEAR. NACo STRONGLY ENDORSES THE "SUCH SUMS" LANGUAGE BECAUSE

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*NACo IS THE ONLY NATIONAL ORGANIZATION REPRESENTING COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA. ITS MEMBERSHIP INCLUDES URBAN, SUBURBAN, AND RURAL COUNTIES JOINED TOGETHER FOR THE COMMON PURPOSE OF STRENGTHENING COUNTY GOVERNMENT TO MEET THE NEEDS OF ALL AMERICANS, BY VIRTUE OF A COUNTY'S MEMBERSHIP, ALL ITS ELECTED AND APPOINTED OFFICIALS BECOME PARTICIPANTS IN AN ORGANIZATION DEDICATED TO THE FOLLOWING GOALS: IMPROVING COUNTY GOVERNMENT; SERVING AS THE NATIONAL SPOKESMAN FOR COUNTY GOVERNMENT; ACTING AS A LIAISON BETWEEN THE NATION'S COUNTIES AND OTHER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT; AND, ACHIEVING PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF THE ROLE OF COUNTIES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM.

IT RECOGNIZES THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES IN PROJECTING REFUGEE CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS.

2. FEDERAL REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS.

IN ENACTING THE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980, IT WAS THE INTENT OF CONGRESS THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WOULD BE FULLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COSTS OF PROVIDING CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES DURING THEIR INITIAL 36 MONTHS IN THE U.S. WE UNDERSTAND THAT A STRONG POSSIBILITY NOW EXISTS THAT THE FY 1982 REFUGEE APPROPRIATIONS LEVEL MAY NOT BE ADEQUATE TO MEET ALL STATE AND LOCAL CASH AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE COSTS THIS YEAR.

TO PREVENT AN UNFAIR SHIFT IN COSTS TO COUNTIES AND STATES, NACo STRONGLY RECOMMENDS THAT THE REFUGEE ACT BE AMENDED TO PERMIT RETROACTIVE REIMBURSEMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL COSTS OF PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES THAT WERE UNREIMBURSED IN A PREVIOUS YEAR. SUCH AN AMENDMENT WOULD ENABLE FY 1983 APPPROPRIATIONS TO BE USED TO REIMBURSE EXPENSES INCURRED BY STATES AND LOCALITIES IN FY 1982, IF, IN FACT, A SHORTFALL IN FY 1982 FEDERAL REFUGEE FUNDING DID OCCUR. LIKE THE "SUCH SUMS" AUTHORIZATION LANGUAGE, THIS AMENDMENT ADDRESSES THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN MATCHING FEDERAL FUNDING LEVELS WITH ACTUAL REFUGEE COSTS WHICH ARE NOT KNOWN UNTIL AFTER THE FACT.

NACo ALSO BELIEVES THE CONGRESS SHOULD RE-EXAMINE THE TIME DURATION FOR FEDERAL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE ASSISTANCE COSTS. WHEN THE CONGRESS HELD HEARINGS IN 1979 ON THE REFUGEE ACT, 36 MONTHS APPEARED TO BE A REASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME IN WHICH TO EXPECT REFUGEES TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT, BASED UPON THE REFUGEE WELFARE DEPENDENCY RATE OF 37 PERCENT AT THE TIME. HOWEVER, SINCE THE PASSAGE OF THE REFUGEE ACT, THE WELFARE DEPENDENCY RATE OF REFUGEES HAS NEARLY DOUBLED. IT HAS BECOME APPARENT THAT REFUGEES ARE NOT ACHIEVING SELF-SUFFICIENCY WITHIN 36 MONTHS. AS A RESULT, THE PRINCIPAL IMPACT OF THE 36-MONTH LIMITATION HAS BEEN TO SHIFT COSTS ONTO STATE AND LOCAL TAXPAYERS.

3. REFUGEE PLACEMENT POLICIES

A MAJOR PROBLEM WHICH HINDERS THE EFFECTIVE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES IS THE LACK OF SOUND NATIONAL REFUGEE PLACEMENT POLICIES. EVEN THOUGH IT IS THE LOCALITY WHICH ULTIMATELY MUST ABSORB INCOMING REFUGEES, NEITHER THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT NOR VOLUNTARY AGENCIES HAVE COORDINATED THE PLACEMENT OF REFUGEES WITH LOCAL OFFICIALS.

WE BELIEVE THAT THE RESETTLEMENT OF REFUGEES INTO ALREADY HEAVILY IMPACTED AREAS HAS BEEN A MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THE HIGH WELFARE DEPENDENCY RATE AMONG REFUGEES. NOT ONLY DO 40 OF THE NATION'S 3,105

COUNTIES ACCOUNT FOR ROUGHLY TWO-THIRDS OF ALL REFUGEES IN THE U.S., BUT ONE HALF OF ALL REFUGEE WELFARE RECIPIENTS RESIDE IN 13 COUNTIES WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR ADMINISTERING PUBLIC ASSISTANCE.

NACo URGES THAT THE SENATE ADOPT LANGUAGE SIMILAR TO H.R. 5879 WHICH REQUIRES THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (ORR) TO:

- DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFUGEE PLACEMENT POLICIES IN CONSULTATION WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS;
- INSURE THAT A REFUGEE IS NOT PLACED INTO HEAVILY IMPACTED AREAS UNLESS THE REFUGEE HAS AN IMMEDIATE RELATIVE THERE;
- PROVIDE FOR A MECHANISM FOR COORDINATION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND STATE AND LOCAL OFFICIALS ON THE PLACEMENT OF REFUGEES.

4. COORDINATION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND LOCAL WELFARE OFFICES IN THE PROVISION OF CASH ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES

NACo SUPPORTS PROVISIONS IN H.R. 5879, WHICH PROMOTE GREATER COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION BETWEEN WELFARE OFFICES AND VOLUNTARY AGENCIES (VOLAGS). THESE PROVISIONS INCLUDE:

- A REQUIREMENT THAT VOLUNTARY AGENCIES NOTIFY WELFARE OFFICES WHENEVER IT IS AWARE OF A JOB OFFER TO A REFUGEE SPONSORED BY THE AGENCY;
- A REQUIREMENT THAT WELFARE OFFICES NOTIFY THE SPONSORING VOLAG WHENEVER A REFUGEE APPLIES FOR WELFARE.

NACo RECOMMENDS THAT VOLUNTARY AGENCIES ALSO BE REQUIRED TO INFORM WELFARE OFFICES OF THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES THEY ARE PROVIDING TO A REFUGEE AFTER BEING NOTIFIED OF THE REFUGEE'S APPLICATION FOR WELFARE. THIS REQUIREMENT WOULD ASSIST WELFARE OFFICIALS IN VERIFYING A REFUGEE'S ELIGIBILITY FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE. IT ALSO WOULD BE USEFUL FOR DOCUMENTING THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES THAT VOLAGS ARE PROVIDING TO REFUGEES THROUGH THEIR RECEPTION AND PLACEMENT (R&P) GRANTS.

IT IS OUR CONCERN THAT VOLUNTARY AGENCIES MAY NOT BE ADEQUATELY MEETING THE BASIC NEEDS OF REFUGEES DURING THEIR INITIAL PERIOD OF RESETTLEMENT, AS REQUIRED UNDER THEIR GRANT AGREEMENT WITH THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE. DATA COLLECTED BY NACo FROM SAN DIEGO AND SAN FRANCISCO--TWO OF THE NATION'S MOST IMPACTED COUNTIES--INDICATES THAT MORE THAN 90 PERCENT OF REFUGEES IS INITIALLY RESETTLED THERE APPLY FOR PUBLIC ASSISTANCE WITHIN WEEKS AFTER THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE U.S. IN A RECENT STUDY, THE U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE (GAO) SIMILARLY FOUND THAT 88 PERCENT OF REFUGEES IN ITS SAMPLE WHO APPLIED FOR WELFARE DID SO WITHIN 30 DAYS OF ARRIVAL.

5. AVAILABILITY OF REFUGEE CASH ASSISTANCE TO FULL-TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS

NACo SUPPORTS MAKING REFUGEES WHO ARE FULL-TIME COLLEGE STUDENTS INELIGIBLE FOR CASH ASSISTANCE, AS PROPOSED IN H.R. 5879. UNDER CURRENT POLICY, REFUGEE COLLEGE STUDENTS ARE ABLE TO RECEIVE CASH ASSISTANCE WHILE, AT THE SAME TIME, RECEIVING STUDENT FINANCIAL AID.

6. ADMINISTRATION OF REFUGEE RECEPTION AND PLACEMENT GRANTS

NACo RECOMMENDS THAT RESPONSIBILITY FOR ADMINISTERING REFUGEE RECEPTION AND PLACEMENT (R&P) GRANTS BE TRANSFERRED FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES. THE SERVICES PROVIDED UNDER THE R&P GRANTS ARE DOMESTIC REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT ACTIVITIES, AND THEREFORE, SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT (ORR) IN HHS, WHICH HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR DOMESTIC RESETTLEMENT EFFORTS UNDER THE REFUGEE ACT.

MANY SERVICES--SUCH AS ORIENTATION, JOB PLACEMENT AND COUNSELING, HEALTH COUNSELING AND REFERRAL AND INITIAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE--DUPLICATE SERVICES AND ASSISTANCE ADMINISTERED BY ORR. THE PROPOSED CHANGES, CONTAINED IN H.R. 5879, WHICH ARE AIMED AT IMPROVING COORDINATION BETWEEN VOLAGS AND STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS RECOGNIZE THE CLOSE CONNECTION BETWEEN VOLUNTARY AGENCY ACTIVITIES AND THE STATE AND LOCAL REFUGEE ASSISTANCE EFFORTS.

IN OUR VIEW, IT DOES NOT MAKE SENSE TO CONTINUE TO HAVE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE R&P GRANTS, GIVEN THEIR CLOSER RELATIONSHIP AND RELEVANCE TO ORR'S DOMESTIC RESETTLEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES. WITHOUT DIRECT RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE RECEPTION AND PLACEMENT GRANTS, WE SERIOUSLY QUESTION WHETHER THE ORR DIRECTOR WILL HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO EFFECTIVELY DEVELOP AND IMPLEMENT REFUGEE PLACEMENT POLICIES, AS PROPOSED IN H.R. 5879.

7. IMPACT AID STUDY

NACo SUPPORTS REQUIRING THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT TO STUDY THE FEASIBILITY AND ADVISABILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN IMPACT AID PROGRAM TO ASSIST STATES AND LOCALITIES AFFECTED BY REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT.

HOWEVER, WE OBJECT TO LANGUAGE IN H.R. 5879 WHICH WOULD LIMIT THE STUDY TO ASSESSING ONLY THE FEASIBILITY OF AN IMPACT AID PROGRAM THAT IS

BASED UPON A CONCEPT OF "NET" OUTLAYS. INSTEAD, NACo RECOMMENDS THAT SUCH A WIDE RANGE OF IMPACT AID ALTERNATIVES BE EXPLORED. FURTHERMORE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ORR DIRECTOR SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO CONSULT WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STUDY.

IN CLOSING, I WANT TO THANK YOU FOR THE OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY BEFORE THIS COMMITTEE ONCE AGAIN. I KNOW THAT I ALSO SPEAK FOR THE OTHER 40 COUNTY OFFICIALS ON THE NACo TASK FORCE ON REFUGEES, ALIENS AND MIGRANTS/ IN COMMENDING YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP AND EFFORTS TOWARD IMPROVING NATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICIES. WE, AT THE COUNTY LEVEL, PERCEIVE A GROWING SENSITIVITY ON THE PART OF THE CONGRESS TO THE IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT ON STATES AND LOCALITIES.

I AM PREPARED TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU MAY HAVE.

Senator **Simpson**. Mr. Van Lare, please.

STATEMENT OF BARRY L. VAN LARE

Mr. **Van Lare**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be here today to present testimony on behalf of the National Governors' Association. Before summarizing my remarks, I would like to note that both Governor Graham, who chairs our task force on immigration and refugees, and Governor Spellman have written directly to the committee. And with your permission, I would like to make those available for the record.

Senator **Simpson**. Without objection, they will be entered.

Mr. **Van Lare**. Governor Graham in his letter, I think, provides a very useful summary and I would like to quote briefly from that. He says:

> First, let me emphasize that it is imperative that a direct and explicit linkage be made between the number of refugees that the Federal Government allows to enter this country and the financial commitment that you are willing to make to their support during the assimilation process. The current system does not insure that fiscal policy considerations are addressed as part of the final decision on numbers. This places a grossly unfair burden on our local governments in the face of current Federal fiscal policy.

He goes on to say:

> Second, I want to emphasize the critical importance to Florida and other overburdened States of a placement policy which limits resettlement of refugees in highly impacted areas to immediate family members. To continue to resettle refugees in communities which are already strained beyond their limits makes no sense from the point of view of the communities, the refugees or the national policy.
>
> Finally, I urge your attention to resettlement notification procedures. Florida has had great difficulty in obtaining any information on refugee resettlement. We consistently learn from refugee resettlements within the State only when the refugees present themselves at State offices for some type of assistance. There must be a mandatory requirement for resettlement notification included in the Refugee Act.

Attached to his letter are two examples of that problem in the very near past.

The Nation's Governors have been keenly interested in and supportive of the national refugee program for several years. The States are committed to working toward the rapid assimilation of refugees into the community. However, the Governors strongly believe that the Federal Government has the total responsibility to meet the basic needs of refugees and entrants for the initial 3 years.

The Governors are also concerned about the need for more effective consultation and better coordination in the initial placement of refugees and the equitable distribution of refugees and entrants.

I would like to emphasize that the NGA task force on immigration and refugee issues has expressed support of the House bill, H.R. 5879, because we believe that it recognizes the fundamental Federal responsibility to assist State and local governments in meeting the costs associated with the initial resettlement of refugees, and because we believe it contains major improvements in administration and coordination in refugee policy.

The Refugee Act of 1980 establishes a comprehensive U.S. refugee resettlement and assistance policy. The 1980 law clearly recognizes that refugees are a Federal responsibility. We believe that this commitment is critical to the national policy objective to assure effective and rapid assimilation of refugees and entrants without an undue burden being placed on State and local governments.

We are concerned, therefore, that the Federal Government is not honoring the commitment as specified in the Refugee Act. The implementation of the 18-month public assistance policy for refugees and entrants who do not qualify for the standard Federal programs is, in our mind, an example of the retreat from the Federal commitment.

We support, therefore, the House provisions which specify that the Director of ORR is authorized to reimburse States for 100 percent of the cash and medical assistance during a refugee's first 36 months in the United States. We think it is imperative that the Congress clarify its position that the decision to admit a refugee is a Federal decision and that it carries with it a firm commitment for Federal financial support.

The Refugee Act of 1980 requires the Director of ORR and the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to consult regularly with States and localities on the distribution of refugees and on the sponsorship process. We are concerned that while there have been improvements, the requirements of the 1980 act have not been implemented as effectively as they might be.

We believe that it is important that a regular mechanism be established to insure appropriate coordination and consultation on placement strategies and the identification of high-impact areas.

The concern, I think, is that while there has been consultation, on many of the major issues, such as placement policies, public assistance, social services, we have not had an opportunity for adequate and timely input. This committee will recall the hearings it had this spring to facilitate that process, and while we very much appreciated it, we would hope that we could develop a process that did not require the regular intervention of the committee.

We also believe that an effective resettlement requires the coordination of activities among the Federal, State, and local governments and private organizations. And we support the House bill because it recognizes the importance of such consultation.

States have also been concerned about the continued resettlement of refugees in already highly impacted areas, and we support provisions which require ORR to develop and implement refugee placement policies which insure that refugees, other than those with immediate relatives, are not placed in such highly impacted areas, and requires voluntary agencies to meet regularly with State and local governments to plan and coordinate such placement.

While we are pleased that the Federal Government has taken the initiative to develop such a plan, we are disappointed again that the policy was developed with only minimal consultation with State and local governments, and that the policy itself does not provide for the ongoing consultation which we think is important.

I would like to emphasize also our concern with adequate social service funding and our support for language that would make clear that the Congress recognizes that such funding must be available to all of the refugee population which remains dependent, and that it cannot be based solely upon 1 year's refugee population.

Finally, the Governors believe that the Federal Government must develop a contingency plan to deal with unanticipated flows of refugees or asylum applicants. While the States understand that the Federal Government's response in such a situation must be immediate, Governors should be consulted in determining the role that States are expected to play.

Mr. Chairman, as the counties, the States very much appreciate your leadership in this very difficult and complex area and your support for our efforts and for attempts to work more closely with the Federal program. We look forward to continuing to work with you on this difficult issue.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Van Lare.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Van Lare, Bob Graham, Governor of Florida, and John Spellman, Governor of Washington follow:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BARRY L. VAN LARE

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to present testimony on behalf of the National Governors' Association (NGA). The nation's governors have been keenly interested in and supportive of our national refugee program for several years. For those refugees resettled in this country, states are committed to working toward their rapid assimilation into our communities. However, governors strongly believe that the federal government has the total responsibility to meet the basic needs of refugees and entrants for the initial three years. Governors are also concerned about the need for more effective consultation and better coordination in the initial placement of refugees and in the equitable distribution of refugees and entrants.

Before commenting on specific areas of our concerns -- federal responsibility, consultation with states, notification of refugee resettlement, placement policies, social services funding, and contingency plans -- I would like to emphasize that the NGA Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Issues, chaired by Florida Governor Bob Graham, has expressed support of the House bill (H.R.5879) because it recognizes the fundamental federal responsibility to assist state and local governments in meeting the costs associated with the initial resettlement of refugees. It also contains major improvements in administration, coordination, and refugee placement policy.

Federal Responsibility

The Refugee Act of 1980 establishes a comprehensive United States refugee resettlement and assistance policy. It also defines the proper role of the federal government in refugee resettlement and domestic assistance funding. The 1980 law clearly recognizes that refugees are a federal responsibility since the decisions surrounding their acceptance for resettlement are made at the federal level. In addition, 100 percent of the funding for cash and medical assistance for refugees and entrants is clearly intended to be provided by the federal government. This commitment is critical if the national policy objective is to ensure effective and rapid assimilation of refugees and entrants without an undue burden being placed on state and local governments. It must be pointed out that even with federal funding, states and localities are incurring special costs to support refugees and entrants. For example, states have always been responsible for the costs of basic education for refugee children.

We are concerned, therefore, that the federal government is not honoring the commitment as specified in the Refugee Act of 1980. The implementation of the 18-month public assistance policy for refugees and entrants who do not qualify for standard federal programs was an example of the retreat from the federal commitment. We recognize that this Subcommittee, concerned about the lack of adequate consultation on this policy change, held hearings on February 9 in recognition of the importance of states' input on such a critical policy change. While NGA appreciates this Subcommittee's efforts, we were disappointed that the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) was unwilling to accept the alternatives presented by the states to the 18-month public assistance policy.

We support the House provision, which specifies that the Director of ORR is authorized to reimburse states for "100" percent of the cash and medical assistance during a refugee's first 36 months in the United States. We think it is imperative that Congress clarify its position that the decision to admit a refugee is a federal decision and that it carries with it a firm commitment for federal financial support.

We strongly believe that the flow of refugee admissions should be consistent with the ability and willingness of the federal government to provide full and adequate funding for domestic resettlement activities. Mr. Chairman, you have repeatedly emphasized your commitment at both the February 9 hearings and the NGA winter meeting to linking admissions to the availability of federal funds. We fully support your position and believe that it is critical that such an approach be taken in fiscal year 1983.

Consultation With State and Local Governments

The Refugee Act of 1980 requires the Director of ORR and United States Coordinator for Refugee Affairs to consult regularly with states and localities on the distribution of refugees and the sponsorship process. We are concerned that the requirements of the 1980 Act have not been effectively implemented. In view of the deficiencies, the nation's governors adopted a policy in February which urges the federal government to establish a mechanism to ensure appropriate coordination and consultation on placement strategies and the identification of high impact areas.

1. Lack of Adequate and Meaningful Consultation With ORR: On major issues in refugee resettlement, such as placement policies, public assistance, and social services, states are not provided with an opportunity for adequate and timely input. While ORR does conduct meeting with state officials, these often take place after the policy decisions have been made. For example, representatives of states were finally invited to meet with ORR on the change in public assistance policy on March 12 — the day in fact that interim final regulations were published. Equally important, ORR has been especially reluctant to meet with the states on a collective basis. Individual consultations, while important, are subject to manipulation and misinterpretation and are no substitute for the formal and continuing group consultation sought by the states. In addition, specific decisions for guidelines for state annual plans, reports, and caseload monitoring systems have been developed without adequate state input. In order to implement an effective program, states need support from ORR through a meaningful consultation process.

2. Notification of Refugee Resettlement: One of the major problems that states have faced is not being notified as to resettlement of refugees. Several states have not been informed of refugee resettlement either by the federal government, or national voluntary agencies.

   We believe strongly that effective resettlement requires coordination of activities among federal, state and local governments and the private organizations. We support the House bill because it recognizes the importance of prior consultation with and notification of states concerning refugee resettlement.

Placement Policies

States have concerns about the continued resettlement of refugees in already highly impacted areas. The House bill requires ORR to develop and implement refugee placement policies which:

- o ensure that refugees other than immediate relatives are not placed in highly impacted areas, and

- o require voluntary agencies to meet quarterly with state and local governments to plan and coordinate refugee placement.

It is our understanding that ORR has been given the lead responsibility to develop a placement policy and has reached an agreement with both the voluntary agencies and State Department. While we are pleased to see that federal government is taking the initiative to develop a plan, we are again disappointed that such a policy was developed without adequate input from state and local governments. We are particularly concerned as we feel that this policy does not establish a mechanism to involve and consult with state and local governments on refugee placement decisions that have a major impact on local communities. In addition, the placement policy fails to address one of the major concerns of state and local governments, that is, the need for establishing a mechanism to monitor and evaluate voluntary resettlement and placement grant activities. The role of private organizations in the resettlement process can best be strengthened and maintained through a monitoring and evaluation process.

Social Services Funding

One of the key goals of refugee resettlement programs is to assist the refugees in adjusting to a new and different environment and becoming self-sufficient as soon as possible. Language and employment training are the appropriate and fundamental means to accomplish this goal. Inadequate funding for these training programs will only prolong refugees' and entrants' dependency on public assistance. The Refugee Act of 1980 recognizes this need and authorizes ORR to make grants to states to provide these services to refugees.

We are concerned that the monies appropriated for social services programs have not been adequate. The Department of Health and Human Services budget request for social services is based solely on the projected numbers of new arrivals each year. This projection does not take into consideration the funding needed to serve those refugees who have not yet reached self-sufficiency. We therefore support the House provision which authorizes $100 million in fiscal year 1983 for social services.

Contingency Plan

Finally, the governors believe that the federal government must develop a contingency plan to deal with unanticipated flows of refugees or asylum applicants. While the states understand that the federal government's response in such a situation would be immediate, governors must be consulted in determining the role states are expected to play under the plan, including any use of state or local resources.

We firmly believe that it was this Committee's intent in the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980 to affirm the federal government's responsibility for meeting the basic needs of refugees and entrants, to ensure that there is coordination and consultation between the federal and state agencies and public and private organizations. Mr. Chairman, we very much appreciate your leadership in federal immigration and refugee policy. Your continued assistance in carrying through on the commitment of the federal government is critical.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your Subcommittee.

STATE OF FLORIDA

OFFICE OF GOVERNOR BOB GRAHAM

September 13, 1982

Honorable Alan K. Simpson
Chairman
Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on
Immigration and Refugee Policy
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am unable to appear before the subcommittee for the important hearings you are holding today, but I want to commend to you the statement which will be delivered on behalf of the National Governors' Association by Mr. Barry Van Lare. The positions and recommendations presented in the statement are the result of extensive and continuing discussions by the Governors on the NGA Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Issues which I chair. They clearly reflect my views and those of my colleagues on the critical issues of federal responsibility for immigration and refugees, placement policies and strategies, contingency planning and consultation -- all key elements of the legislation you now have under consideration.

Mr. Chairman, you know from your participation in our NGA committee meeting earlier this year just how strongly these views are held and how critical the nation's Governors believe it is that Congress squarely address both immigration and refugee issues before adjournment. The American people have a right to expect the passage of measures which reestablish America's control of her borders through strengthening of our immigration laws -- particularly expedited asylum and exclusion procedures; and which recommit the nation to the principle of federal responsibility for refugees who are allowed to enter this country as a result of national decisions.

Under your leadership, the Senate has moved forward toward the first goal. I hope you will now move with dispatch toward the second.

As the key Senator in the fight for the immigration reform bill recently passed by the Senate, I believe you will share my view that support for the continued admission of refugees is linked both to the public's belief that the U.S. will again control its borders against illegal immigration and to restored confidence in the federal commitment to its responsibilities for refugees resettled in our communities.

As Governor of Florida, I have a special, personal interest in several provisions contained in the Refugee Act before you.

First, let me emphasize that it is imperative that a direct and explicit linkage be made between the numbers of refugees the federal government allows to enter this country and the financial commitment you are willing to make to their support during the assimilation process. The current system does not ensure that fiscal policy considerations are addressed as part of the final decision on numbers. This places a grossly unfair burden on our local governments in the face of current federal fiscal policy.

Secondly, I want to emphasize the critical importance to Florida and other overburdened states of a placement policy which limits resettlement of refugees in highly impacted areas to immediate family members. To continue to resettle refugees in communities which are already strained beyond their limits makes no sense from the point of view of the communities, the refugees or the national policy.

Finally, I urge your attention to resettlement notification procedures. Florida has had great difficulty obtaining any information on refugee resettlements. We consistently learn about refugee resettlements within the state only when refugees present themselves at a state office for some type of assistance. There must be a mandatory requirement for resettlement notification included in the Refugee Act.

Thank you for your consideration of my views and those of my fellow Governors. As always, your leadership in this critical area is very much appreciated.

With kind regards,

Sincerely,

Bob Graham

Governor

BG/pc

LACK OF NOTIFICATION ON REFUGEE RESETTLEMENTS

Outlined below are two specific instances where Florida has had an extremely difficult time receiving any information about refugee resettlements within the state. It should be noted that the information we were able to get came only after the state initiated inquiries.

Polish Refugees

The state refugee administrator first heard about Polish refugee resettlements in Florida from a social worker. At the request of the state administrator, the Florida Washington Office contacted the State Department which was unable to provide any information concerning the resettlements. They referred the state to the United States Catholic Conference (USCC) in New York. USCC confirmed that Tallahassee had been targeted as a site for resettlement. When we requested information on any other sites targeted in Florida, USCC asked us to name cities in Florida as they did not list refugee arrivals by state.

Cuban Refugees from Costa Rica and Spain

The state originally heard of the United States' negotiations with Costa Rica and Spain to resettle Cuban refugees in May 1982. Information as to possible numbers and timing of resettlement was understandably sketchy at that time.

On August 26, 1982, the Florida Washington Office contacted the State Department after hearing from the state's refugee administrator in Miami that a *Miami Herald* article had reported that processing in Costa Rica was complete and that resettlements were to begin at any time. The State Department confirmed the article. They were unable, however, to provide any information on resettlements from Spain or the relationship (i.e., Cateogry 1,2, etc.) of those to be resettled in Miami from Costa Rica. The State Department did agree to contact the state on September 1, with the additional information we had requested. On September 1, the Florida Washington Office heard from the state refugee administrator in Miami that, according to news accounts, Cuban refugees had arrived in Miami from Spain.

Because the State Department did not call on September 1, as promised, the Washington Office contacted them on September 2. They once again confirmed the news reports but could give no information on the sponsoring agency, sites of resettlement or degree of relationship.

State of Washington

JOHN SPELLMAN, Governor

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR

September 10, 1982

The Honorable Alan K. Simpson
Chairman, Immigration and Refugee
  Policy Subcommittee
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
Suite 2226
Dirksen New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Simpson:

I appreciate being given the opportunity to include Washington State's position in the forthcoming testimony on the reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-212). Our basic premise is that it is a Federal responsibility to help state and local governments meet costs associated with the domestic resettlement of refugees.

The following set forth the state of Washington's position on the key issues of the legislation:

Federal Fiscal Responsibility

- There should be a full 100 percent reimbursement to states for cash and for medical and administrative costs for three years from the date a refugee enters the United States.

- I support the $100 million level for social services as an adequate level of funding to promote refugee self-sufficiency.

- A cap should not be imposed on reimbursements to states, because the flow of refugee admissions has a history of being unpredictable.

Consultation

- The consultation as required in the original act needs to be strengthened. There have never been any regulations established which spell out the consultation requirements and procedures. States need to be consulted by National Voluntary Resettlement Agencies (VOLAGS) at the beginning of each fiscal year with regard to the number of refugees they expect to bring in, so that resources can be appropriately allocated. This should be done in accordance with a state refugee placement policy which has been developed by locally based VOLAGS and by the state and local governments. Such state refugee placement policies should be required under a National Placement Policy.

National Voluntary Agencies should also be required to consult with state governments before opening new offices in areas where they had not been placing refugees prior to October 1, 1982.

Service Coordination

One Federal agency, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), should be responsible for domestic resettlement programs. Domestic resettlement funds, whether given to states or to VOLAGS for their per capita resettlement and placement grants, should be issued by one office. Currently, the Department of State is funding voluntary agencies for resettlement agencies, while DHHS is funding state governments.

For further information regarding the state of Washington's position in this matter, please contact Alan Gibbs, Secretary, Washington State Department of Social and Health Services, at 206/753-3395.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

John Spellman

John Spellman
Governor

Senator SIMPSON. At this point, Mr. Woods, I ask your forbearance, and Ms. Stark too. Senator Hawkins is with us and she was to have given a brief statement at 4:30. That became impossible because of the abortion amendment vote on cloture, and so if I may, let me at this point have Senator Hawkins present her statement.

I deeply appreciate her interest in the critical issue of Federal financial responsibility, since she has been in the U.S. Senate and her assistance in the Immigration Reform and Control Act proceedings, and her continual presence on refugee and immigration matters.

If we may then interrupt the panel—and I assure you that I will remain right here, personally, until the last dog is shot, whenever that is. So, fear not; I will not leave you in the hands of my sinister aides. [Laughter.]

So, Paula, go right ahead.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAULA HAWKINS, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA.

Senator HAWKINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and also the panel. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to speak with you as you consider reauthorizing the Refugee Act of 1980.

The spectacular immigration emergency that struck Florida caused and still causes many problems in my State. I know a lot of people think they are over, and I know that this chairman does not because we discuss it almost daily.

What I would like to discuss with you today is a concrete strategy for reassuring Floridians and the citizens of other threatened States that it will never happen again. However, I want to emphasize that my proposal will cost nothing unless our worst fears materialize. The Federal Government would pay more only if a hostile foreign power could not be deterred by the State Department from launching an immigration emergency.

During debate on the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1982, I submitted an amendment that would financially protect people in States and localities bearing the brunt of a foreign-inspired immigration emergency. However, I later decided not to offer this amendment on the floor, when the distinguished chairman of this subcommittee, who is so patient and has so much understanding for me as a freshman Senator who comes from a State that has so many immigration problems, and the chairman of the House Immigration, Refugee Policy and International Law Subcommittee, Rom Mazzoli, both agreed to consider my proposal as an amendment to the reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980.

Now, I greatly appreciate their sensitivity to the specific needs and the problems of my State and all States. I do want to emphasize, though, that my amendment is not limited to just Florida. It applies to any State that might receive large numbers of undocumented aliens in violation of our own immigration laws.

Today, this subcommittee considers reauthorizing the Refugee Act of 1980. The Refugee Act embodies the same principle as my amendment; that is, if the Federal Government permits an alien entry into the country, it is the Federal Government's responsibility to see that the alien is equipped to adjust to American society smoothly and quickly.

It is indeed true that as a result of 1980 and other related legislation, a portion of the alien's readjustment expenses are covered by Federal programs. Unfortunately, Florida's experience shows that significant expenses are not covered by Federal programs and State and local governments must pick up the tab.

In my view, this is unacceptable and unfair. It is particularly unfair when a foreign power encourages its citizens to enter the United States in violation of U.S. immigration laws and U.S. foreign policy subsequently fails to respond appropriately.

There is, I believe, an important distinction between an ordinary refugee and entrants covered by my amendment. As you know, before a refugee is allowed entry to the United States, he or she goes through a process to determine eligibility. This process helps to prepare refugees for life in the United States.

However, in the case of a large number of people who arrive suddenly in this country, there is no such opportunity. Entrants arrive in the United States without any preparation for an entirely new life. Furthermore, their arrival is a surprise to immigration officials, unprepared to cope with the staggering problems of immediately resettling thousands of aliens who probably have never been in the United States before.

Furthermore, Florida's experience under the Mariel boatlift proved that an alien population that enters with the encouragement of a hostile government can include, and did include, large numbers of criminals, disabled, the elderly, the very young and the mentally ill, all of whom are likely to be a burden on society. These are people who are likely never to make a smooth transition into American society and who will need extensive and expensive assistance. Such individuals are sure to become a financial burden on local communities.

This is a burden unfair and unasked for that overextends our local communities. Foreign policy and immigration policy are the full responsibility of the Federal Government. States, cities, towns and villages, Mr. Ruvin, are not permitted to have navies, air forces or armies to protect themselves from foreign invasion. States and localities have no ambassadors or diplomats to settle difficulties between nations. These powers belong to the Federal Government, and if a Federal Government's foreign policy, whether by design or incompetence, overburdens States and localities, then the Federal Government ought to pay the price and not local taxpayers.

It is my sincere hope that my amendment will never be needed, and therefore will result in no added costs to the Federal Government. However, I believe that it is important that our States and localities know that when the Federal Government fails to defend their interests, they will be held harmless. It is a form of malpractice insurance, in effect.

In April 1980 Fidel Castro, in defiance of American law, encouraged over 120,000 Cubans to invade our borders. A foreign dictator disrupted our communities, imposing upon us thousands of criminals, psychotic mental patients and social outcasts.

While Florida bore the brunt of this onslaught, many other States, including New Jersey, Arkansas, California, and New York, were hurt as well. At some point we must be able to say never again to States fearful that they also will be left holding the bag. My amendment therefore links Federal authority with Federal responsibility. The cause will be responsible for the effect.

I would like to share with you what has happened to Florida following the Cuban boatlift and what could happen to other States unless my proposal or a similar one becomes law.

Over a period of 6 months, starting in April 1980, 125,000 Cubans arrived confused and helpless on our shores of south Florida. The communities were unprepared for this onslaught of people arriving with no more than what they could carry. Tent cities were erected. People started living under the bridges throughout our entire city of Miami. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was called in to arrange for the reception and processing of the Cubans. When all the costs associated with the Cubans' arrival are added, it totals a staggering $1 billion.

Florida's taxpayers paid their share of this $1 billion. To date, they have also paid another $150 million in unreimbursed State and local costs because the safety net erected under title V of the Refugee Education Assistance Act of 1980, the so-called Fascell-Stone amendment, has large holes in it. The fact is that Florida's taxpayers have financed 40 percent of the cost of supporting the Marielitos, as they have become known.

Consider education expenses. Almost 15,000 Cuban children were imposed on Dade County schools immediately after the Mariel boatlift. Florida State and local governments have paid for 75 percent of the cost of educating these children. And, as you know, these education expenses do not disappear. They continue as long as the children remain in school. As long as these children need education, Florida's taxpayers will pick up the tab.

In addition to this, Floridians also bear the cost of adult education so that entrants can more readily enter the mainstream of American life. Unreimbursed costs to date for education alone exceed $110 million. It will continue to grow.

Another major expense concerns crime fighting. Normally, crime can be expected to increase in proportion to increases in population. Increases in the Dade crime rate, however, have far outstripped population increases. The reason is that thousands of Cuban criminals have continued their careers in Dade County.

The crime rate in Dade County had actually declined, Mr. Chairman, in the year prior to the boatlift. In the year following the boatlift, though, serious crimes increased by 23 percent, although the Dade County population rose by 10 percent. The people of Dade County have paid over 75 percent of the cost of fighting this crime epidemic, as well as enduring a high crime rate in their formerly safe, beautiful community.

In addition to these costs, there are other problems, including housing shortages, strains on police and fire services, additional burdens on water, sewage and power systems, and a constricted job market. So, in addition to paying their share of Federal taxes to support the immigration influx and an unfair share of unreimbursed expenses, Floridians have faced a deterioration in their quality of life.

I would like to emphasize I have no intention of impugning the reputation of the Cuban community of south Florida. Indeed, I believe that the prosperity enjoyed by south Florida in the 1970's is due in large part to the ingenuity, the drive and the solid character of the Cuban community. There is no question in my mind that Florida has benefited from the Cubans who arrived in this country in the 1950's, 1960's and 1970's in an orderly manner. The majority of the Cubans who arrived in the Mariel exodus are already making an important contribution to south Florida's culture and economy. There is a significant portion of people, though, who will continue to be a long-term problem.

My amendment is not designed to help solve Florida's current fiscal problems stemming from the Mariel boatlift. What it would do is to protect Florida, Wyoming, Idaho or Oregon in the future from Florida's fate. This amendment provides reimbursement to States for a range of benefits to aliens who arrive in the United States as a result of the policy of a foreign government in violation of U.S. immigration law. In other words, these aliens are here as a result of a failure of U.S. foreign policy.

The benefits in the amendment are designed to hold the Federal Government responsible for financing benefits to those invited into the country. Foreign policy is a Federal responsibility. It is only equitable, then, that the spectacular failures of foreign policy be funded by the Federal Government.

Under this amendment, State and local governments will be reimbursed by the Secretary of the Treasury after consulting with appropriate Federal departments. Before being reimbursed, a State must submit to the Secretary of the Treasury for reimbursement and provide proof that the services were furnished to eligible aliens quickly and economically.

The services provided under this amendment include cash assistance for a 36-month period, health care for a 60-month period, and educational services for a 120-month period. A complete list is included in the amendment before you. These services are necessary to prevent aliens from becoming a burden on any community and will help them assume a productive role in our society.

It would provide States and local governments with critically needed assurances that from now on, the Federal Government will live up to its foreign policy and immigration obligations.

I hope we will have the vision and the boldness to act on this problem without waiting for another crisis to occur. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and the panel that I interrupted.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much, Senator Hawkins. I assure you that the subcommittee will give that every consideration. We will be looking closely into the issue of the costs that will be involved with the legislation, especially if it is retroactive—and I know it is not, but if it were—so that we can try to get an idea.

Assuming no additional boatlifts and using what estimates we have of the undocumented aliens, regardless of whether there were a boatlift involved—these costs are something we will be pursuing, too.

I appreciate your comments about the benefits, indeed, of the Cubans who indeed have been a very formative force in Florida's development in these latter years. All of those things will come into focus as we pursue the issue, and I very much thank you for your testimony and thank you for your continued interest. I really appreciate it.

Senator **Hawkins**. I really appreciate your working with this so closely. We have a delicate balance in Florida. We have a community of Cubans that are the backbone of our society, but they came in an orderly manner, just as we would like them to come in the future, and they have prepared the way for others that have followed.

We do appreciate all your help, and your tolerance level is fantastic. I hope it is contagious.

Senator **Simpson**. Well, I do not know. Thank you, though, Paula; I appreciate it very much. You are very helpful.

And now, Mr. Woods, please, if you would proceed, we would like to have your testimony.

STATEMENT OF MARION J. WOODS

Mr. **Woods**. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am Marion Woods, the director of the California Department of Social Services, the State agency responsible for the administration of the refugee program. I have prepared testimony which I think is before your staff, and I will merely summarize, which I do not think will take more than 5 minutes.

Senator **Simpson**. Thank you.

Mr. **Woods**. I would like to digress, however, to say just a couple of things. I surely appreciate the interruption of Senator Hawkins. I am sure that my Governor will be pleased to know that her advocacy of a Federal declaration of commitment for refugee programs parallels his concerns. In fact, if such an amendment was current today, I would not have had to provide the kind of testimony I have and make the comments I want to make about the responsibility of the Federal Government and its commitment, and exercising that commitment, for a 100-percent share of the cost of this program.

The second point I want to make is I do aline myself with the remarks made by Mr. Van Lare and Mr. Ruvin of the National Association of Counties. I find that their remarks are coherent and congruent with what we have been trying to do in California.

Particularly, the National Governors' Association, along with some of the members of the voluntary agencies, have been providing leadership and filling a void that the Federal Government has left in providing a forum for States, counties, and voluntary agencies to come together periodically to discuss and test and describe the concerns we have with the program.

We think it should be the responsibility of the Federal Government to provide such forums and to provide the leadership that is lacking in this program.

I would have to separate myself from the remarks made earlier by the Ambassador, as well as the Director of ORR, in terms of the Ambassador's remarks in his answer to your question about his position on up to 100-percent Federal funding.

I do not believe, first of all, that the refugees from Indochina come to this country with a welfare mentality. Neither do I believe that we have to maintain some welfare tension in order that the States could have some stake in the program.

But it was the remarks of the Director which I found incredulous and unfounded and somewhat irresponsible in terms of the dependency rate. I do not have in my prepared testimony anything about dependency, but let me just tell you that his answer to your question of an 80- to 99-percent rate in California is unfounded and unsubstantiated by any facts.

For him to say that he developed this calculation based upon our request for funding is simply incredulous. I would hope the committee would ask the Director to present to the committee the figures and calculations as to how he did that computation.

For your information, there are 108,000 persons on AFDC in California, and when you add to that the people on SSI, RCA, and general relief, you get a total of 152,000. Since there are 279,000 refugees in the entire State, that comes to some 54-percent dependency rate, which is about 2 percent above the national average.

Now, if you would compute all of the refugees—Soviets, those from Afghanistan, Poland, and other places—and divide that by the total number of refugees, you do get a 66-percent rate. So, if you compute using only AFDC and only Southeast Asian refugees—and we are talking about, in California, a 47-percent rate as of June of this year.

I appreciate this opportunity to comment on the reauthorization of funding for the Refugee Act. In our view, the single most important provision that must be explicitly spelled out in the Refugee Act is the declaration by the Federal Government that it will meet the commitment for 100-percent Federal reimbursement of refugee program costs incurred by the States. This provision is necessary in order to avoid the kind of crisis that California is presently undergoing.

Although Congress and certain members of this administration have given verbal and written assurances, particularly the Secretary, for full Federal funding, California finds itself faced with a severe shortfall in the current fiscal year, ending this month, because of the Office of Refugee Resettlement's refusal to uphold the Federal commitment.

For California, it means that at the end of this month, we will be denied $67 million in Federal funds necessary to pay this year's program costs. As we understand it, this decision is based on ORR's accusations that California program claims include inappropriate costs. Since, to date, the Federal Government has not conducted an official audit of the State claims and they have not provided a reconciliation of the account, there is no evidence substantiating their allegations and we consider their accusations to be unfounded and irresponsible.

Their position is especially reprehensible in light of the fact that we have been alerting ORR for over 1 year of the serious funding problems in this program.

Now, I have been director of the California agency for 7 years, and in 1975 when the first refugees from Southeast Asia landed at Camp Pendleton, I was there. At that time, we looked at that as being a temporary program, and that is still what is happening with ORR. They continue to administer the refugee program as if it were a temporary program, with persisting uncertainties about future program content and funding.

Consequently, it has failed to establish and fund a coherent, coordinated refugee resettlement program. The problem caused by the inadequacy of that funding is compounded by the unpredictable basis on which the funds are allocated.

Now, my testimony goes on to bring out all of those points. Let me just close by saying that when I came here 7 years ago—and I have been here six times since, and in each case my testimony at either the House or the Senate has indicated that the absence of a national plan and the absence of a well-stated national policy has resulted in confusion of roles and responsibilities, a lack of policy coordination and consistency, a lack of a national placement policy, and the inability of States and counties to do any meaningful long-range planning themselves.

Finally, I think the national plan, if one is ever administered or put together, should address and resolve the many problems caused by the fragmented Federal administration. The bifurcation at the Federal level between the Department of State and HHS has resulted in some serious domestic aspects of the refugee resettlement program by there not being any single Federal agency.

We support in California the 1-year reauthorization of the act. We support Congress intent to limit reauthorization to 1 year in order to address some of the major issues in the program. And we trust that every effort will be made to resolve these outstanding problems within that year.

I want to thank you for allowing me an opportunity to comment on this issue, and we will be available for any questions you may have.

Senator SIMPSON. Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:]

Prepared Statement of Marion J. Woods

My name is Marion Woods. I am the Director of the California Department of Social Services, the State agency responsible for the administration of the Refugee Resettlement Program in California. I have also been designated by Governor Brown as the State Coordinator for Refugee Services. In these roles, I have been personally involved in the resettlement of refugees since the first group of Indochinese refugees arrived at Camp Pendleton in 1975.

I want to thank you for the opportunity to provide testimony on the reauthorization of funding for the Refugee Act of 1980. As the State most heavily affected by the growth in the refugee population and the subsequent policies imposed by the Federal Government, California obviously has much at stake in the outcome of your deliberations here. We view the requirement for reauthorization as a positive situation because it focuses on the need for critical improvements and changes in the refugee program. We are, therefore, supporting certain amendments proposed in HR 5879, as well as other recommendations which I will discuss in greater detail in this presentation.

The single most important provision that must be explicitly spelled out in the Refugee Act is the declaration by the Federal Government that it will meet its commitment for 100% Federal reimbursement of refugee program costs incurred by the States. This provision is necessary in order to avoid the kind of crisis that California and other states are presently undergoing. Although Congress and certain members of the Administration have given verbal and written assurances for full Federal funding, California finds itself faced with a severe shortfall in the current fiscal year ending this month because of the Office of Refugee Resettlement's (ORR) refusal to uphold the Federal commitment.

ORR has informed California that it intends to withhold any Federal funds above the $232.5 million currently allocated for the cash, medical, and administrative portio of the State's Refugee Resettlement Program (RRP) for this year. This withholding action is apparently to remain in effect for some unspecified period of time pending further review of the State's fiscal claims by the Federal Government. As a result of this action, California will be denied the additional $67 million in Federal funds necessary to pay this year's program costs. As we understand it, this decision is based on ORR's accusations that California's RRP claims include "inappropriate costs". Since, to date, the Federal Government has not conducted an official audit of the State's claims nor provided any evidence substantiating their allegations, I consider ORR's accusations to be unfounded and irresponsible.

Their position is especially reprehensible in light of the fact that we have been alerting ORR for over a year of the serious funding problems in the program. As early as June 1981, we informed ORR that their funding projections were inadequate and that program changes which they were contemplating would be insufficient to balance their budget. Even though we subsequently and repeatedly have provided them with fiscal, program, and other information which fully substantiated this fact, ORR still failed to recognize the problem and chose instead to attack California's integrity. Now that it is clear, on the basis of actual expenditures, that California's projections were accurate, ORR not only has withheld payment but is attempting to block our efforts to secure a supplemental appropriation for the balance of the year.

The impact of ORR's decision to circumvent the previously expressed Federal commitment means that California will have to seek State General Fund monies to meet its expenses. Since the General Fund has already been depleted in an effort to compensate for massive Federal cuts in other public assistance programs, a choice must be made about which group of needy persons to assist. The Federal Government has placed the State unfairly in the untenable position of having to choose between its "native" poor and the refugees who were brought to this country in the best interest of the nation and the international community as a whole.

California simply cannot afford to take $67 million from other programs designed to serve the needy in this State to pay for this Federal program, particularly since this action would be necessitated on the basis of such superfluous and outrageous accusations as those cited by ORR in denying timely release of Federal funds to California and in denying the obvious need for a Federal fund supplemental for this program. If adequate funding is not received, we will be forced to seek alternative measures to conserve our drastically depleted State funds. In addition, if we cannot be assured of full Federal funding for the future, reauthorization of the Refugee Act may become a moot issue for this State.

In a good faith effort, we have continued to administer the Refugee Resettlement Program up to this point. If the Federal Government reaffirms and upholds its financial responsibility, I am sure that we shall then be able to give full support to the goals and objectives of the Refugee Act and together, achieve the necessary program improvements during the coming year under reauthorization of the Act. Toward that objective, we would support the provisions of HR 5879 which:

- reject a ceiling on Cash assistance/Medical assistance/Administration (CMA) costs, and give states a commitment for 100% Federal reimbursement.
- require consultation by Voluntary Resettlement Agencies (VOLAGs) with the states prior to the placement of new arrivals.
- recognize the need for impact aid.
- strengthen employment/training requirements for cash assistance eligibility (with revisions).

These provisions are especially significant in the context of the following broader policy statements which I recommend for your serious consideration in discussing the future of the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Refugee Resettlement Program. The first statement regarding full financial responsibility further substantiates the need for the Federal Government to live up to its commitment on both an immediate and a long-term basis.

I. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MUST MAKE A CREDIBLE LONG-TERM COMMITMENT TO ACCEPT FULL FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR PROVIDING ECONOMIC SUPPORT AND SERVICES NEEDED BY REFUGEES TO ACHIEVE SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

It has been over seven years since large numbers of Indochinese refugees began to be admitted to this country on a continuing basis. In all this time, the federal government has never fully accepted the fact that refugee resettlement is a federal responsibility resulting from federal decisions made in the interests of the international community and our nation as a whole. Consequently, it has failed to establish and fund a coherent, coordinated refugee resettlement program which would enable states to assimilate refugees more smoothly into their communities and would prevent states and counties from having to bear disproportionate shares of costs generated from decisions beyond their control.

Although the Refugee Act of 1980 acknowledged Congress' intent to establish a permanent and systematic process for the admission and resettlement of refugees, the Federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) has continued to administer the refugee program as if it were a temporary program with persisting uncertainties about future program content and funding. For example, the Refugee

Act itself provides only for "up to 100% federal reimbursement" for only a maximum of 36 months. Also, the Cuban Phasedown Program was terminated prematurely and abruptly on September 30, 1981, despite earlier commitments to provide partial funding for another year. Most recently, new federal regulations effective May 1, 1982, limited cash assistance eligibility for certain recipients to 18 months instead of 36 months. These actions, along with the federal decision to grant refugees an immigration status which makes them eligible for existing public assistance programs, have shifted a huge financial burden to state and local governments. In California, the state and counties were required to spend $25.2 million in State Fiscal Year (SFY) 1982 to cover the nonfederal share of the costs of providing cash and medical assistance to "time-expired" refugees in categorical aid programs (AFDC, SSI/SSP, Medicaid/Medi-Cal) and General Assistance programs. The cost will increase to $50.3 million in SFY 1983. This state is faced with an additional $60+ million shortfall in the current federal fiscal year which ends September 30, because ORR is not meeting its commitment to provide 100 percent reimbursement for CMA costs.

The transfer of the financial burden for refugee resettlement to states and counties is unfortunately occurring at a time when states are encountering other severe fiscal crises and are being forced to curtail benefits to citizens and other residents. The negative environment caused by the reduction or termination of assistance and benefits to nonrefugee residents can only be aggravated by the fiscal shift of refugee programs.

If the FFY 1983 budget for CMA is not increased, only two options will be available: Either further substantial program changes must be made, or an additional financial burden must be imposed on state and local governments. If program changes are planned, they must be done quickly and in close consultation with the states. The primary reasons that ORR, and consequently California, are facing a large shortfall this year are that (1) ORR failed to heed states' input on cost projections for the impact of the new federal regulations, and (2) the changes were implemented far too late. The second option of additional fiscal shifts is totally unacceptable. Any new encumbrance undertaken by the already frustrated states and counties will likely result in their refusal to cooperate with federal officials in the resettlement of the thousands of refugees who continue to arrive in this country every month.

Refugee social services programs, a key element in efforts to attain self-sufficiency, are especially impaired by inadequate and inconsistent federal funding because states and counties may choose to terminate such programs rather than to pickup the costs not borne by the federal government. California's RRP allocation for social services has dropped from $28 million in FFY 1980 to $16 million for FFY 1983, despite inflation, an increased population, and a decreased level of knowledge and skills possessed by new arrivals. The problems caused by the inadequacy of funding are compounded by the unpredictable basis on which the funds are allocated. While an annual "planning figure" is given to the states, it is not usually received until mid-year, and even then there is no guarantee that the planned amount will actually be received. Funding is distributed on a quarterly basis and is generally not received until the middle of the quarter for which is it intended. California's actual allocation for last year, for example, was not received until the last month of the FFY and was 20 percent less than the "planning figure". Needless to say, this situation renders virtually impossible any meaningful, effective program planning and administration by the state and counties. Ironically, the lack of adequate social services actually costs more in the long run by leading to increased welfare dependency and demands on other services, such as mental health, which are themselves financially strapped.

We realize that the federal government does not have unlimited resources at its disposal. Nonetheless, reductions or limitations on federal spending should not be achieved by the transfer to the states of legitimate federal responsibilities such as refugee resettlement. The federal government must assume its rightful responsibility for those refugees already admitted, and, in the future, it must limit refugee admissions to be consistent with its ability and willingness to provide adequate funding.

Our specific recommendations in this area are as follows:

A. For CMA: Require the Director of ORR to provide 100 percent funding for at least the first 36 months upon arrival.

B. For social services:

1. require ORR to fund services at an adequate level
2. base state allocations on the existing population as well as new arrivals

3. require ORR to give annual allocations to states no later than the start of each FFY.

11. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MUST CLEARLY DELINEATE ITS PLACEMENT POLICY. IN ORDER TO ENSURE EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION AND FULLY MEET THE INTENT OF REAUTHORIZING LEGISLATION, IT MUST REQUIRE A NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT PLAN, COORDINATION WITH VOLAGS, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, AND IMPACT AID.

Refugee resettlement involves many public and private agencies at the federal, state, and local levels. These include the VOLAG's and the governmental agencies responsible for the administration of RRP. A large number of other agencies also affect, or are affected by, the housing, employment, education, social, health, and other needs of refugees. In order to ensure the effective planning, coordination, and management of these resources, the federal government must develop a National Plan for Refugee Resettlement. It is interesting to note that while ORR requires states to submit State Plans on their program objectives and operations, it does not develop such a plan itself. The absence of a National Plan (or a well-stated national policy which would be embodied in such a plan) has resulted in a confusion of roles and responsibilities, a lack of policy coordination and consistency, a lack of coordinated planning efforts, and the inability of states to do any meaningful, long-range planning themselves.

The National Plan should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of those agencies involved in refugee resettlement, especially the VOLAG's and the federal, state, and local agencies administering RRP. It should further address and resolve the many problems caused by the fragmented federal administration of refugee resettlement, with serious consideration given to the consolidation of responsibility for the domestic aspects of refugee resettlement within a single federal agency. For example, a particularly awkward relationship exists among ORR in DHHS, the State Department Bureau for Refugee Programs, and the Office of U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs. As a recent report by the GAO points out, the roles of these three offices are tangled, without any one having overall authority over domestic resettlement management and policy functions.

The role of the VOLAG's vis-a-vis these offices and the states is especially cumbersome. VOLAG's are presently responsible for determining the locations in which newly arriving refugees will be resettled. Consultation between the VOLAG's and the states is critical to the equitable placement of refugees and utilization of public resources within the states. VOLAG's are, however, accountable to the State Department and not to DHHS. There appears to be little evidence of operational coordination between the types of assistance provided to refugees by the State Department through the VOLAG's and the types of assistance provided by DHHS under the refugee program.

To ensure that consultation between VOLAG's, DHHS, and the states actually occurs and is meaningful, a framework for such consultation must be specifically spelled out in the Act. Based on my seven years of experience in working with VOLAG's, counties, and others involved at the state and local levels, I have developed the following proposal to be included in the Act:

A. An annual statewide planning meeting of local VOLAG representatives shall be scheduled and coordinated by the State Refugee Coordinator. Its purpose shall be to define jointly the criteria for determining high-impact areas and for deciding the framework for the development of annual, local VOLAC resettlement plans.

B. Following the statewide meeting, local meetings shall be held between the local VOLAG and county-designated representatives to determine the projected number of refugees to be resettled in the area for the year, and the minimum level of services to be provided to each such refugee. The local VOLAG plans will also be developed at this time.

C. Quarterly meetings of the local VOLAG and county-designated representatives will be held to discuss implementation of the annual plan and to update the plan as necessary.

D. The local annual plans and quarterly updates will be provided to the national VOLAG's for inclusion in a national resettlement plan to be prepared by each VOLAG.

In preparing its National Plan and coordinating with VOLAG's, the federal government must develop and implement specific policies to ensure the equitable distribution of refugees throughout the nation. I recommend strongly that the following measures be required:

A. Base the distribution formula on both the initial resettlement population and secondary/subsequent migration patterns, as determined by valid data collection methods.

B. Assess the impact on states and communities, including the impact to date on certain "saturated" communities from migration and the failure to adhere to a reunification policy.

C. Adopt the reunification policy in HR 5879 and enforce this policy with no exceptions.

D. Provide impact aid to heavily impacted states and counties to avoid a further drain on local resources (such as educational systems; housing facilities, employment situations, health care systems, etc.).

E. Establish disincentives to secondary and subsequent migration.

In the development of all of the above actions, the federal government should be required to solicit the active participation of the states and to provide sufficient opportunity for public review and comment prior to finalization.

III. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD MAKE NECESSARY AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT TO ENSURE THAT ITS POLICY OF STRENGTHENING EMPLOYMENT/TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR CASH ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY IS UPHELD.

California supports the need to strengthen employment/training requirements for receipt of cash assistance. However, I recommend the following changes in HR 5879 in order to maximize the state's ability to mandate these requirements as a condition of eligibility for cash assistance, and to resolve several legal and administrative problems posed by the currently proposed language:

A. Expand the criteria for eligibility and the bases for sanctioning (denial or termination of aid) to include:

1. continuation of employment
2. compliance with requirements of employment services or training program

These new conditions for eligibility supplement the following proposed conditions, which we support:

1. registration with Employment Services agency
2. participation in job/language training
3. acceptance of employment

B. Do not limit required participation in job/language training to those projects funded by ORR. County welfare departments (CWD's) should have the flexibility to refer to other comparable projects if no ORR-funded projects, or "slots" in projects, are available.

C. Revise the proposed language regarding termination of aid to require termination as soon as possible after the CWD becomes aware of a client's noncompliance, but not before good cause determination, notice of action, and opportunity for hearing are provided. The currently proposed language requires termination of aid, after opportunity for an administrative hearing, in the month in which the client refuses an appropriate job offer or refuses to participate in an appropriate social services program. Our revision accounts for the fact that the CWD often may not become immediately aware of the client's noncompliance. Also, present legal requirements for good cause and timely and adequate notification may preclude the possibility for termination in the actual month in which noncompliance occurs.

D. Require that ORR issue federal regulations on this and other cash assistance requirements. ORR has attempted to implement specific refugee program requirements almost solely via Federal Action Transmittals which bypass public hearings and other normal channels for regulatory processing. Since these transmittals do not possess the legal weight of official regulations, the enforcement of compliance based on the transmittals is legally tenuous.

As Congress is aware, effective communication and coordination between CWD's and VOLAG's is critical to the enforcement of the employment/training requirements. While California has long recognized this need, we have until now lacked the legal authority to mandate, or even permit, key procedural components of the CWD/VOLAG relationship. The amendments in HR 5879 resolve several significant problems by:

A. requiring VOLAG's to notify CWD's of job offers made to refugees.

B. requiring CWD's to notify VOLAG's of a refugee's application for aid.

However, as with the provision for eligibility and sanctioning, additional changes need to be made to maximize the benefits from such communication and to resolve legal/administrative problems:

A. VOLAG's should also be required to notify the CWD when they become aware of an instance of noncompliance.

B. CWD's should be required to notify the VOLAG only when the VOLAG has been identified.

C. ORR-funded service providers should be required to notify the CWD of the same information that the VOLAG's report. This provision is required to ensure equity in the treatment of applicants/recipients subject to sanctioning for noncompliance with employment/training requirements.

D. CWD's, VOLAG's, and service providers should be authorized to exchange information freely, notwithstanding other provisions of law. This provision is necessary in order to overcome legal confidentiality protections which currently hinder effective communication and referral systems between these agencies.

In light of the proposed amendments and recommendations for strengthening cash assistance eligibility requirements, Congress needs to be aware that:

A. The enhanced communication and sanctioning systems will increase administrative costs. If states are expected to implement these provisions, they must be assured of full federal reimbursement of such costs. The funds for such reimbursement must not be taken from RRP social services dollars.

B. For the most part, these provisions will only effect changes in the RCA component of the program, which accounts for less than 20 percent of the time-eligible refugee cash assistance population in California. The largest portion of recipients are aided under AFDC and must be treated equally with nonrefugee AFDC recipients in accordance with AFDC Program law and regulations. Current AFDC law requires the State's Employment Services agency (EDD, in California) to make a good cause determination before any sanctioning action can be taken. In order to align the proposed RRP changes with the AFDC Program, either the federal law for all AFDC recipients (refugee and nonrefugee) would have to be changed, or the state's employment agency (EDD) would have to negotiate with the Federal Department of Labor to allow special requirements in California. This is a primary example of the problems created by the federal government's decision to utilize existing welfare systems for refugee resettlement.

IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD IMPLEMENT, ON A PILOT BASIS, THE NECESSARY MECHANISMS TO PROVIDE INTERIM SUPPORT AND MEDICAL ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE EXISTING GENERAL WELFARE SYSTEM. ADDITIONALLY, IT SHOULD TAKE STEPS TO REDUCE ENTRY, IN THE FIRST PLACE, INTO THE WELFARE SYSTEM.

As previously noted, the decision to use the state-administered public welfare system as the vehicle for the provision of economic support to needy refugees was made by the federal government. This system has not always meshed with the goals of refugee resettlement because, for one reason, it was not designed for that purpose. Therefore, it should surprise no one that some aspects of the system do not correspond to the needs of the overall resettlement effort and cannot be modified to meet those needs. Furthermore, many of the problems which are raised are not, in fact, unique to the refugee program. They are often merely specific manifestations of general problems which exist in the public welfare system as a whole, and for which acceptable solutions have not yet been found. An excellent example of this is the relative attractiveness of welfare dependency for the head of a large family in comparison to the prospect of working at a minimum wage, entry-level job. The continued existence of these problems in the public welfare system is a reflection of the fact that there are no easy answers for them.

To test the feasibility of removing the provision of refugee support from the existing welfare system, I recommend the placement of language into the Act which would permit and fund the development and implementation of alternative systems on a pilot basis.

It is important to stress the need for testing systems on a pilot basis first. To do otherwise, e.g., to implement across-the-board waivers to preclude eligibility for existing welfare programs, would be premature and certainly ill-advised at this time. Such matters as potential changes in refugee/immigrant status, equity, and other legal, technical, and operational issues must be fully evaluated before embarking on a large scale change.

Additionally, I recommend that the Act be amended to require other measures to prevent entry into, and dependency on, any welfare system:

A. Increase the frequency and duration of VOLAG case management and monitoring. VOLAG's must fulfill their obligation to provide, for example, job counseling and job placement assistance, and to follow-up on client activities in this area.

B. Require VOLAG's to increase the accountability of sponsors. VOLAG's should become more effective in impressing upon prospective sponsors the seriousness of the obligations they are undertaking, and should provide effective orientation and training to them in the needs of refugees and the roles they are expected to play in helping refugees to meet those needs. VOLAG's should also ensure that sponsors have the resources and abilities to meet these obligations.

C. Prohibit welfare recipients from becoming sponsors. This provision is in line with the above-expressed need for holding sponsors accountable for their obligations.

These measures should help to improve the quality of sponsorship. The relative ineffectiveness of the sponsorhsip modes is reflected in a recent study done in California which indicated that over 80 percent of the Indochinese refugees in 1981 applied for public assistance within one month of their arrival in the United States. If adequate numbers of qualified sponsors cannot be identified, this must be explicitly recognized by the federal government, and steps must be taken to meet the needs of refugees for whom qualified sponsors cannot be found. It is important to avoid designing and funding RRP in a manner which mistakenly assumes that the vast majority of refugees have sponsors who can fulfill their obligations.

V. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD CLEARLY DEFINE ITS INTENT AND DIRECTION FOR THE REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM IN THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE REFUGEE ACT.

I strongly support the statements of intent in the House analysis of HR 5879 which provide good focus and direction for the refugee program. However, I urge that several changes be made in the language of the Act itself to further clarify and record Congressional intent and to eliminate any ambiguity:

A. Change every "should" to "shall".

B. Clearly state that participation in a training program shall not prevent a refugee from searching for a job or accepting/maintaining a job, as a condition of eligibility for cash assistance.

C. Place more emphasis on employment services, attainment of a job, and the fact that English-speaking ability shall not be considered a prerequisite for job searches.

D. Give specific priority to unemployed refugees in the provision of social services, due to the limited funding available (employed refugees would not be precluded, but would be given lower priority).

VI. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD PROVIDE FOR A ONE-YEAR REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ACT, PENDING THE STUDY AND RESOLUTION OF MAJOR RESETTLEMENT ISSUES DURING THAT TIME.

I support Congress' intent to limit reauthorization to one year in order to address major issues in the program. I trust that every effort will be made to resolve outstanding problems within the year.

In closing, I wish to thank you again for inviting me to provide testimony on this very important subject. I will be pleased to answer any questions that you may have about my statement or our experiences with refugee resettlement in California.

Senator **Simpson**. Now, Paula Stark, please.

STATEMENT OF PAULA STARK

Ms. **Stark**. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify. I would like to make my comments in three main areas. One is the plea for a continuation of full Federal fiscal support. But furthermore on that, it is not just a matter of the act authorizing the full fiscal support, but to insure that ORR provides that.

We have had a continuing problem since the beginning of the program that we do not have timely allocations in the States to run our programs. When we do get the allocations, they do not reflect the population that we have in the States, and then we do not have a timely reimbursement.

I call to your attention in this matter that the State of Michigan this year is running a deficit of $1.5 million; that although it is not the $60 million that California has, it is still a significant amount for our State. We have called this to the attention of ORR. Our Governor has written to Secretary Schweiker and we still have not received a response, nor is there any means that ORR has devised in order for us to reconcile this with them. They have no formal reconciliation process.

Our allocation for the fourth quarter for Cubans and Haitians—our State again, although it has a small Cuban population, was given a $12,500 allocation for the fourth quarter. Our bills in each quarter have been running between 300 to $400,000. There is absolutely no reasonable explanation for our allocation to be so low, other than the intention that ORR was not going to reimburse us for the Cubans that we have in the state.

Second, I would like to urge the committee to include in its bill some ongoing mechanism for coordination between the States and voluntary agencies. Wells Klein testified earlier of the effort that we have had for the last year and a half to meet together in a series of three meetings between the national voluntary agency leaders and approximately 18 to 20 States. These meetings have proved that we can effectively coordinate, but there needs to be some kind of ongoing mechanism, and that, I believe, should be the responsibility of the Federal Government.

We also would like to urge continued consultation between the States and ORR, but to have that consultation be in some kind of process or procedure that will be meaningful. We have given ORR and the Department of State many suggestions, but many times we feel that it is just a pro forma kind of situation where we testify or give them consultation and in some cases the policy has already been determined.

Finally, I would like to make some comments on the refugee assistance programs that the States do administer. One is I urge you to continue to allow for 36 months for transition of refugees and allow the special programs in the States.

Second, I urge you to dictate or mandate that ORR develop a reasonable and feasible management information system. Although they have been administering this program since 1975, as early as 2 weeks ago they were calling around asking for information so they could provide budget request data to OMB and to Congress. After 7 years of administering the program, they ought to have a management information system that they can rely upon and that they can change when they need to. They should not be calling around to States and asking for information on how they are running programs and, each year, having this information somehow different and changing so that we cannot go into our records and give them even credible information. We have to start doing estimates that we are pulling out of the air.

I also recommend to you that the disregard for refugees be reinstated. Up to the changes in the regulations that also changed the limitation to 18 months, refugees on cash and medical assistance were allowed a disregard once they became employed. I believe that this should be reinstated.

We can get refugees jobs. Many of these jobs, though, are entry-level jobs. People need time for transition; they need to have a period of anywhere from 4 months to 1 year that they have the disregard that allows them to amass some of the financial assets and also transition to work so that they can then be fully self-supporting.

I also urge that you continue to allow medical assistance after refugees are self-supporting financially according to welfare standards. Again, refugees frequently get minimum wage jobs that either have no medical benefits or their medical benefits are very limited. To allow them an additional 4 to 6 months to 1 year of medical coverage will enable them to transition and become self-supporting much easier, and there has been this precedent in the ADC program.

Finally, I urge you to mandate that ORR promulgate rules if they wish to have refugees comply with employment and training programs. There is not an adequate regulatory base that States can use in order to insist that refugees accept employment and accept training or participate in work experience programs. Although the law provides a very general framework, there needs to be an adequate regulatory base before we can actually sanction people for noncompliance.

I will give you just one example before I terminate my testimony. ORR has some policy out which is not regulatory but is simply an action transmittal. Their policy is a conglomeration of employment and training policies, some of which goes back to the 1972 provisions in the WIN program. Those provisions have long been either revised or eliminated from the WIN program. They are not even current in terms of how States administer employment and training programs or how they sanction for noncompliance.

So, we are requesting that you mandate that ORR develop that policy and provide it on a regulatory basis so that States then can take action when it is necessary to make sure that people comply with the intent of the law.

Once again, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, I thank you very much. It is very helpful testimony from all of you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Stark follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF PAULA STARK

Senator Simpson and Subcommittee Members:

Thank you for giving me this opportunity to testify on the reauthorization of the Refugee Act. I am Paula Stark, Director of the Office of Employment Development Services in the Michigan Department of Social Services. I have administrative responsibility for developing programs and policy in employment for welfare clients as well as being the State Refugee Coordinator and having administrative responsibility for the Michigan Refugee Assistance Program.

I would like to start by acknowledging that the State of Michigan, even with an unemployment rate that has once again exceeded 15%, is aware of the special circumstances of refugees. Michigan citizens, even with the State's massive economic problems and high rate of unemployment, have responded with compassion to refugees who have experienced loss of family, friends, home, country, jobs, possessions and sometimes the spirit to survive. However, the compassion of the State of Michigan and its citizens is contingent on the fact that the federal government continue to assume fiscal responsibility for the refugees during the initial three years of their resettlement in the United States. It is imperative, therefore, that the Senate act to reauthorize the Refugee Act which expires September 30th and to insure that the reauthorization act continues to recognize the federal government's responsibility for not only determining the flow of refugee entry, the policy for refugee resettlement, but also assume fiscal responsibility for the program and obtain consultation of the state governments in making decisions on cash and medical assistance and the provision of social services.

The Administration bill for the reauthorization of the Refugee Act has certain key additions and provisions which are unacceptable to the State of Michigan.

The Administration bill sets a cap of $514.8 million authorization for state administered programs, Soviet and refugee matching grants, preventive health programs, and federal administration. At the same time the bill allows "such sums as necessary" for federal reception and processing of refugees and for the initial reception of placement grants. The State of

Michigan opposes the cap as proposed by the Administration. The federal government must be willing to financially support the initial domestic resettlement of refugees. It is solely within the federal government's power to decide which refugees will come to the United States, how many refugees will come and when they will arrive. It must also then be the federal government's responsibility to provide for the refugees' initial support. The Administration bill provides for "such sums as necessary" for the reception and placement of refugees, but then sets up the situation that would permit the shift of costs to local and state governments for domestic resettlement by capping the authorization on these programs. The federal government must provide the sums necessary to provide the basic needs of refugees that the federal government admits to the United States.

The Administration bill omits any provision for continued consultation and coordination of the voluntary agencies with the states on the initial placement of refugees. The efficient and effective administration of the refugee resettlement program is contingent upon the cooperation and coordinative efforts between voluntary agencies and state administered refugee assistance programs. The unique combination of public and private resources offers many strengths to the refugee assistance program that are missing from traditional welfare programs. But it also requires an ongoing process that insures communication and coordination, particularly between the initial placement of refugees, the reception of placement grants, and the transition to state administered programs. I urge the Senate to include a provision that would mandate such coordination.

The State of Michigan would also like to see a provision in the bill that would insure that states are notified by the voluntary agencies or the federal government, of the arrival of each refugee within the state boundaries.

The Administration bill provides for up to 100% reimbursement for refugee cash and medical assistance. The State of Michigan wishes the legislation to recognize the federal government's total responsibility to meet the basic needs of refugees in the cash and medical assistance, social services, and special health and/or educational costs for the initial three years.

If it is the intent of the federal government to permit the states to sanction those refugees on cash and medical assistance who are unwilling to accept available employment, or participate in language, training, or work experience programs, then the Act must clearly provide for the state to set up conditions of eligibility for cash and medical assistance; for a work and training requirement; and for a legal authority to terminate cash and medical assistance for non-compliance with those provisions. Michigan would like such language to allow the states to use the same work and training requirements, procedures and penalties for non-compliance that they do for their other ADC and GA clients.

In addition to recommending specific changes in the reauthorization of the Act, I would also like to take this opportunity to share with you some observations of mine on refugee resettlement.

In reviewing my testimony and comments before the House Subcommittee on April 28th, I am surprised by the amount of changes and efforts of the states to come to grips with managing the refugee resettlement program, even within the past four months.

Refugee resettlement, comparatively speaking, is a young program. It has been dynamic, crisis-oriented, intense, unpredictable and changing. It has suffered from a lack of consistency in the federal leadership, a lack of sound program management by ORR and a lack of stability in staff, funding and direction.

And yet, despite the difficulties and weaknesses of refugee resettlement, the program has attracted a group of diverse, dedicated and responsive people working at the local, state and national levels, from public and private agencies, who are committed to refugee resettlement.

In the past two years since the authorization of the Refugee Act, the crisis of the Boat People and the large influx of Cuban and Haitian entrants, states have been building sound and ongoing systems for domestic refugee resettlement. A significant amount of expertise and experience has been amassed by state coordinators in this period. States are administering well-managed cash and medical assistance and social service programs for refugees.

There has also been an ongoing effort for the past 15 months to provide for the cooperation and coordination of state programs with the efforts of voluntary agencies. Through the sponsorship of the National Governor's Association and the American Council of Voluntary Agencies the directors of the national voluntary agencies and approximately 20 state coordinators have met at six month intervals to identify, discuss, and try to resolve crucial issues in refugee resettlement. As long as refugee resettlement remains a combined public-private program; as long as the reception and placement grants in domestic resettlement programs are separately funded and administered; as long as responsibility for the federal program is divided between the Department of State and the Department of Health and Human Services; then coordination is the most critical element in an effective resettlement program which maximizes the use of federal resources.

The states and voluntary agencies need to continue to talk with each other, to share information and develop policy proposals that are feasible within both the private and public systems. Our meetings over the past 15 months have been productive and effective. There needs to be a continuing mechanism to insure coordination.

There has also been a great deal of criticism during the past two years about the increased utilization of cash and medical assistance and the need to emphasize self-sufficiency for refugees. I am confident states will be able to increase the number of refugees who gain employment. However, many of the jobs that refugees receive will be entry level and while contributing to self-support of refugees, they may not provide the refugee family with enough funds to be truly self-supporting. Entry level employment does not equate with self-sufficiency. Self-sufficiency for refugees will take time. Realistically, some refugees, for a variety of reasons, may never become fully self-supporting and independent again. Government support may not be available for the entire time needed to become self-supporting. To be truly self-supporting and independent in American society, the refugees need a period of transition using government services to give them an opportunity to risk the safety that the welfare system provides.

Specifically, I am recommending:

- Cash and medical assistance continue to be provided for a maximum of three years.
- The income disregard be reinstated for refugees who are employed to provide an incentive for work and transition to self-support, and that this disregard be allowed for a period of 4-6 months.
- Refugees be allowed to receive medical assistance for a period of six months to one year after the closure of their public assistance case, subject to the overall 36 month limitation of cash and medical assistance provided in the Act.

Traditionally, entry level jobs have provided little or no medical coverage. While urging refugees to enter at the bottom and work their way up to self-sufficiency, a transition period of medical coverage can be essential. Medical costs can easily shrink the income of an entry level job to the point that it is no longer feasible for someone to continue working.

Refugee resettlement must be not only well-managed, it must be realistic and not expect from refugees a goal in resettlement that we have not been able to achieve for the rest of our unemployed citizens.

Senator SIMPSON. I have just several questions of a general nature. We have had now various references to excessive welfare dependency rates since I have been chairman of this subcommittee. Now, let us say we do not know whether it is 71 percent or 67, 52, 35, or 20, you know, for my purposes.

How do you explain these welfare dependency rates when we are talking about refugees? More importantly, what can local governments do to take action to reduce those levels? How is that for a grabber?

Mr. WOODS. I will take a crack at it in terms of the policy of self-sufficiency. We are dealing with a population that, in addition to having, of course, the problems with language and the problems with skills that are transferable or relevant to our communities in California, we are overwhelmed by the size of the population.

When you talk about 279,000 persons in a State where 7 years ago there were none, that has been too rapid a growth for us to plan and to provide the necessary resources to make sure they do not get on welfare. When you go right from the sands of Southeast Asia to an urban environment in San Diego, Los Angeles, or Orange County, you cannot cope and compete with the population that is there.

The other problem has been the lack of a coordinated, planned way in which to do this. As I tried to comment, the lack of a national plan impacts the ability to have a State plan. The traditional sponsorship role of the voluntary agencies does not necessarily fit with the size or the numbers and the type of population that we have.

Ms. STARK. I would like the opportunity to comment because I also, in my capacity in the Department of Social Services, do the programing for our employment programs for ADC clients and GA clients.

Michigan, as you know, has the highest unemployment rate in the country. I think we are back up to 15.2- or 15.4-percent unemployment. Yet, we find that refugees can get jobs. The problem in Michigan and many of the other States that are suffering from high unemployment is that the jobs that are available are entry level jobs.

There is a reluctance both by the refugees and by the sponsors that still exist to take the entry level jobs. They are frequently minimum wage jobs. They have very little or very poor health insurance. With the changes in the refugee policy that there is not the disregard and with the feeling by the refugees that they are going to take these jobs and then lose the support of the voluntary agencies or lose anybody helping them go from that job to anyplace else, it is a big concern of theirs.

The entry level jobs, if it is a family situation, do not cover their needs. They do not provide enough to have an adequate living, and they are afraid of being caught in that trap of being the severely underemployed.

We have been able to find in Michigan where even with our very high unemployment, if someone can get the refugee into a work situation, employers are willing to accept refugees. Our biggest problem, again, in getting them in a job, even an entry level job, is going through the interview process. Where you have a job opening posted and you have 100 people show up or 1,000 people show up for several job openings, it is difficult to have a non-English-speaking person trying to compete for that job.

But even in those situations where we are able to contact employers directly, refugees are seen as very good workers. They are seen as very desirable employees, but again it is in the entry level employment. I think refugees are looking for some way that there will be some kind of support or some kind of assurance or some kind of help that if they take those entry level jobs, somebody is going to help see them along the way to really becoming self-supporting.

There is a danger—and I saw it in a paper that ORR released 2 weeks ago—to equate entry level employment with self-sufficiency and self-support. I think you have to be very careful about that. The people do not want to take that job for $3.35 an hour, have a family of four or five or six people to feed, and then be told they have no cash and medical assistance and be left high and dry—worse off than when they were on public assistance.

Senator SIMPSON. Well, that is very interesting, but, boy, that sounds like somewhat of an elitist attitude for someone who is fleeing for their very life persecution, or they would not fit the category of the definition of refugee. I do not quite track that one, I must admit. Maybe it is afternoon fatigue.

Ms. STARK. They are willing to take the job and they are willing to work, and I think there is a very strong work ethic amongst the refugees.

Senator SIMPSON. How can that be sustained when they are told not to work?

Ms. STARK. Well, I do not think people are telling them not to work.

Senator SIMPSON. They are. We have evidence that comes to us that has been confirmed many times over that they are told to leave a job through a voluntary agency sometimes and to go on welfare. That comes to us more than you would know. I say, how can that continue to occur? Those are the things that we are going to try to correct.

Ms. STARK. Yes. I guess the message that we give in Michigan and that we would like to see other people give is, "You must work, you must take the entry level job, and it will be your responsibility, with our help, as much as we can give to you, to go from that entry level job to another job." I am agreeing with you. But at the same time as they come into the entry level job, I think we need to be able to provide them some transition support.

Senator SIMPSON. I have a hunch that you and I would both agree that probably they are the bright ones; they are people who know that the choice was there and they made the choice and they left their country, with this fear of persecution. But if they were advised of the upward mobility in this country for those kinds of people, instead of not being advised of that, if they were told that you can start at an entry level job even if it may be demeaning to them, because in this country, if they wish to move on, they have that remarkable opportunity, and that is part of our heritage. I will not go on into the great philosophy of it.

Harvey?

Mr. RUVIN. I do not have very much to add. The last part of your question intrigued me about what local governments can do.

Senator SIMPSON. Yes.

Mr. RUVIN. Although those comments from the State of Michigan are contrary to the general picture that I perceive, I do not think you can discount the downturn in the economy of this country as being a factor when you are comparing what the dependency rates were at the time of the Refugee Act of 1980 with now.

We have been looking at the job of local government in the area of training.

Senator SIMPSON. I wish I could have had a shot of all of your faces as I asked that question. It was interesting. [Laughter.]

Mr. VAN LARE. Mr. Chairman, if I could just add to that, I think that the two other State people have made a couple of points I would just like to reemphasize. One is that a sound placement policy which does not overburden the capacity of any given locality or any given State is very critical.

I think the comments from Michigan were not aimed so much at justifying not taking employment, but I really believe in terms of demonstrating the importance of the continuation of the support services and the educational services that are necessary to make that upward mobility real.

I guess I am frustrated in the sense that I have sat here now a couple of times and heard what I think are very real concerns and very real examples about individuals who may have been urged not to accept jobs or to remain on welfare. But I am also reminded that as I deal with this issue, I am also being criticized in other settings by recipient groups and others who say that the State pressure to go to work in this and other programs is too great.

I think that the association in its policy and the States individually recognize the importance of working and want to make sure that there are those support services that will allow us to make this a real transition.

Mr. WOODS. If I could just add just for a moment to what Barry was saying in terms of California, I have heard the same thing that you referred to, and I have met some people about whom that was said.

At the same time, what I would like to talk about is the reverse. We have 52 percent on assistance; we have 48 who are not. What we are finding in California is that this particular group of new Americans are moving up into the middle class and into Bel Air and the affluent areas of Orange County and San Diego County faster than any group of migrants we have ever had.

Now, one of the reasons we have found is that those persons who are receiving ESL and VESL are being placed in jobs much faster than the ones who are not. In the last 3 years, our social services expenditures have gone from $28 million to $16 million, while the number of refugees has grown from 147,000 to 279,000.

Now, as you reduce the ESL classes and the VESL classes, the opportunity for getting them off of welfare and into jobs increases. Last year, we had 12,000 persons in ESL, and this year we have 8,000. Last year, we placed into jobs 26,000 people. We will not do that this year.

Senator SIMPSON. I appreciate this very much.

Mr. Ruvin. There was one very intriguing response concerning the increase in the number of former refugees who are now acting as sponsors. That may indicate that there has been some upward mobility in terms of refugees assimilating and then taking responsibility for other refugees.

Senator Simpson. It could indicate that, or a lessening by others who were formerly sponsor groups who were perhaps more attentive and more able to assist those persons in getting into the community. That is another part of it.

Let me say that the cooperation and coordination of the local governments and the States and municipalities and the voluntary agencies, I think, has to be improved, and we will have a separate hearing on that in the future. All of you are nodding, let the record show.

We should get into that at some future time because I think that is going to be critical. We can do that.

I thank you very much. Hopefully, we can reduce these pressures on local communities. Thank you so much.

Mr. Ruvin. I have some testimony that was prepared by officials of Orange County, Calif. that I would like to enter into the record.

Senator Simpson. Without objection, it is so ordered. The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:37 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX

TESTIMONY
PREPARED FOR
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY
OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIARY

CHAIRMAN: ALAN SIMPSON
SEPTEMBER 13, 1981

PREPARED BY:
COUNTY OF ORANGE SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY
DIRECTOR: LARRY M. LEAMAN
ORANGE COUNTY, CALIFORNIA

Mr. Chairman, Committee Members:

Orange County is pleased to take this opportunity to offer testimony on this critical piece of legislation - the Reauthorization of the Refugee Act of 1980. As a County with a significant population of refugees, we see this Act as important to our continuing efforts to assist these newcomers to assimilate successfully into our community life.

An estimated 50,000 refugees have made their home in Orange County. This represents a refugee population larger than any other state outside of California. Our county is large in population (approximately 2 million) but small in size, so the rapid influx of refugees has been highly visible. Our ethnic composition appeared to change almost overnight - the Asian population has increased five-fold from 1970 to 1980.

Even if no new refugees were placed in our county, this population would continue to increase as refugees follow the well-worn migration pathways from East to West. Thirty-eight percent of our July, 1982 applicants for assistance were initially resettled outside of Orange County (AFDC, RCA/ECA).

Thus, we are very concerned that refugee policy decisions are made here at the Federal level which effectively respond to the needs at the local level where resettlement actually occurs. Federal policy must provide for a coherent program of resettlement which will enable us to carry out the program's mandates and assist refugees to make rapid progress towards the goal of self-sufficiency.

First, we will address those provisions of the Act which we support and see as positive steps to improving the overall resettlement program. Secondly, we will address those areas of concern where we believe amendments to the Refugee Act will further strengthen the program.

SUPPORT AMENDMENTS

It is clear that Congress has done its homework. Specifically, we support the amendments which:

1. Build in consultation and communication with local governments
2. Itemize appropriations for health and social services
3. Tighten cash assistance eligibility requirements
4. Open the door to consideration of local impact aid

We applaud the provisions which link local governments into the process of refugee placement and resettlement planning. After seven years, it is time to recognize that local governments participate in resettlement. In Orange County we have taken the initiative to plan and coordinate at the local level: Our Board of Supervisors adopted the Orange County Plan for Refugee Resettlement earlier this year. Our participation in the placement and resettlement planning process will maximize our ability to implement the Plan and operate an effective resettlement program.

Secondly, the appropriations for social and health services recognize the residual service need of the refugees who have entered our community over the past several years but who are not yet self-supporting.

Third, we support the thrust of the provisions which strengthen communication between Volags and welfare departments and tighten cash assistance eligibility requirements. Some of the provisions, e.g., that of welfare office notification to Volags of refugee applicants are part of our current operations. We see the provision to preclude the use of cash assistance to support college education as a very positive step. This inappropriate use of cash assistance has been of great concern in our County as it has contributed to community backlash and unnecessarily high welfare dependency rates, and we are pleased that our input on this issue has developed such a response.

There are two recommended changes we propose and believe will maximize the intended outcomes of these provisions:

1. Sec. 5 Section 412(b)(2): That the welfare office be notified when a refugee is offered employment be clarified by requiring notification to the welfare office that a refugee has obtained or refused appropriate employment and/or training.
2. Sec. 6(B): "Cash assistance shall not be made available to refugees who are full-time students in institutions of higher education."
   - Should clearly include refugee recipients of AFDC as well as Refugee or Entrant Cash Assistance
   - Should exempt refugees attending such an institution for the purpose of participating in an employment-directed English language or vocational training program approved by the local welfare department or designated refugee employment service provider.

Finally, we are heartened that consideration will be given to an impact aid program. There is no dispute that the responsibility for refugee resettlement lies with the Federal government, however, many segments of local government have been ignored even as they have been called upon to increase and specialize services to meet refugee needs.

RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS

As outlined above, the Act does take some initial steps towards building a more efficient and effective refugee resettlement program. The following is a discussion of those areas which still need to be addressed in order to create a credible, cohesive refugee resettlement program.

FEDERAL COMMITMENT

Refugees are admitted to the country through decisions made by the Federal government in support of national interest. Actually, it has been the resources of very few States and localities which have been tapped to support this national commitment.

Recent developments within the Refugee Resettlement Program have made it clear that the intent of the program is to mainstream refugees by shifting costs for their assistance and medical care to States and local governments. While the Refugee Act implies a 36-month commitment to each refugee admitted, recent regulations implemented by Office of Refugee Resettlement to reduce RCA/ECA to 18 months from date of entry is a clear message that the Federal government is backing away from this commitment. Although aid that is provided to refugees under local assistance programs in their second 18 months is reimbursed at this time, there is no guarantee of an ongoing commitment.

In addition to the loss of program credibility, these new regulations appear to penalize the refugees most in need. It has exacerbated secondary migration by forcing needy refugees to move from high unemployment areas with no local assistance programs, e.g., Oregon to lower unemployment areas with local assistance programs, e.g., Orange County, California.

Additionally, refugee families most in need of assistance to become self-supporting are often ineligible for the Federal AFDC - Unemployed Parent Program. Federal eligibility is predicated on labor force attachment - work history in the past two years. Such labor force attachment cannot be obtained in a Communist reeducation camp. California aids such families under our State AFDC - Unemployed Parent Program. Recent changes in that program (effective 7/82), however, limit eligibility to three out of 12 months. This will cause an immediate and significant increase in local fiscal expenditures for refugees who have expired their 36 months of eligibility.

While some refugees do need longer than 18 months to develop self-support earning capacity, not all refugees need 36 or even 18 months. A caseload tracking study conducted in the process of the development of our County Plan for Refugee Resettlement revealed that for those refugees who became self-supporting (approximately 50%), the average length of time on aid was ten months. Thus, our overriding concern is for those who are in need for longer periods and are at-risk of becoming long-term welfare dependent. These tend to be the more recent refugee arrivals - less skilled, less educated.

Refugee assimilation to our local communities is a function of our ability to establish a credible program which will generate local cooperation to assist refugees towards self-sufficiency. That credibility is clearly in question as the Federal government is perceived to be balancing its budget by shifting the responsibility for refugee support to States and local governments.

Recommendation:

The Federal government should make a credible commitment to accept full financial responsibility for cash and medical assistance to needy refugees for no less than the first 36 months they are in the United States.

CASH ASSISTANCE

Welfare dependency rates and attendant costs and concerns appear to be the primary problem for decision makers, government officials, citizens and for the refugees, themselves. This issue cannot be addressed in any real sense without recognition of the fact that the majority of refugees receive aid through the AFDC system. Refugees are being blamed for having become enmeshed in a public welfare system that was not designed for the purpose of refugee resettlement. Their problems in this system are actually only a small window on the larger picture of this country's current public welfare model.

A good example is the work registration requirements in this program. AFDC is wedded to WIN (Work Incentive Program) which is administered by the Department of Labor and in California by the Employment Development Department. Thus, the "case manager" for the refugee AFDC employable recipient is WIN, not the Volag, refugee employment service provider, or the County Welfare Department. Yet WIN is abysmally underfunded to serve its general population clients, much less refugee clients with their special needs. Nor are they linked in at any level, State or Federal, to serve the refugee population group.

Thus, the dollars expended by ORR for refugee employment services are primarily used for the minority of refugee employables who are not registered with WIN (Refugee Cash Assistance recipients) and who, because of their childless status, are less vulnerable to welfare dependence than the refugee families on AFDC.

Recommendation:

Either

1. Establish a program for interim support for a certain specified period of time from the refugees' date of entry outside the public welfare system (as recommended for study in the Act) whereby refugees are precluded from eligibility to regular assistance programs. Such a plan must include a mechanism for reimbursement by Volags to local welfare departments for cash aid provided to a needy refugee in case of Volag sponsorship breakdown, e.g. in the event the refugee moves from the original place of resettlement to an area with no local Volag affiliate.

OR

2. Establish a separate Refugee Assistance Program to be administered through the Public Welfare System whereby for 36 months refugees would be eligible for this program and not to AFDC. Such a program would be designed to meet refugee resettlement needs with flexibility to respond to the differing needs of the world's refugee populations.

COORDINATION

Although the proposed legislation makes some strides towards improving the Refugee Resettlement Program, it falls short of structuring budget and services program coordination. The absence of such coordination has several consequences for actual program operation at the local level and for outcome expectations for the overall program.

In this very complex program with a variety of services and assistance being provided through thousands of agencies throughout the United States, coordination is critical to program efficiency and monitoring for effectiveness. As indicated above, we in Orange County have initiated fairly effective coordination efforts, but we are limited in what we can do since the participating agencies all answer to different masters and mandates. We operate a program administered from the Federal level with no guidance to establish clear responsibilities for specific services in support of a common goal. Overall program accountability is impossible without a coordinated coherent structure.

Recommendations:

1. That the Office of the U. S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs be fully supported in order that the mandate for the development of a uniform Federal policy and overall budget strategy may be carried out.
2. That the State Plans be required to involve Volags in the planning process and that they specify the specific services that Volags will provide within the State for which they may be held accountable.

REFUGEE SUPPORT SERVICES

While we recognize that cash and medical assistance are essential to meeting the temporary support needs of refugees, in our experience support services are the key to an effective resettlement program. Funded agencies in Orange County effect approximately 225 job placements per month. Our Social Services Agency has had a strong commitment to refugee employment services for the past six years and currently effects an average 150 cash assistance case terminations or grant reductions per month.

Our County's experience has also shown that for a refugee service delivery system to be effective in assisting refugees to self-sufficiency, it must be adequately integrated with support services, especially health and social adjustment. Our caseload tracking study revealed that these two support services were highly utilized by the refugees who became self-sufficient. Refugees, like the general population, are more apt to find a job through family or friends than from an employment service. Thus, removal of barriers is critically important. A refugee suffering from a health or adjustment problem will not be able to go to work, no matter how sophisticated our placement efforts.

Adequate health services are not only important for removing barriers to employment, but are critical for maintainance of public health, treating refugees' personal health problems and providing the health education needed as refugees move from the third world to an urban, industrialized society. Prompt initial screening of refugees is essential to maintain treatment started overseas (TB prophylactic treatment must be reinstituted if disrupted - refugees receive only limited medication upon departure from the camps.)

Services funding, however essential, is another area where Federal commitment is questionable. The funding flow has never been regular. Local services have been unnecessarily cut back or disrupted as Federal support services funds have been delayed or held hostage to cover potential shortfalls in cash and medical assistance. These delays have been complicated by the absence of planning figures, making planning at the State and local levels a nightmare.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. The Federal government should provide adequate and regular funding for refugee support services.
2. The proposed amendment to focus funds on employment-related services should not preclude the provision of the support services necessary to remove barriers to employment.
3. The Federal government should establish a policy to declare refugees presumptively eligible for Medicaid (Medi-Cal in California) for the first 90 days after arrival in the U. S. This will assure that delays in Medicaid/Medi-Cal eligibility processing do not prevent prompt TB and health screening

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RELEASES

Mr. Gregory J. Ahart,
Director
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548

Dear Mr. Ahart:

Thank you for sending copies of the GAO draft Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and International Law, House Judiciary Committee, concerning resettlement of Indochinese refugees. ACNS welcomes serious attempts by the government and others to study and propose changes in the organization and administration of refugee programs.

In many ways, ACNS agrees with the general thrust of the GAO Report on Indochinese refugees, and acknowledges a need for more accountability on the part of all who participate in the refugee program. Since the initial summary of the GAO report was issued, ACNS has taken a number of significant steps to ensure that its member agencies uniformly document services provided. Among these are the introduction of a Core Services Checklist to document the delivery of services to all ACNS-sponsored refugees amd the publication of Guidelines For Refugee Services which articulates principles and standards for refugee resettlement.

Still, we must take issue with a number of the assumptions and assertions found in the Report. Our objections concern its underlying theme and focus, the factual accuracy of some of its statements, and some of the conclusions and recommendations drawn.

On a general level, we are concerned with the Report's limited frame of reference. The Report approaches the refugee program as if it were established solely for the purpose of domestic assistance and its conclusions are almost unrelievedly negative. The opening remarks in the Report imply that the overall thrust of the Refugee Act of 1980 is to establish the goal of quick self-sufficiency for refugees. In point of fact, the Refugee Act begins by stating:

> "...the historic policy of the United States is to respond to the urgent needs of persons subject to persecution in their homelands, including, where appropriate, humanitarian assistance for their care and maintenance in asylum areas, efforts to promote apportunities for resettlement or voluntary repatriation, aid for necessary transportation and processing, admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and transitional assistance to refugees in the United States."

Over the past decade, voluntary agencies have rescued over ½ million Indochinese refugees as well as hundreds of thousands of others, including 125,000 Cuban Marielistas who unexpectedly arrived on our shores. As partners with the Federal government, we have responded quickly and effectively in many crisis situations. In citing these facts, we do not mean to deny that problems in the refugee program exist. But, it is necessary to place these short-comings within the context of the humanitarian nature of the program and its success in acheiving its major goal of rescue. This, the GAO report totally fails to do, and thus distorts the purpose and performance of all parties involved in refugee resettlement.

In addition to these contextual concerns, we would like to take issue with several of the over-riding themes of this document. We will reference our comments to specific chapters of the Report.

Chapter 2: Placement of most refugees in few locations...

The GAO report makes reference to the fact that placement decisions are heavily influenced by emphasis on reunification of families and friends, without fully acknowledging that reunification has been the cornerstone not only of the refugee program but of our country's entire immigration policy. It is true that 70% of refugees resettled reside in ten states. It must also be remembered that 80% of our regular immigration flow goes to these states, and that a majority of the total U.S. population also resides there. This means that refugee distribution is not abnormal, and in fact, corresponds with other demographic statistics.

The Report also makes reference to the fact that "traditional sponsorship is on the decline." It would appear that there is some semantic confusion between the word Sponsorship -- a formal responsibility exercised by the voluntary agency -- and the term Help -- an informal yet essential ingredient in the resettlement process. Since ACNS became involved in refugee resettlement, its member agencies have assumed sponsorship responsibility for all cases, whether additional family members reside in the community or not. However, we have always welcomed and encouraged the participation of family members in the resettlement process, particularly in such areas as locating housing, securing furnishings, etc. In cases where such tasks are delegated to willing relatives, we have asked relatives to document their ability to provide these services, and such documentation is included in case records.

Implicit in this chapter is the assumption that placement clusters are bad and that efforts should be made to disperse new arrivals. This is an odd approach for an accounting report to take. Surely, there are advantages as well as drawbacks to clustering, and the real challenge lies in assessing the that in some cases, concentration of ethnic groups generates its own economic activities that benefit both newcomers and the surrounding community. The Khmer Guided Placement Project operated on this assumption. The true task is to study what level of clustering provides optimal results that balance ethnic development and community concerns. We welcome and support further study of the newly implemented Placement Policy. Narrowly focused criticisms of placement issues merely distract attention from what really needs to be done.

Chapter 3: Public assistance plays a major role in initial refugee resettlement.

We acknowledge that public assistance plays a major role in initial refugee resettlement. However, it must be recognized that most refugees are not employment-ready immediately upon arrival in the United States and do require a period of interim support before they can be realistically expected to take and retain jobs. It is important to distinguish between welfare use and welfare dependency. Given the limited nature of the Per Capita Resettlement Grant, the limited availability of entry-level jobs in the current economy, the presence of the waiver of categorical relatedness which makes cash and medical assistance an entitlement to refugees for an 18-month period, a limited and controlled use of the public assistance system would appear inevitable. This does not imply that we seek to make refugees welfare dependent, which speaks to permanent and/or long-term reliance on public dollars, but rather, that we seek to use assistance as a safety net while preparing them for self-sufficiency.

Secondly, the Report makes much of the 67% welfare dependency rate. As Susan Forbes of the Refugee Policy Group pointed out in recent Congressional testimony, the perception that this represents a significant rise in recent years is due to statistical rather than empirical considerations. Like any statistic, the 67% rate is figured as a share of a base population, in this case, poorly educated refugees in the most vulnerable years of their residence in the United States. Rather than dwelling on this figure, efforts should focus on identifying a realistic expectation for self-sufficiency times and rates, and toward gearing programs to acheive this goal. Again, this requires serious analysis of a set of complicated factors, and not suggesting quick answers or pat solutions.

Chapter 4: Insufficient emphasis on employment.

We acknowledge that relatively few refugees find employment shortly after arriving in the United States, and that concerted efforts need to be expended on the part of all involved parties including voluntary agencies, state employment services, and other service providers. There is, however, a methodological question to be raised with regard to the statistics cited in Table 4-1. This table makes no distinction between "employable age" refugees and refugees who are in fact employable. In Cook County, for example, we understand that there is a considerable discrepancy between the number of refugees GAO implies are employable, and those which the Illinois Department of Public Aid (IDPA) had designated as such. Unfortunately, because there was no final debriefing between the GAO auditors and the voluntary agencies and IDPA, it was not possible to rectify this seeming discrepancy in fact in the draft document.

If you would like further clarification of our comments on these important issues, please do not hesitate to contact us. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss the conclusions and recommendations found in this draft prior to the submission of a final document.

Sincerely yours,

Wells C Klein

Wells C. Klein,
Executive Director

WCK/ETM/jrd